Trial of Seven Ingush Protest Leaders Shifted from One Russian City to Another

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – Even before the first day of the trial, the authorities shifted the venue from one Russian city (Kislovodsk) to another (Essentuki), ostensibly to provide more room for family members given pandemic distancing requirements but clearly yet another effort by the powers that be to limit any show of support for these political prisoners.

            But that was not the end of the problems with this case today. The witnesses who were supposed to show up didn’t, and so the session which lasted 4.5 hours was devoted to listening to prosecutors read from some of the 120 volumes of evidence investigators and prosecutors have gathered (fortanga.org/2020/12/svideteli-obvineniya-po-delu-ingushskih-aktivistov-ne-yavilis-v-sud/).

            Lawyers for the defendant expect that the case will last over 15 to 20 work days, although if witnesses don’t show up or there are other problems, those days could extend over many weeks. What the powers that be do not seem to understand is that the longer this goes on and the more judicial errors and political moves surface, the angrier the Ingush are likely to become.

            It is bad enough that Moscow and Magas not only insist on having the trials outside the borders of the Ingush Republic and continue to make charges for which there is no evidence aside from anonymous witnesses. But it is even worse when officials can’t even manage to have their own witnesses show up.

            As Magomed Mutsolgov, chairman of the Ingush NGO Coordinating Council, warned in open letters to Moscow and Magas, if the two government’s don’t intervene to stop what is becoming a farce, the trust that the Ingush people have in the two of them, already low, will collapse altogether (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/11/putin-kalimatov-warned-ingush-trust-in.html).

            If that happens, mass protests in Ingushetia could soon resume; and they would likely be more radical both in their behavior and their demands than anything the powers that be have had to contend with up to now. In that event, the powers would have to decide whether to come down even harder or make concessions that could calm the situation.

            The former is more likely, of course, but a feint in the direction of the latter may nonetheless occur, given that neither Moscow nor Magas can easily afford the emergence of yet another hot spot within the current borders of the Russian Federation.

Putin’s Fascist Constitutional Coup Now Analogous to Stolypin’s a Century Ago, Skobov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – This year, through his amendments to the constitution and related actions, Vladimir Putin has carried out a constitutional coup analogous to but even worse than Petr Stolypin did in June 1907 when he gutted the democratic gains the Russian people had extracted from the monarchy, Aleksandr Skobov says.

            And although the Russian analyst does not underline the point, it will be recalled that while Stolypin’s moves brought a certain temporary stability to Russia on the eve of World War II, they ultimately set the stage for developments that led to the revolutions of 1917 which destroyed the monarchy.

            The amendments Putin and his team pushed through did not simply allow the Kremlin leader to remain in power for life, Skobov says; they “strengthened authoritarian aspects of the state system of Russia today and inserted into it openly totalitarian ones” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5FC4E0B5B1D77).

            As such, the amendments both reflected the process of the ongoing transformation of the Putin regime “from a relatively soft authoritarianism (‘imitation-manipulative democracy’) toward a harshly authoritarian one” that opens the way to “’a new totalitarianism’” but accelerated this trend in the process.

            But Putin’s goals are not simply authoritarian but fascist; “and although this fascist state still remains not completely put in place, the aspects of fascism which from the beginning have been part of the Putin regime are becoming ever more obvious,” including a forced return of a modernized society to archaic forms, reaction and the destruction of democracy.

            Indeed, Skobov argues, Putin’s coup from above “bears not simply a reactionary and anti-democratic character but is an important milepost on the profess of the movement of his regime toward fascism.”

            The amendments did not simply allow him to remain in power but brought the country to “a qualitatively new level by freeing the powers that be from legal limitations” and sending a message to all the cogs of the regime that they can act without regard to the law as long as they follow the orders from the leader.

            What is especially disturbing, the Russian analyst says, is that “there was practically no resistance” to this fascist coup.” Many felt there was nothing they could do, but the opposition did not use even those opportunities for protest which the regime has left it. And that lack of opposition only emboldened the Kremlin to go further.

