Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 16 – Many in the
West assume that Russians who turn to the Internet instead of
government-controlled media will become more liberal as a result, but in fact,
a new study finds, Internet use by Russians has an impact much like that in
other countries: by their choice of sites, surfers seek and gain reinforcement
for positions they already have.
Consequently, while Russian liberals
who use the Internet may become more liberal, their views being reinforced and
validated by the sites they visit, Russian conservatives, nationalists, and
communists who go online and visit very different sites have analogous
experiences with their views being reinforced and validated rather than
challenged.
To the extent this is the case, the
Internet may exacerbate divisions within society, but it is unlikely to serve
as the magic wand many have imagined it to be, especially given that Moscow
appears to understand this and is simultaneously promoting nationalist and
conservative sites even as it is seeking to block or otherwise restrict liberal
ones.
In a report on this issue, Dmitry
Novikov, a researcher at the Moscow Center for Scientific Political Thought and
Ideology, argues that “the political map of the Russian segment of the Internet
[is currently] a reflection of the quality of government administration” (rusrand.ru/analytics/politicheskaja-karta-rossijskogo-segmenta-interneta-kak-otrazhenie-kachestva-gosudarstvennogo-upravlenija).
Since
the end of the USSR, the government has not been able to fill the ideological
vacuum that opened up. Instead, a variety of groups have sought to provide one.
Not surprisingly, the Internet reflects this, and because only 40 percent of
Russians now go on line, the impact of the net in this regard will only grow as
more people use it.
It
is already the case that the Internet is becoming more important than other
means of the dissemination of information, he says, and it is likely that the
2012 election was the last presidential vote in Russia in which “television
agitation will play a greater role than agitation campaigns in the Internet.”
But
“in the information marketplace, supply does not always correspond to demand,”
Novikov continues. “The political preferences of Russians are varied and
inconstant, and those things too find their reflection in the Internet,” with a
wide variety of sides offering a wide variety of positions.
Research
shows, he says, that “the most visited political Internet resources which undoubtedly
exert a significant influence on the formation of public opinion as a rule are
not distinguished by neutrality.” Instead, they are partisans of one or another
position, and Russians go to those whose views most closely align to their own.
The
most visited sites are those associated with conventional media outlets, he
says, and “usually these are either sites of a conservative direction which
support the authorities in office or liberal web resources which are filled
with anti-government rhetoric.” At present, the former predominate, and many of
the latter are closing or shifting away from their former positions.
Data
about how many visitors this or that site has are notoriously unreliable, but
both special surveys and reviews of expert opinion suggest that those sites
which support the government or back nationalist positions attract more visitors
than do those liberal sites which oppose the regime.
Novikov
and his colleagues divide the Internet population among communists,
nationalists, liberals, national patriots or imperialists, and supporters of
the authorities. “All these ideological groups without exception” focus on
domestic problems and challenges, but increasingly international issues are
becoming dominant on liberal and pro-government sites.
And
that trend, he suggests, points to the emergence of “a new social group” in
Russia: people who earlier placed their hopes on the government but who are now
disappointed with it and who are increasingly interested in the creation of a
just and anti-oligarchic society based on traditional values.
That is something that the
Russian government must either respond to or struggle against, Novikov
suggests, noting that the authorities are currently devoting enormous efforts
so as “not to lose the information war including on the world wide web.” But until Moscow develops a “single
ideological project,” the Internet will highlight divisions within Russian
society.
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