Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 10 –Picking up on the
increasingly alarmist rhetoric of Kremlin outlets about the possibility of war,
a Urals blogger who openly flaunts his ties with the FSB yesterday posted three
commentaries in which he said that Russians must prepare for a major war with
the West, according to Kseniya Kirillova.
Sergey Kolyasnikov, who presents
himself as a super patriot had in the past limited himself to statements that “there
may be a real war or there may not be,” but yesterday he shifted his tone and
pointedly called on the Russian people to prepare for a major war with the
Western powers (nr2.ru/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/Rossiya-spolzla-v-yadernuyu-isteriyu-98625.html).
In
the first, Kolyasnikov said that “the only variant which the US and Europe
consider acceptable for Russia and us is destruction. Any rejection of this
means war. Thus, there will be war.” In the second, he said that the West had
long been preparing for war and that “the population of Russia must massively
prepare for one.” And in the third, he
wrote that “the next factor which has returned to our reality will become the
atomic bomb.”
There are all
kinds of things on the Internet, Kirillova notes, but there are four reasons
for taking Kolyasnikov’s words more seriously than most: he “doesn’t conceal
his links with the FSB;” his denunciations have led to criminal cases; he has
appeared at Kremlin-sponsored conferences in recent weeks; and as, the Novy
Region-2 commentator says, any Russian who puts out something which the
authorities don’t like would suffer for it.
Some may be
inclined to view Kolyasnikov’s remarks as an indication that at least one “hurrah
patriot” has escaped the control of the Kremlin and is “seeking to organize ‘a
patriotic Maidan’ in Russia, Kirillova suggests, but she dismisses this because
of the prominent place Kolyasnikov has been given in RISI meetings and the
like.
That still does
not mean that the Urals blogger’s words should be taken entirely at face value,
she continues. There are three obvious
alternative explanations for them.
First, they could be intended to “create in the eyes of Western analysts
the illusion of ‘a patriotic opposition which Putin ‘can hardly restrain’” and
that “’without him, things would be still worse.’”
Second,
Kolyasnikov’s words could be intended to justify in the minds of the Russian population
further deprivations and “any worsening of the economic situation.” If the country faces war, Russians will
accept shortages far more willingly than if it were the case that it does not.
And third, they
could be intended to set the stage for intensifying the repression of the
population and for presenting that intensification as being “’at the demand of the
people.’” Such actions could be directed not only against the opposition but at
officials, Vladimir Putin excepted of course.
But
putting out such messages is extremely dangerous. The FSB and the other siloviki
may be able to arrest a Koyasnikov or others like them, but these institutions
are unlikely to be able to cope “with the hundreds and thousands of people who
they have succeeded in zombifying” by such messages in the course of Russia’s
war against Ukraine.
One
very much wonders, Kirillova says, whether those backing the issuance of such
messages understand that “hatred and fear are irrational forces” which are easy
to provoke but difficult to “’drive back into the bottle.’” But however that may be, it is clearly the
case that “under the pretext of a non-existent threat, Russia directly inspired
by the authorities is descending into a hell, the depth of which it is even now
very difficult to imagine.”
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