            “The purge of people who have been critical of the existing regime began in scholarly and educational institutions.” And it was made clear that those with opposition views could not expect to make a successful career anywhere. Still worse, the regime demanded not just passive support but active and enthusiastic statements in favor of its actions.

            “The purely totalitarian mechanism of mass political mobilization is being reborn with mass involvement of citizens in active measures directed at the political support of the regime, including steps to force others to display their loyalty.” The opposition could and should have at least denounced this but it hasn’t.

            Today, Skobov insists, Russia needs people who will speak out against what is going on and awaken the Russian nation to the threat they are now facing. Such people must deliver three messages, he argues.

·         First and foremost, such activists must remind everyone that Putin and his associates are “criminals who have carried out a fascist state coup. Their power is illegal, and they must be removed from office and handed over to the courts.”

·         Second, Russia must go back to the 1993 constitution with modifications that will eliminate its presidentialist elements and establish genuine federalism, including the right of regions and republics to decide to leave if they want to.

·         And third, those who recognize this must ostracize all who work in support of these fascists and occupiers. Russian society must learn to display “absolute moral intolerance to such collaborationism.”

Pandemic Claiming More Collateral Victims Because of Putin’s Healthcare Optimization, Uchaykina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – Elena Uchaykina, the wife of a diabetic who may face amputation because the hospital that had been treating him has been repurposed for coronavirus victims, says that he is just one of many collateral victims of a healthcare system that was downsized earlier by Vladimir Putin to save money and now can’t cope with the pandemic.

            Because of her husband’s travails, the journalist says, she began exploring the broader issue of collateral victims of the pandemic in Russia. The authorities said cancer patients would suffer first because their treatments could be postponed. That has been true, but many other Russians suffering from other diseases are now at risk as well (apn.ru/index.php?newsid=38946).

            She reports case after case of such losses and argues that “the collapse of the [Russian] healthcare system has an obviously systemic character.” It is not, as the regime claims, in good shape but stressed. It is fundamentally inadequate to deal with those who need medical care even if they are not suffering from the coronavirus.

            And she cites some disturbing statistics. Russian deaths are up this year far more than can be accounted for by coronavirus losses even if one doubles what the authorities acknowledge in that case. Many of the tens of thousands of excess deaths are the direct result of the healthcare optimization program that deprived those now dead of getting adequate treatment.

            In too many places, Uchaykina continues, all other illnesses are being treated as if they did not exist because the regime is focusing now only on the pandemic. But many Russians have illnesses like diabetes, cancer and circulatory ailments that if left untreated will mean that many will suffer more or even die. 

            But there is yet another set of victims in this situation, she writes. In many hospitals, administrators restrict the access of relatives of patients who are not suffering from the coronavirus because they have put in place restrictions on contacts between coronavirus victims and their relatives and have simply extended these to all patients.

            That makes it worse for the patients and for their families and friends, even if it makes things easier for hospital administrators and medical personnel. And many of these relatives and friends are now expressing their outrage both in letters and calls to officials and, given the unresponsiveness of these, online – and behind each of these are thousands who stay silent.

            According to Uchaykina, ever fewer Russians are willing to do that. Instead, they can see that their government has no intention of helping them unless they happen by the luck of the draw to get sick with the disease of the moment. Otherwise, they will be allowed to suffer and die.

            “The right to receive medical assistance is a basic one, paid for by out taxes and ensured by the Constitution,” she continues. It is time to demand that the powers that be recognize that right and take steps to make sure it is real as opposed to a propagandist illusion. Otherwise, the number of collateral victims of the coronavirus pandemic will continue to grow.

           

Moscow Urged to Reopen Military Airfield in Stepanakert – A Reasonable Move or Russian Mission Creep?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – Moscow military analyst Stanislav Tarasov has urged that Moscow restore to full operational capacity the military airport at Stepanakert in order to supply the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the region and to be prepared for any contingencies including a deterioration of the security environment across the region, including in Iran.

