With Norwegian Seizure of Russian Ship, Svalbard Controversy Heats Up Again

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Russians have expressed outrage at the decision of a Norwegian court to detain a Russian ship in Svalbard (Spitzbergen) in fulfillment of a 2023 decision of the international criminal court to compensate a Ukrainian company for Russian seizures of its assets, a court decision that Moscow has ignored.

Vladimir Putin called the decision of the Norwegian court at the end of August and the actions of Svalbard police in carrying it out an act of “state terrorism” with others in Moscow demanding a tough response. So far, however, the Russian government has limited itself to appealing the decision and diplomatic protests.

            The passengers have been offloaded and will be returned to Russia, while the crew remains onboard. Whether Moscow will take further action very much remains to be seen (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/cuzezemcy-v-forme-i-spicbergen-russkaa-zemla-cto-proishodit-posle-aresta-professora-molcanova-na-arhipelage-i-v-rossijskih-media/457304).

            This is the latest chapter in the long-running story of Russian efforts to test the resolve of NATO on the archipelago that has a complicated treaty arrangement that Moscow has exploited to the fullest in the past and that some think will be the place where Russia will move first against NATO (jamestown.org/moscow-using-svalbard-to-test-natos-readiness-and-resolve/ and jamestown.org/moscows-first-move-against-nato-could-take-place-in-norways-svalbard-archipelago/).

            The ship in question, the Professor Molchanov, is identified by the Russians as a research vessel; but over the past two years, it has brought workers, tourists, and others to the islands to see just how far Russia can push the limits. (On that history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/moscow-organizes-summer-school-in.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/russian-victory-day-ceremony-on.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/03/russian-company-on-svalbard-hoists.html.)  

Russian Firms in Far East Registering in China to Escape High Taxes and Get Cheaper Loans

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – Firms in the Russian Far East are now registering their head offices in China in order to escape higher Russian taxes and to gain access to loans from Chinese banks that are now being offered at far lower rates, business leaders in the region tell Vedomosti.

            The exact number of such firms and their total size is not publicly known; but this shift is ongoing and almost certainly gives Beijing yet more leverage over the Russian Far East (vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2026/09/04/1226136-malii-biznes-rasskazal-o-peremanivanii-dalnevostochnih-kompanii-v-kitai).

            It isn’t always easy for firms to take or maintain this status given the complexities of Russian business law, but Moscow seems unwilling or even unable to block such moves entirely. And as more take place, there is likely to be a backlash given that firms that do more to China will cost the Russian government tax revenue and Russian banks earnings.  

Russia’s Standup Comedians Now Hiring Lawyers to Advise Them about Jokes that Could Land them in Jail, ‘The Insider’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Today, Russia’s standup comedians are hiring lawyers to review their material in advance lest they cross some as yet poorly defined line of the permissible and land in jail, Valentina Matryonina says. And audiences too want these comedians to avoid political jokes as well lest they be recorded and those listening get in trouble too.

            While many Russian standup comedians left in 2022, others did not and some who went abroad have returned, the Insider journalist says. The world they live in now resembles that of humorists at the end of Soviet times but the rules are less clear and constantly changing (theins.ru/confession/296457).

            As these humorists note, “there is no concept of ‘a sense of humor’” in the Russian criminal code; and so they need help in figuring out what will offend some group or officials and avoid those things just as they now avoid any criticism of Putin or his war in Ukraine because those are very dangerous things to speak about.

            Audiences generally accept that as they are there to be entertained more than anything else. Consequently, the demand for political humor has fallen as well, even when it is expressed by hints or Aesopian language as was the case before glasnost, standup comedians with whom Matyonina spoke say.

            In many cases, the organizer of the sessions insist on reading the standup comedians’ texts and “delete everything that is impossible.” Sometimes this leads to absurdities. One comedian had to drop a joke about “the services of women on call for money.” He meant nurses but the bosses said he had to “reformulate it so there is no hint of prostitutes.”

