Orthodox Church Not as Slavishly Subordinate to State or Its Bishops to the Patriarchate as Many Imagine, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 13 – The pandemic and the issue of whether church services should be cancelled to block the spread of infection show that the Russian Orthodox Church is not as subordinate to the Russian state as many have assumed and that the bishops of the church are not as obedient to the patriarch as the church has always maintained, Aleksey Shaburov says.

            In Moscow, after some delay, Patriarch Kirill brought his public position and the actions of churches in the capital he directly controls into   line with the state on the issue of suspending church services, but in the regions, many bishops ignored him and the state in remarkable ways, the Yekaterinburg commentator says (politsovet.ru/66107-koronavirus-protiv-rpc.html).

            In Europe, Shaburov notes, “the issue about the closing of churches was resolved very quickly: they were closed not only in Catholic countries but even in Orthodox Greece.” And church leaders, like Pope Francis, who were seen addressing empty facilities gained in popularity as a result. 

            But in Russia, things haven’t gone so smoothly. Muslims and Jews suspended their religious services immediately. But “the Russian Orthodox Church did not go for that.” During March, the Patriarchate repeatedly declared that it would be impossible to close the churches although it said it was prepared to ensure the safety of parishioners in other ways. 

            But when St. Petersburg’s governor ordered people to stop visiting churches, “the Patriarchate declared that this prohibition violates the constitutional rights of citizens.”  As the number of cases and deaths rose, however, Kirill fell into line with the government and suspended services in the capital.

            Beyond outside the capitals, Kirill’s change of heart did not get all Orthodox bishops to fall in line. In Novosibirsk, the bishop and the governor jointly called for people to attend church; and in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the bishop asked people to come even though the governor was opposed, a difference that sparked a sharp exchange of words between them.

            “This polemic,” Shaburov says, “was complicated by the speeches of local Orthodox activists who denounced the governor and all others who have called for ending collective religious services during the pandemic as “enemies of the church.” One who said this had his post taken down, but he was visited by the police.

            What has occurred, the Politsovet editor says, requires a revision in what most people think about the relations between church and state and about that between the patriarch and his bishops. Clearly, the patriarch sees himself on many issues as at least partially independent of the state; and some of his bishops now feel free to act against his explicit orders.

            There are three reasons the patriarch and his bishops would really prefer to have the churches remain open – spiritual, financial and ideological. Having services is at the center of church life. Palm Sunday and Easter are the times when churches fill and so do collections. And such action risks further exacerbating tensions between liberals and conservatives in the church.

            In recent years, Shaburov says, “the Russian Orthodox Church on the ideological plane has become ever more dependent on the opinion of more conservative circles.” They now set the tone, and they oppose closing the churches for any reason.  If Kirill appeared to eager to follow the state in this, he would have faced even more opposition from that quarter.

            “The status of the Russian Orthodox Church is changing directly in front of our eyes,” Shaburov says. “Political games with the government will not remain without consequences. And how serious these consequences will be depends on the number of infections and deaths from the coronavirus.”