Declining Trust in Kremlin Makes Russian Nationalist Rising More Likely than Liberal One, Kirillova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Even Russian officials acknowledge that the figures they are releasing concerning the pandemic and the economic decline significantly understate the problems, that Russians are very much aware of this, and that this is driving down the amount of trust they have in and support they show for the Kremlin leaders, Kseniya Kirillova says.

            The US-based Russian journalist cites a variety of sources on this trend, but perhaps the most telling is from the Nezygar telegram channel which is known to be connected with the Kremlin’s curator for information policy, Aleksey Gromov who is close to Vladimir Putin (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5EABF9A10B1DC).

            “All polls say,” the channel reports, “that the application of extraordinary measures [to combat the pandemic] isn’t finding support in the population and is capable of fundamentally destroying the ratings of state institutions. They have been falling consistently since March and now this is the main headache in Kremlin offices.”

            Other Russian experts report the same trend, Kirillova continues;  but this “decline in the level of trust in the powers unfortunately doesn’t mean a willingness of the Russian majority to pursue liberal transformations.” Many who don’t trust the regime don’t want it to become a liberal one but rather more Stalinist.

            It is important to keep in mind, she argues, that those who favor that option do so not because they want an aggressive foreign policy but rather because they want a state that provides more social supports and restricts the income inequality which strikes many Russians as fundamentally unjust.

            MBK commentator Yekaterina Neroznikova describes the worldview of one such Russian, her neighbor Ivan: “Vanya doesn’t believe in any viruses because they were dreamed up by the Americans to destroy the economy of our great land. How can one condemn him given that he’s been fed such ideas by [Moscow] TV?” (mbk.news/sences/pandemiya-lzhi-i-repressij/).

            And surveys by the Gumilyev Center show that for the second year in a row, xenophobic attitudes have been growing with 50 percent of the population now favoring the illiberal attitude of “Russia for the ethnic Russians” (gumilev-center.ru/vtorojj-god-podryad-rastut-v-rossii-ksenofobskie-nastroeniya/).

            “Now, given the economic decline and the increase in competition for jobs, combined with fears about the ‘foreign’ origin of the coronavirus, the level of anti-migrant attitudes will only increase,” Kirillova suggests, as will hostility to non-Russians from the Caucasus or Middle Volga whom many Russians view as fundamentally different from themselves.

            “As a result,” she continues, “we have a striking combination: an angry and divided population hostile to both ‘near’ and ‘far’ foreigners, believing in the hostility of the  West and the most absurd conspiracy theories but at the same time ever more distrustful of the current authorities in Russia.”

            Such a consciousness, she says, “in a paradoxical way does not contradict conspiracy thinking and the illusions of ‘a besieged fortress.’ Rather, to the contrary, it harmoniously combines the two and leads to a situation in which ever more residents consider the Kremlin and the Russian oligarchs (and at time Putin himself) as ‘agents’ of the hostile West.”

            Those who feel that way “dream about ‘a real Stalin’ and a genuinely popular government capable of instituting social justice and finally defending Russia from its numerous ‘enemies,’” Kirillova suggests. 

            Up to now, few of these people took part in street protests, “but now given the new limitations and the rapidly worsening epidemiological and economic situation, the number prepared to do so is growing significantly,” a trend that presents special challenges for the special services who are not used to having to fight other than liberal groups.

            “As a result, after years of suppressing ‘intelligentsia’ protest activity,” Kirillova concludes, the special services of the Kremlin “may encounter the much more horrific phenomenon for them of ‘the senseless and pitiless’ Russian rising,” something the intelligentsia has long feared as well.

            Kirillova does not say, but it follows from her analysis that if the possibility of such a Russian “bunt” is growing, at least some among the powers and others among the liberal intelligentsia could converge to try to prevent an outcome that could threaten the interests of both of them.

            If there are any moves in that direction, it will underscore the significance of her insight and change Russian political life at least for a time and possibly for far longer.