            One group of standup comedians gets away with things none of the others can: those who are still in their teens. “Because they are not taken seriously,” one older comedian says, “they get away with a lot.” But if they continue to use the same jokes when they are over 18, “the consequences can be quite different.”

            As a result of increasing repression, what the comedians say and what audiences want is narrowing. All this recalls a joke that was widespread among Russians at the very end of the USSR: When things are bad, the joke ran, they told political jokes; but when things got worse, they stopped. 

Neither Rising Age of First-Time Mothers Nor War in Ukraine has Any Significant Impact on Russia’s Birthrate, Independent Demographer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – Neither the rising age of first-time mothers nor the war in Ukraine has had any significant impact on the birthrate in the Russian Federation, Aleksey Raksha says, despite Putin’s insistence that the first is critical and his opponent’s equally firm belief that the second is playing a major role.  

            According to the former Rosstat expert who now is an independent demographer, changes that can be attributed to either of these fall “within the margin of error” and thus are not behind the decline in Russian fertility (thereplica.io/post/demograf-aleksei-raksha-o-zayavleniyakh-vladimira-putina-o-prichinakh-nizkoi-rozhdaemosti-v-rossii).

            And despite the alarm expressed by Putin and other Russian politicians and commentators, Raksha says, “Russia’s current fertility rate is not exceptionally low compared to European countries.” Instead, it is “a perfectly average European level,” although Russia births still occur at a younger age than European ones do.

The demographer says that the age when women have their first child in Russia is 26.5, not the 29 years Putin has claimed; and the Russian figure while rising remains “one of the youngest” in Europe.  “Only Ukraine and Moldova now have lower ages” for when a woman first gives birth.

According to Raksha, the figure of 29 years cited by Putin is incorrect. "The calculation provided to him was wrong. It isn't 29 years; it's approximately 26.5." "This is one of the youngest ages for having a first child in all of Europe. Only Ukraine and Moldova have lower ages," he says.

While Russia is “roughly at or slightly above” this age metric among comparable countries for the first child, “it is noticeably below the average for the second. For the third, Russia ranks among the leaders … and for the fourth, Russia holds the top spot among this group of countries, including the US.”

Encouraging women to have a second child is both the most important and most difficult task Moscow faces in order to boost birthrates. After the first child is born, parents can see the impact on their lives and thus often are unwilling to have a second, Raksha’s analysis suggests. 

Russian Firms Less Likely to Hire Those who Took Bonuses to Fight in Ukraine than Those who Didn’t, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 –Russian firms are less likely to hire those who took bonuses and signed contracts to fight in Ukraine than those who went there after being drafted, according to research conducted by Sergey Alekseyev, published in the Journal of Peace on August 25 and now republished by the Russian-language Riddle portal.

            The Russian scholar who teaches in Australia says that this is not “proof” of anti-war attitudes among employers but rather likely reflects concerns among then about “exposure to violence or trauma, concerns about workplace adjustment, and [an association of] volunteary enlistment to financial desperation of ideological zeal” (ridl.io/ru/geroj-na-bumage-minus-v-rezyume/ resposting academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjag064/8769484).

            What Alekseyev and  his research colleagues did was to send 120 fake but plausible applications to employers which were similar except for the cv line about military service with 60 declaring that they had signed contracts to serve in Ukraine and 60 saying that they had served as draftees.

            The differences in the response of potential employers was “stark,” Alekseyev says. Fifty-five percent of those who said they had served as draftees got callbacks while only 36.7 percent of those who said they were volunteers did no, “exactly one-third” fewer than the applications which said they had been draftees.

            This research was carried out in the late spring and over the summer, when Russia’s official unemployment level was at an all-time low of 2.2 percent, but before the introduction by regional governments of requirements that firms hire a certain number of veterans or face fines.

            Alekseyev’s overall conclusion is that “the Kremlin can flatten distinctions in official speech while civilian behavior restores them given that employers appear to distinguish between service and choice and between putting on a uniform and volunteering for the campaign” in Ukraine.