            On the one hand, Tarasov’s argument seems reasonable given that supplying the Russian peacekeepers without such an airport will require flights into Azerbaijan proper and use of heavy trucks over roads that at present are both long and in poor repair (regnum.ru/news/polit/3128598.html).

But on the other, the Regnum analyst couches his arguments in terms of broader issues, not only involving the interest of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the unblocking of routes crossing the territory of each other but also concerns about American intervention in the area and new Iranian activity, arguments that suggest that this may be an example of mission creep.

According to the November 10 declaration, Russian peacekeepers are strictly limited in number and length of time in the region, but Tarasov’s comments raise concerns among those who fear that Moscow has no intention of limiting itself to the declaration’s provisions but will use its forces for broader purposes and over a much longer period.

If Moscow officials pick up or act on proposals like Tarasov’s, that is likely to become a source of new tensions in the region, involving not only Azerbaijan and Armenia but Iran and Turkey as well – and at least potentially involving any Western powers that may become involved there.

At present, Tarasov says, Moscow and Baku have agreed to Russia’s supplying its contingent via Azerbaijani airfields and then roads into the region. That is more secure than flights over Georgia given that Tbilisi, possibly under pressure from the United States, may at some point withdraw its approval of Russian overflights of its territory.

But the routing of Russian materiel through Azerbaijan is far from ideal, Tarasov continues, as the two roads the equipment could be carried on are long – 646 kilometers and 728 kilometers – and in bad repair. Baku won’t object to this arrangement because it benefits from the unblocking of the route between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan.

Despite that, however, Iran and the West may become more active in the region, and consequently, Tarasov argues, Moscow would be well-advised to reopen the military field near Stepanakert so that it won’t have to depend on the approval of countries in the region and will be prepared for any contingency.

That sounds less like a recommendation based on current needs than the advocacy of an expanded role for the Russian peacekeepers in the region, one that will likely look to many involved as the kind of mission creep Moscow’s involvement in conflicts beyond its borders is notorious.

Politics, Not Science Said Dominating Kremlin’s Response to Pandemic, Undermining Its Effectiveness

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – A major reason why the Kremlin has had so little success in fighting the pandemic is that in contrast to earlier public health crises, it has been listening not to scientists but to political technologists who worry more about imagery than about curing people, medical expert Konstantin Yemeshin says (regnum.ru/news/3128077.html).

            Indeed, Rosbalt commentator Sergey Shelin says, the top leadership of the country has shown itself in many ways to be incapable of dealing with a crisis, something he suggests will limit its ability to cope not only with phenomena like the coronavirus but policy issues across the board (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2020/11/30/1875579.html).

            Today, Russian officials reported the registration of 26,338 new infections and 368 new deaths. Both figures are down slightly but likely reflect the impact of fewer examinations over the weekend than any turning of the corner, given that the pandemic continues to surge most places (t.me/COVID2019_official/2083 and regnum.ru/news/society/3128044.html).

            But a new independent examination of health statistics suggest that 75,000 Russians have died from the coronavirus, roughly twice as many as the government says (znak.com/2020-11-30/mediazona_v_kovidnyh_bolnicah_rf_s_aprelya_umerli_pochti_75_tys_chelovek_eto_v_dva_raza_bolshe_ofici).

            Officials in many places outside of Moscow announced new restrictions today, while those in Moscow did not (regnum.ru/news/society/3128044.html and

echo.msk.ru/news/2750550-echo.html).The central government did say it was allotting 10 billion more rubles (130 million US dollars) to pay medical personnel involved in fighting the pandemic (regnum.ru/news/3129020.html).

