Crimean Tatar Institutions Now a Model for Ethnic Groups without Autonomy in Russia

Paul Goble

Staunton, May 3 -- Ethnic conflicts in most non-Russian republics typically refer to disputes between members of the titular the titular nationality and its language, on the one hand, and local Russians or Russian speakers and Moscow, on the other. But there is another kind, one between subgroups of the titular nationality.

            Mordvinia, a Finno-Ugric republic of some 800,000 people in the Middle Volga, currently features examples of both kinds, a situation in which those of one may very much affect the other, according to a report by the Free Ideal Ural movement (idel-ural.org/archives/бюджетников-мордовии-предупредили-о/).

            The Mordvins are roughly subdivided between the dominant Moksha who form two-thirds of the nation and the Erzya, who form about one third; but because the Moksha are in control of most institutions, the language imbalance in favor of the Moksha against the Erzya is far larger, perhaps ten to one.

            As long as the Mordvins as a whole were a distinct minority, Moscow and Saransk were united in seeking to eliminate these sub-ethnic divisions. But now the Mordvins as a whole have increased from 31 percent in 2002 to 40 percent in 2010 and may top 50 percent this year, while the share of ethnic Russians, long about 60 percent, may become a minority.

            Consequently, Moscow now appears to favor a divide-and-rule game while Saransk sees national unity as in its interests (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/10/ethnic-divisions-among-those-moscow.html). And because the minority Erzyra see this split, they are becoming more active (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/03/first-moksha-blogger-appears-harbinger.html).

            But this greater activism by the Erzya may be playing a trick on the Russian authorities. According to IdelReal commentator Ramazan Alpaut, that ethnic group, which lacks its own state institutions, is copying the system of national representation that has been developed by the Crimean Tatars (idelreal.org/a/30588969.html).

            Two days ago, the Erzya council of elders (Atyan Ezem) adopted a decision to take that step, Bolyaen Syres, the Inzyazor (“senior elder”), says. Under its terms, the leadership of the national movement will be realized by the Promks, a congress of deputies from the Erzyan political parties and social movements. 

            The congress in turn will elect a Council of Elders to serves as the national leadership between meetings and the Council in turn will elect an Inzyazor to speak in the nation’s name, a system that is based on the Crimean Tatar Milli Majlis. Given how many problems that body has created for Moscow, it is not beyond the possibility that the Promks will do the same. 

            “Before the Erzyans stand some serious challenges,” Syres says, including “a strong assimilationist policy, the rapid reduction in the population, and the ignoring by republic and federal powers of our rights and needs.” Individual activists cannot hope to win out but a united nation can.

            “For the nation not to cease its existence,”” he continues, “it isn’t enough to preserve popular traditions in the family,” as the Russian authorities insist. There must be a public face to the nation, and the new body can help ensure that.

            At the end of Soviet times, the Baltic peoples fronts became a model for ethnic mobilization across the USSR. The Erzya appear to be following a similar course by adopting the remarkably successful approach of the Crimean Tatars.