            The new  regional quotas for hiring veterans, the scholar says, “may suppress the visible consequences of that distinction but may also conceal rather than eliminate it” – and that is yet another consequence of Putin’s war in Ukraine on Russia that is likely to last long into the future.

Few Russians are Prepared to Call Putin a Criminal but Most are Now Ready to Label Him Incompetent, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 4 – What has been happening on the front lines in Ukraine and across Russia itself has not led many Russians to call Putin criminal – for the present, that is simply “too much,” Abbas Gallyamov says; but it has led a majority of them to conclude that he is incompetent and that in itself is eroding his support.

            According to the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic, that is because “Putin ever more strongly recalls a religious fanatic: his struggle with the West looks ever more like a real crusade; and fanaticism from the point of view of the public is the opposite of competence” (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/11066 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/putin-vsyo-silnee-napominaet-religioznogo-fanatika).

            For most Russians as for most other people, Gallyamov continues, “a competent man thinks soberly and dispassionately; a fanatic however is not capable of either. And the latter, even if he doesn’t shout with bulging eyes like Hitler, still harbors a fixation which prevents him from viewing things in an adequate way.”

            Russians can now see that in Putin and it is why they are expressing less and less confidence in him. A recognition of incompetence by elites and masses can even be the start of his fall, something that has been true in the case of other leaders who have demonstrated their incompetence as well.

            Gallyamov sums up the situation by referring to the classic Soviet film about Stirlitz, the Russian spy in Nazi Germany, who was once told by “a wide Nazi general” that “fanatics can win at first, but they will never achieve a victory because they will get tired of themselves” and thus act in ways that will preclude such an outcome.  

Ingushetia Plays Down 1992 War with North Ossetia but is Worried Enough about That Clash to Bring in Police from Vladivostok to Man Border Post

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 2 – The 1992 border war between Ingushetia and North Ossetia has been forgotten by many, but it is still very much on the minds of Ingush who were forced to flee. The Ingush authorities this year have played it down in the hopes of avoiding protests, but they have been worried enough to bring in police from Vladivostok to man border post.

            The independent Ingush portal Fortanga noted that no senior official or government media outlet used the occasion of the day of memory of MIAs to recall the 1992 clashes in the Prigorodny district, an issue that still roils Ingush society (fortanga.org/2026/09/vlasti-ingushetii-ne-vspomnili-o-zhertvah-tragedii-v-prigorodnom-rajone-v-mezhdunarodnyj-den-propavshih-bez-vesti/).

              Just how much those events of more than 30 years ago do affect the thinking of Ingush, however, was implicitly recognized by those same officials when they brought in police from Vladivostok in the Russian Far East to guard the border post between the two republics (fortanga.org/2026/08/chermenskij-post-na-granicze-ingushetii-i-osetii-budut-ohranyat-policzejskie-iz-vladivostoka/).

              The commanders of these Russian units and the Ingush government not surprisingly presented this decision as one intended only to block illegal flows of goods and to protect the population, but there can be little doubt that these outside forces were brought in to prevent any protests about 1992 and the unresolved problems the war left behind.

              Ingushetia has brought in police from the Russian Far East before when it has felt threatened by popular protests; but analysts said that this earlier move had proved counterproductive because it had shown the Ingush people they remain part of an empire (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/06/moscows-use-in-ingushetia-of-police.html).

              What has happened in Ingushetia is a useful reminder of both how people who have suffered conflicts do not soon forget them however much the authorities try to encourage that and also how these authorities simultaneously refuse to address these problems and instead use outsiders to repress their own people and maintain their reputation in Moscow.

              In this case, it may also be that Magas doesn’t trust its own security forces, a reasonable view given that a group of Ingush police broke with Magas over the protests about the deal with Grozny that gave away a large portion of Ingush land. (On that case and its resonance, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/european-court-to-take-up-case-of-13.html.)  

              While attention to Ingushetia has declined since the end of the protests in 2019-2020 and the subsequent trial of the Ingush Seven, these latest reports from Magas suggest that the situation there is anything but calm and stable and that the authorities both in the Ingush capital and Moscow are worried.