Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 25 – There “cannot
be a more bitter date for contemporary Russia than August 24, 1991,” Yevgeny
Ikhlov says, when Ukraine proclaimed its independence and thus showed the
bankruptcy of all three Muscovite imperial projects – the Orthodox Third Rome, a
European Russian Empire, and “’the new historical community of the Soviet
people.’”
In a commentary on the Kasparov.ru portal,
the Russian analyst says that this becomes clear if one imagines for a minute
that Ukraine had not declared its independence but instead had somehow agreed
to remain in a Soviet Union “with legitimate President Gorbachev” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57BE8D9574D4B).
Had that been the case, he points
out, the renewed USSR would have had only “two union sovereign republics, the
RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR,” and the two would, according to the April 23,
1991, decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet made their respective autonomies “sovereign.”
Under these conditions, “the
Ukrainian SSR would have lost Crimea, but the RSFSR would have lost the North
Caucasus, half of the Volga-Urals region, and also the Khanty-Mansiisk and
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Districts and Yakutia-Sakha.” Yeltsin’s Muscovy would have been left “without
oil, gas or diamonds.”
“It would be a good thing,” Ikhlov
suggests, to ask those who are nostalgic for an empire of the Russians whether
they would want to live in union with Ukraine under the power of Gorbachev (or
his successors from the Central Committee) but with new borders for their own
union republic along the Terek and Volga.”
The answers would be self-evident
were such people thinking, but they remain prisoners of the kind of passions
that led the Israelites to protest against Moses who led them out of Egypt
because while in the desert, they remembered that in Egypt and even in Egypt’s
jails, they were given food.
Given that, Ikhlov continues, the
departure of Ukraine is an even greater tragedy for these Russians, Ikhlov
says, because it highlights the bankruptcies of the three major Russian
imperial projects of the last millennium.
The first of these, which one can
call the Third Rome received “an enormous gift: its vassal became the
Hetmanshchina, a significant portion of the former Russian Lithuania along with
Kyiv. That had the effect of convincing
Russians that they had a single Orthodox civilization that was “an alternative”
to the West.
“Ukrainian independence in 1991 is a
recognition of the historical bankruptcy” of this notion, Ikhlov says.
The second Russian imperial project
was that of Russia as “a joint project of Russians and Ukrainians for the
establishment of a European empire as hegemon over the Baltics,” one that resembled
in some ways the British Empire as “a joint project of the Anglo-Saxons and the
Scots.”
“Ukrainian independence in 1991 is a
recognition of the historical bankruptcy of the project of the European Russian
Empire,” he argues.
And the third Russian imperial
project, that of the USSR with its russification and depriving of the
Ukrainians of their own identity and with its insistence that Ukrainians be
prepared to always be “’the younger brother’” also continues to animate many
Russians, Ikhlov suggests.
But “Ukrainian independence in 1991
is a recognition of the historical bankruptcy of the project of ‘the new
historical community of the Soviet people.’”
It is thus no wonder that Russians
find it so hard to accept the idea of Ukrainian independence and at the same
time why Ukrainian independence is so important to the possibility, however small,
that the Muscovite state and its Russians can overcome their imperial dreams.
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