            On the vaccine front, medical specialists said that mass production of the Sputnik-5 vaccine would begin only in the spring, citing the difficulties of manufacturing as the cause of the delay (regnum.ru/news/3128418.html and regnum.ru/news/3128341.html). They also reported that once vaccinated, Russians will become immune 42 days later (regnum.ru/news/3128381.html).

            A sharp debate broke out among economists over whether the government has done enough to help business, whether unemployment will increase or not, and when the economy and personal incomes will recover, with the pessimists outweighing the optimists at least in the central media (regnum.ru/news/3128868.html, regnum.ru/news/3128780.html, regnum.ru/news/3128771.html, regnum.ru/news/3128767.html, regnum.ru/news/3128762.html, regnum.ru/news/3128239.html and svpressa.ru/economy/article/282622/).

            Although he said the Kremlin does not plan additional assistance to business, Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the Russian authorities are in “constant dialogue” with the business community about how best to respond to the pandemic and other challenges (regnum.ru/news/3128543.html).

            Meanwhile, in other pandemic-related developments in Russia today,

·         The percentage of Russians who report experiencing fraud online has jumped from 25 percent last March to 54 percent now, a reflection of more fraud and more use of the Internet (regnum.ru/news/3128112.html).

·         A Siberian virologist who reported that he had recorded coronavirus re-infections has attacked Moscow officials who say that there are no cases of that in the Russian Federation (siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/virology-professor-hits-back-at-russian-chief-doctors-claim-of-no-covid-19-reinfection-cases/).

·         A strict regime prison camp near Murmansk has become a coronavirus hotspot, with 24 confirmed cases of the infection. Experts say that the situation there is especially dangerous because the quality of medical care for inmates is so low (severreal.org/a/30962306.html).

Yegor Ligachev Marks 100th Birthday

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – Today, Yegor Ligachev reached a milestone no other member of the Soviet Politburo ever did: he celebrated his 100^th birthday, prompting Russians to recall his role in perestroika and his opposition to Boris Yeltsin, to whom he once addressed the now famous words, “Boris, you are not right,” your policies are destructive not constructive.

            Born in Novosibirsk Oblast in 1920, Ligachev graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1943 and the Higher Party School in 1949. He began his rise through the Soviet leadership in the Komsomol and then the CPSU, before being dropped as a party secretary and removed from the Politburo in 1990.

            After 1991, Ligachev served as a member of the KPRF central committee between 1993 and 2013 and as a member of the Duma between 1999 and 2003. In 2013 after heart surgery, he retired from public life, surfacing again only in 2018 when he urged that the airport in Tomsk not be named for him (newizv.ru/news/society/29-11-2020/avtoru-slov-boris-ty-ne-prav-egoru-ligachevu-ispolnilos-100-let).

Do Russians Now Favor Heavier Taxes on Those with Higher Incomes?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – Vladimir Putin’s signing into law a small additional tax on those making more than five million rubles (70,000 US dollars) is supported by two-thirds of all Russians, certainly a reflection of the propensity of many of them to support whatever the Kremlin does but possibly also a sign some are ready to tax the better off more heavily.

            For most of the post-Soviet period, Russians have favored a flat tax on all incomes, an arrangement that has allowed those at the top of the income pyramid to do far better even as it has cost the state the resources it would need to be able to address the problems of those further down.

            But the pandemic has changed attitudes, and a new survey by the SuperJob service finds that Russians, especially older Russians, now support raising taxes on the rich in order to maintain or improve services for everyone else. Many higher income Russians also support raising taxes on themselves (krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/82064).

            Those who oppose the boost in taxes on the better off argue that such taxes will hit not only corporate managers and industrial titans but those who work in professions, such as airline passengers, where such pay compensates both for the additional training such jobs require and the greater risks they entail.

            But in one indication that more Russians are ready to support higher taxes on the better off is this: some of those SuperJob spoke with suggested that the Kremlin action was clearly designed to deceive the people that the powers were now doing something real. After all, these respondents said, Putin’s new tax is small and affects fewer than one Russian in 100.