The Longer Putin Continues His War in Ukraine, the Less Likely Russia is to Emerge with Its Face Saved or the Kremlin Leader Still in Office, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 13 – Had Putin ended his ‘special military operation” in Ukraine in the summer of 2022, he might have been able to present it as a Russian victory, Vladislav Inozemtsev says; but the longer he continues his war there, the less likely it is that Russia will exit with its face saved or with Putin himself still in office.

            That conclusion reflects four lessons that wars in recent centuries teach, lessons that do not indicate when a war will end but give a remarkably prescient description of what their results will ultimately be for the country that launches such a campaign, the Russian commentator says (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/13/konets-ne-blizkii-no-yasnii-a195126).

            The first lesson, Inozemtsev says, is that in recent times, the longer any war lasts, the greater the dangers for the aggressor and its government. The second is that modern wars are fought and won on the basis of large coalitions and any country that tries to go it alone will lose in the end.

            The third lesson, he argues, is that “modern wars – especially unsuccessful ones – become a critically important catalyst for the restructuring of the political systems within the nations involved,” something that means it will be very hard for Putin to convince Russian’s he has won in Ukraine if he so obviously hasn’t.

            And the fourth lesson involves the economics of war. Conducting wars is increasingly expensive; and with each passing month, the bill both now and the future rises, something that the population of the aggressor country can ever more easily see and is ever more likely to act against those, their own leaders, who are imposing it.

            “None of this implies that Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely to end anytime soon,” Inozemtsev says. But together these reasons mean that “the longer the conflict drags on, the less room there remains for doubt that the Kremlin stands no chance—not only of achieving victory but even of exiting the conflict "with its face saved."

            The Russian commentator concludes with words that deserve to be quoted in extenso: “Russia had already reached the absolute limit of what it could hope to gain from a war with Ukraine back in the summer of 2022—before Putin was forced to declare a "partial mobilization" and subsequently pivot to his "death-onomics."

And also “before the full force of sanctions took effect and Europeans began to sever energy ties; before the West began supplying Ukraine with substantial quantities of modern weaponry and before Ukraine itself began laying the groundwork for establishing a modern domestic defense industry.”

Since that time, Inozemtsev continues, “the Kremlin has done nothing but sink ever deeper into a futile confrontation—one it is now openly beginning to lose. This reality will become increasingly self-evident with every passing month.

No one today can predict with any precision how this war will ultimately end; however, the notion of Russia acquiring four (or six, or eight) Ukrainian regions is now entirely out of the question.” But at the same time, “the prospect of Putin remaining at the helm of a humiliated and bankrupt Russia looks increasingly improbable.”