Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 4 – Clausewicz famously
observed that "war is the continuation of politics by other means;” but in
the case of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has inverted that definition and is seeking
to make peacemaking into another means for continuing the policies behind his
war there, according to Ukrainian commentator Vitaly Portnikov.
The chief results of the Normandy
Four meeting in Paris, he says, are that the Minsk Process will continue into
next year with a focus on elections in Russian-occupied areas with Putin
avoiding direct aggression but seeking to destabilize Ukraine internally by
other means (liga.net/opinion/252840_podmorozhennyy-konflikt-chto-zhdet-donbass-posle-vstrechi-v-parizhe.htm).
And
that means, Portnikov says, that the chief question is whether the Donbas will
become a second Transdniestria or a second Gagauzia. Both sought independence,
but Gagauzia, although pro-Russian influence there remains strong, accepted its
status as a territorial autonomy while Transdniestria continues as “a
self-proclaimed republic to this day.”
Given
the absence of a joint statement at the end of the Paris meeting, Portnikov
argues, it is important to remember what the two sides had as their “main task”
for the session. Ukraine’s Petro Poroshenko sought the putting off or
cancellation of separatist elections because such votes would have made the Minsk
Process meaningless and mean “the final freezing of the conflict.”
For
Putin, the Ukrainian commentator says, “the main goal” was not to allow any new
sanctions against Russia but rather to gain time by extending the time frame
for the implementation of the Minsk accords. That goal became even more
important after he launched his Syrian air campaign.
Western
countries are furious at what Putin is doing in Syria, Portnikov points out, and
they would only have been encouraged to
impose yet more sanctions on Russia if he allowed the separatist elections to
go forward in Ukraine.
Given these
goals, the two sides each took something away: Poroshenko succeeded in delaying
if not cancelling elections in the Russian-occupied areas of his country, and Putin
succeeded in pushing the Minsk process into 2016 thus reducing the likelihood
that the West will impose more sanctions on Russia in the near term.
But that
prolongation hardly solves the problem. Kyiv still wants to set the rules under
which any such elections will take place, and Moscow does not want to act in
any way that might make it appear that Putin has made concessions and thus “lost
face.” Trying to square this circle is not easy; delaying any final decision
thus is the least unattractive option.
What
then does this mean? Portnikov asks rhetorically. Simply this: any settlement
has been put off, the war has been
frozen without the occupied territories having acquired “specific form,” and
Moscow will thus pursue its agenda in Ukraine by other means, a policy less
likely to lead to new sanctions but no less risky for Kyiv – and perhaps even
more so if the West turns away as a result.
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