Russia’s Federalization Requires Weakening of Moscow Because Federal Subjects are Too Diverse to Form Alliance among Themselves, Busygina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 15 – The federalization of Russia will be extremely difficult but it won’t happen at all unless there is a significant weakening of Moscow since the federal subjects beyond the ring road are too diverse to form an alliance among themselves and the leaders of most will adapt to the rules Moscow sets as long as Moscow sets them, Irina Busygina says.

            The Russian expert on federalism at Harvard’s Davis Center argues that “the regions aren’t victims; they are agents of the Kremlin. They are integrated in this pllitical system, and tey have learned to live by its rules” (idelreal.org/a/chto-voyna-menyaet-v-otnosheniyah-kremlya-i-regionov-obyasnyaet-ekspert-iz-garvarda-irina-busygina/33702106.html).

            What is especially important, Busygina says, is that “any alternative [to the existing system] is more dangerous and more risky than the current status quo. Therefore, this status quo will be preserved” in the absence of some serious shock. The current system can’t be modified; it can only be demolished and a new one put in its place, a difficult task.

            “All projects for the future transformation of Russia call for federalism,” she continues, a system which requires democracy and thus requires Russia to escape from its authoritarian paradigm. And that in turn requires a change in how relations between the center and the regions are viewed.

            Most Russians see the issue being one of a strong center or strong regions; but in fact, Busygina argues, they both must be strong and must achieve that by negotiations and an agreement, something no one at this point of time is in a position to call for in any serious way let alone achieve.

            The biggest obstacle is that Moscow is for the time being a personalist dictatorship in which one man balances the interests of various political groups in the capital and in which the regions are too diverse to come together because it is easy for Moscow to play one or more of them off against the others.

            As a result, the construction of real federalism while possible and desirable for Russia is “more complicated than in another country.” It requires a shock to the center in which the leader loses the ability to play the role of arbiter and to the federal subjects which can then develop ties with one or another group in the capital.

            When the center is weakened, “the regions must cease to be a conservative force which are are now. They must formulate their own interests together as a coalition and not as a sinel region distancing themselves from Moscow because doing that is simly political suicide and perhaps, even not political but physical.”

            “In Russia, there is a great deal of imperial heritage, but Russia undoubtedly is not a classic empire,” Busygina suggests. “But it uses ‘empire-like’ institutions. The absence of horizontal coordination among the subjects of the federation, among the territories, is a typical sign of empire.”

            As she and her co-author Mikhail Filippov argued in a 2024 article, she argues, the Putin system has suffered a certain “erosion” since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine. Governors can no longer be simple technocrats but must become public politicians to explain things to their people. That is a breeding ground for a new kind of regional leader.

            But even such leaders continue to play by the rules because that is the only “rational” strategy,” Busygina contends. Only if Moscow weakens will there be a real chance for change. And even Putin’s departure may not be sufficient to cause that to happen because “this sytem cannot be reformed – it can only be dismantled.”