Paul Goble
Staunton, February 8 – What Moscow
is doing in Daghestan today, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov says, it is
prepared to do in every region of the country in order to root out corruption (vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/02/08/750313-kreml-masshtabnih-sledstvennih-deistvii-dagestane
and rbc.ru/politics/08/02/2018/5a7bfc919a7947b904893cd5).
That Kremlin declaration means that
Daghestan is far from the special case many have been treating it as being at
least from Moscow’s point of view and suggests that it is critically important
to understand just what Moscow is doing there and how it is likely to affect
other regions and republics of the Russian Federation in the near future.
The other republics in the North
Caucasus are watching the events in Daghestan out of concern that one or more
may be the next to have local elites pushed out of the way, external rule imposed,
and their prerogatives trampled upon (onkavkaz.com/news/2105-siciliiskii-razgrom-klanov-dagestana-moskva-gotovit-ogranichenie-nacionalnogo-suvereniteta-kavk.html).
Some in Russian-occupied Crimea
think that region may be next, especially given its problems and the enormous
burden the Anschluss has placed on Moscow (komtv.org/64683-kreml-gotov/?utm_campaign=auction).
But Peskov’s comment suggests that no region, except possibly Chechnya at least
initially, is safe from moves like those being made in Daghestan.
That makes three arguments today
about the Daghestani events of even greater importance. Their disturbing messages
are as follows:
1.Moscow is
Re-Imposing Direct Colonial Rule on Daghestan
Ukrainian commentator Vitaly
Portnikov says that what Moscow is doing in Daghestan is reposing direct
colonial rule, using “the fight against corruption” as little more than an
implausible fig leaf given that there is corruption everywhere in Putin’s
Russia (graniru.org/opinion/portnikov/m.267511.html).
What is taking place in Daghestan,
he continues, “is not about any desire to defeat corruption.” Instead, “it is a
desire to transform a corrupted dominion, ‘a state within a state,’ into a
corrupt colony of the Kremlin” -- or to put it politically correctly, to
transform Daghestan from a place where the Daghestanis engage in corruption to
one where the Muscovites do.
Today, Moscow has sufficient power
to impose its will, at least for a time, Portnikov says. But what he is worried
abut is this: what will happen when the central authorities weaken? Do today’s
“’battlers against corruption’” understand they are making it impossible for
Russians to remain there or elsewhere in the borderlands – and for Russian
borders to remain unchanged?
2.Kazan Tatars are
Being Used and Played in Daghestan
In today’s Svobodnaya pressa, Anton Chablin addresses a critical point: He
asks why Moscow is choosing to use cadres from Tatarstan in the Middle Volga to
impose order in Daghestan in the North Caucasus and he gives the approved
answer that Moscow wants a successful republic to help it in an unsuccessful
one (svpressa.ru/politic/article/192447/).
That is a reasonable answer, but it
is certainly only a partial one. Tatarstan did not become successful on the
bayonet points of the Russian siloviki, and in Daghestan, as some in Russia
have already pointed out, even Tatars won’t be able to do that in the way that
Moscow hopes for (ura.news/articles/1036273833).
But there may be a deeper game here, one
that reflects past history and Moscow’s current concerns. When Russian occupied
Central Asia in the 19th century, the tsars used Tatars as its
agents to make Russian power there work. It is not surprising then that they
might think about doing so again.
And there is an additional and more
contemporary reason: Because of the role the Tatars played, many in Central
Asia never entirely trusted them again.
The Kremlin may hope that by putting a Tatar in as prime minister in
Daghestan, it can undercut Tatar influence among the non-Russians within the
Russian Federation.
Over the last several years, Vladimir Putin
has worked hard to cut Tatarstan down to size. The Tatar leadership has
responded first by reaching out to Tatars outside of Tatarstan and then to
Muslims (ansar.ru/rfsng/minnihanov-posetil-starejshuyu-mechet-rossii).
Putin may see his move in Daghestan therefore as a move against Tatarstan as
well.
3. The Terror in
Daghestan has Begun to Spread – And Will Last as Long as Putin Does.
Israeli analyst Avraam Shmulyevich
says that what is happening in Daghestan is part and parcel of what is
happening in Russia as a whole rather than something separate and distinct (rusmonitor.com/avraam-shmulevich-ob-arestakh-v-dagestane-repressii-budut-prodolzhatsya-do-tekh-por-poka-sushhestvuet-ehta-sistema.html).
The country has entered a new 1937,
the beginning of terror. “Today Russia is ruled by Chekists … They even call
themselves that. But Chekists do not know how to do anything but arrest people.”
That is what it was established to do and that is what it is doing now.
“In contrast to Perm, Tver or
Sakhalin,” Shmulyevich continues, “Daghestan is viewed as a colony of Russia as
a certain alien place and therefore everything which is taking place there is examined
with particular interest – although in this specific case, there is no
difference between Daghestan and Kirov oblast or Magadan.”
But there is one
difference that Moscow appears to have forgotten: unlike in these other places,
in Daghestan, there is a tradition of partisan war, of going into the forests
and fighting back. And consequently, if
Moscow continues to repress people in Daghestan, it is more than likely that
this tradition will return to the fore.
But at the same time Moscow is
arresting people in Daghestan, Shmulyevich points out, “arrests and even
murders in the ruling stratum are occurring throughout the entire country” – in
Tatarstan, in Ingushetia, in Stavropol and in Kaliningrad. And that means
something else: it has begun and will continues as long as this [Putin] system
exists.”
Many will talk about Daghestan, but
so far, what is happening elsewhere hasn’t attracted as much attention.
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