The Better a Region was Doing Before Sanctions, The Harder It has been Hit by Them, Zubarevich Says

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 16 – Natalya Zubarevich, an economic geographer at Moscow State University, makes an important and consequential point that is often lost sight of both in Russia and in the West: the better any particular Russian region was doing before the West imposed sanctions, the harder they have hit it.

            Federal subjects in the Russian Federation which depended on exports of raw materials or on the import of key components for their industries have been hit hard by the sanctions regime, Zubarevich says. Those, mostly agricultural which largely didn’t depend on either, have been must less seriously affected (reforum.io/blog/2022/06/16/kakie-regiony-stradayut-ot-vojny/).

            The stronger, more developed and more advanced a region or city and the more it was linked to the global economy, Zubarevich says, the more it has felt sanctions and suffered economically. The situation for “backward” agrarian regions, in contrast, has been much better, she suggests.

            “Agricultural business has been maintained, pensions are indexed, and people in these regions had not yet learned about advanced medicines. They cured themselves” if they could “with aspirin.” As a result, these areas viewed until recently as backwaters are doing relatively better and feel less anger than do more advanced ones.

            Of course, this divide exists not only among regions but within regions and even within cities, Zubarevich says. Those which were doing less well are now doing relatively better; and those that were doing better are doing relatively worse, changing the attitudes of both about the situation they find themselves in.

            But over time, the economic geographer suggests, those doing relatively better will be pulled down by the decline in purchasing power of those that had been doing better; and the entire country will thus suffer economic stagnation or decline for many years because any “winners” now will be “losers” as well in the future.

            Zubarevich does not discuss this aspect of the situation, but those imposing sanctions in the hopes of changing Russian behavior need to recognize that her point very much is that sanctions have hit those parts of the Russian economy most likely to be integrated with and supportive of ties with the West and less likely to hit those less tied to it.

            That works, at least for a time, to the Kremlin’s benefit; but it may mean that groups that thought ties with the West were a positive thing may be among the first to conclude the opposite, a shift that Vladimir Putin and his regime are certain to try to exploit.