Kremlin Suppresses Most Russian Nationalists But Hopes to Control and Use Others, Popkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 9 – “Russian nationalism is entering a new decade in the worst of all possible situations,” Roman Popkov says. Its organizations are banned and most of its leaders are in jail or in exile, but at the same time, the regime is seeking to recruit a new generation of Russian nationalists and use them as witting or unwitting agents of the powers that be.

            In a commentary for the MBK news agency, the Moscow analyst says that after 2014, the Kremlin concluded it had no choice but to crush Russian nationalists lest they form an alliance with liberals and become “the moving force” of a Maidan in Russia (mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/vlast-izmenitsya-a-pozo/

            As a result, “the most important ultra-right political organizations are banned, the most influential leaders are in emigration, in jail or having been freed under the supervision of the special services,” Popov continues.  But now, as the Kremlin worries about problems in the next few years, it is again seeking to control and use Russian nationalism.

            Earlier this year, the Presidential Administration gave approval to plans by “the Orthodox oligarch’ Konstantin Malofeyev” to create a pro-regime Russian nationalist movement (dossier.center/ and openmedia.io/infometer/dvuglavyj-orel-i-pravoslavnye-trolli-kak-mediaimperiya-biznesmena-malofeeva-pytaetsya-zaxvatit-internet/).

            The new movement is intended, Popkov says, to be relatively large and provide both a new wave of “Orthodox trolls” online and “groups of provocateurs” who can be deployed to disrupt and discredit all opposition groups. Older Russian nationalists have not been taken in, but a new, younger generation is at least interested, he continues.

            As Russian nationalist Vladimir Basmanov points out, “those who know about Putin’s crimes against Russians and Ukrainians” view what Malofeyev is trying to do in a very negative way.  “But a new generation of nationalists who do not remember the events of the past … are potentially under threat of influence” from him either as bloggers or as sports enthusiasts.

            Aleksey Levkin of the Russian Center says that “Malofeyev’s people are carrying out work even among pro-Ukrainian ultra-right groups.”  And they are having some success even though such people generally are suspicious of the Kremlin. Malofeyev has promised that their groups will be registered but so far that hasn’t happened.

            Popkov says that his sources say that “the initiative for establishing on the base of the Two-Headed Eagle Society a pro-power nationalist movement came from Konstantin Malofeyev and [only then] was he able to convince the leadership of the country that such a new project would be useful.”

            The Putin regime has a history going back to at least 2005 of trying to penetrate and control Russian nationalist groups. Most of the time it has not had great success, although it did achieve a breakthrough of sorts in 2014 when pro-Kremlin Russian nationalists went to fight in the Donbass, splitting the Russian nationalist movement in two.

            But those who went to fight in Ukraine found that the regime was not prepared to defer to them at home and that they have not benefitted from cooperating with it, Popkov says. Instead, their leaders too have landed in prison or been forced to emigrate – or in the best case, driven into the underground and marginalized.

            Malofeyev may have some success with younger Russian nationalists but he is not going to achieve what he promises and so the future of his effort – or at least of the Kremlin’s support for it – remains uncertain, the MBK commentator concludes.