Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 10 – Many ethnic
Russians in the Baltic countries think that they can function perfectly
normally there because they speak the languages and get along with their
coworkers and neighbors, but that just shows they do not understand the
situation, Vladimir Ilich Linderman says, and Moscow must intervene to show
them what is really the case.
Linderman, an ethnic Russian from
Latvia who has been a member of the National Bolshevik Party since 1997, argues
on the “Svobodnaya Pressa” portal today that “among a significant portion of
Russians living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, there is no
understanding of the nature and logic of nationalism” (svpressa.ru/society/article/114984/).
Many Russians in Latvia, for
example, see their situation approximately as follows: “I am a Russian; I was
born in Riga. Among my acquaintances and colleagues are many Latvians. We have
normal relations and no conflicts on an inter-ethnic basis. Sometimes we speak
Latvian, and sometimes Russian.”
“Not long ago,” say those who feel
this way, “I helped fix my Latvian neighbor’s car, and his wife shared with
mine some recipes. I do not understand where all this antagonism is coming
from. It must be being promoted by politicians for their interests. But simple
people simply suffer as a result.”
Such a perspective, Linderman says,
is mistaken because “it does not distinguish and confuses two levels of
relations between people which we can conditionally call ‘everyday life’ and ‘ideological.’
Successful cooperation at the everyday level,” he insists, “in no way
guarantees mutual understanding at the level of ideology.”
According to the Latvian Russian publicist, “the
very same Latvian who shares her recipes with a Russian almost certainly
believes as a matter of faith all the nationalistic dogmas: ‘Latvians are the
masters of Latvia and Russians are guests,’ ‘Latvia was occupied by the Soviet
Union,’ [and] ‘the Russian language is a foreign language in Latvia.’”
Such people will not give up these
views even if their level of cooperation with Russians on the everyday level
expands by several orders of magnitude, Linderman says. “Put simply, if you
help your neighbor not only fix his car but also his apartment, motorcycle and
computer, he will all the same retain his nationalist convictions.”
Many Russian diplomats make the same
mistake about the non-Russian leaders they deal with in the post-Soviet states.
They think that because they get along in an everyday way, they can find common
ground. And then these diplomats are surprised when a Maidan or something
similar breaks out, and they learn that that is not the case.
They wouldn’t be surprised,
Linderman says, if they had not underrated the power of nationalist ideology or
“failed to recognize” it at all.
Given this, “Russian cannot retain in
the sphere of its influence a single country if it continues to ignore the
issue of ideology.” Indeed, even among those countries which are allied with it
in the Eurasian Economic Community are many who are quite prepared to take
Moscow’s money but who promote nationalism in their schools and media.
That in turn means that whenever the
West wants to overturn a pro-Russian or even a genuinely pragmatic non-Russian
government, “it will do this easily by operating on young people and the media
infected by anti-Russian nationalism.”
To oppose such scenarios will be “impossible”
in the absence of “a strong and organized Russian community,” and if that
community is a minority, it can be strong “only with support from Russia.” Moscow should thus insist on a ban against
all anti-Russian propaganda as well as on “the protection of the rights and
interests of the local Russian population.”
Does that constitute interference in
the sovereignty of these countries? Linderman asks rhetorically, and answers, “Yes, it does,” Linderman says. “But there is no other way out”
because Latvia’s acquisition of weapons is less dangerous to Russia that “the
liquidation [there] of education in the Russian language.”
“The
war for the souls of people is the most important war, and defeat in it is
impossible to compensate for even with very large amounts of money. Only blood
and only human lives can do that,” he says, as “we are not seeing today in the
Donbas.”
Three things about Linderman’s argument are especially
striking. First, he concedes that most Russians even in Latvia are quite
comfortable with their current position. Second, he admits that they will rise
up against the government only if and when Moscow openly interferes, something
he very much wants to occur.
And
third and most worrisome of all, he argues that Moscow should view all the
non-Russian governments and peoples in the region as inherently anti-Russian
and move forcefully against them, actions that are almost certainly going to
prove a self-fulfilling prophecy and cost Moscow what hopes it may have on
having good ties with any of them.
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