Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 4 – It is an axiom
in most countries that people will protest when their living conditions decline and that assumption
underlies current Western policy toward Moscow, but Mark Urnov, one of Russia’s
leading political analysts, argues that the situation in Russia is different
and that Russians are less rather than more likely to protest as conditions
deteriorate.
In an interview in “Profile” today,
Urnov notes that “in Russia as in all societies where the demolition of
totalitarian or traditional arrangements is far from complete … the reaction of
the population to changes in its material situation is fundamentally different
from those typical of developed industrial and post-industrial societies” (profile.ru/society/item/93378-ot-patriotizma-k-politicheskomu-terroru).
And
consequently, he says, unlike in the latter, “dissatisfaction and political
activity [in Russia] intensify not when the situation is getting worse but when
it is getting better … When the situation is getting worse, demands sharply
decrease, the split between ‘I want’ and ‘I can’ becomes smaller, frustration
weakens and protest activity falls off.”
This
pattern was first noted by de Tocqueville in his book, “The Ancien Regime and
Revolution” (1856) and has been confirmed by Russian experience from the Bolshevik
revolution, which happened after 40 years of “stormy economic growth and the
improvement of the standard of living of the population” as well as in other
times and places.
Today
in Russia, Urnov says, there is “again a crisis and naturally a fall-off of
mass political activity is beginning.” That is because people are now focusing
on “individual survival” and “collective protests are losing their
attractiveness” for almost everyone, whatever some may hope and others fear.
Urnov,
the head of the political science department of Moscow’s Higher School of
Economics, tells his “Profile” interviewer Dmitry Ivanov that this is only part
of the reason for the high levels of support Russians are giving to Vladimir
Putin and the Russian regime at the present time.
Most
of this, he suggests, is the result of propaganda, which has been far more
successful than he had thought possible even a year ago, given the Internet and
other sources of information which mean that the Russian population is far less
cut off from accurate information than was its Soviet counterpart.
The main reason Russian government propaganda has been so
successful, Urnov argues, is that it has played to the requirement many
Russians feel for “a positive identity, self-assertion and national pride,” something
that the propagandists under Russian conditions can give by presenting Russia
as standing up to and thumbing its nose at the West.
Seizing
Crimea was not primarily about increasing the size of the country, he
continues, or even about righting what some Russians view as a historic wrong.
Instead, as the propagandists recognized and promoted, it was “a demonstration”
of aggressive political behavior.
Russian
television assured Russians: “Having returned Crimea, we have not only restored
historic justice but we have also thumbed our nose at the US and in this way
and yet again shown everyone that we have risen from our knees” and won’t be
pushed around. That message played a far
greater role than any other in winning support for the Kremlin.
Prior
to the Crimean Anschluss, Moscow propagandists pushed the notion that Russia’s
achievements were peaceful: its athletes at the Olympics and its rich
businessmen who were able to buy everything. “Now,” however, “militarist
rhetoric predominates,” and that has nothing to do with concern about “the good
life” but rather with patriotism and enemies.
In some respects, Moscow’s rhetoric today is like that of
the Soviet Union’s, Urnov says. “But one must note that in the USSR of the
Brezhnev period, the core message of propaganda was, in comparison with that of
the present day, “more calm, more peace-loving and more kind.” And that does
not bode well for the future.
Today’s rhetoric is “nervous, hysterical and extremely
aggressive,” and that has consequences which are “extremely dangerous” not only
by creating the preconditions for intolerance and political terror, whose most
recent victim was Boris Nemtsov, but also stimulating emigration of the most
educated and talented people in the population.
Within
Russia now, Urnov suggests, there is no “organized opposition which could
really pose a threat to the authorities” and that it will “hardly appear over
the next several years.” Hope in the
middle class is misplaced because most of it consists of those employed by or
dependent on the government rather than independent of the regime.
If
the current kind of propaganda continues, the share of aggressive people in the
population will increase because their numbers are “absolutely dependent on the
authorities” rather than reflecting the decisions of the individuals involved.
Their attitudes and actions are thus “triggered” by the propaganda.
Some
of these people will be passive as a result, but others will become active and
do things that will threaten society at large and also the regime which riled
them up. Overcoming that and overcoming Russia’s totalitarian and authoritarian
past will not happen quickly, he says. Instead, it will require concerted
effort over several generations.
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