Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Those who want to see Russia become a democratic and law-based state after Putin must make it clear they are calling for is “not a weak state after a strong autocracy” but rather another kind of strong state based on politics and law but capable of enforcing common rules for all, Irina Bursygina and Mikhail Filippov says.
Otherwise, these two Russian analysts who now teach at Harvard and SUNY Binghampton respectively say, the widespread fear among Russians that what the democrats seek is a weak state unable to hold the country together and will continue to support autocracy (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/25/silnii-tsentr-kak-nedostayuschii-element-demokraticheskoi-alternativi-a196196).
Putinism, Bursygina and Filippov say, “offers a politically understandable answer to Russian fears of a weak center and more broadly of a weak state,” but “this answer not only destroys political freedom but has other destructive consequences.” Consequently, those who want democracy in Russia must offer a different but clear and understandable answer.”
That answer, they argue, must call for the creatio questionn of a strong state “together with politics and not instead of that;” and a failure to come up with this answer and promote it will leave the democrats without the allies they would otherwise have and ensure that the supporters of autocracy will have more support than they should.
This view is held not just by Putin but by a large number of Russians as a result of the events of the last 35 years. It is widely held because it is convincing … “The weakening of the center is thus equated by supporters of the status quo as a weakening of the state as such,” and therefore even many who don’t like Putin’s approach don’t see an alternative.
What those who want to see a law-based state with democracy and real federalism need to convince such people of is that it is possible to make the government responsive to the people and the laws institutions formulate but at the same time not making is weak, something many Russians do not yet accept.
Byrsygina and Filippova say that “a strong state after reforms is not a state which controls all political and economic processes. Rather it is a state capable of maintaining a common space of rules, ensuring the carrying out of decisions, resolving conflicts among major interest groups, and not becoming a hostage to more powerful coalitions.”
Putinism by its authoritarianism and suppression of politics addresses these problems in its own way and appears to many to be “a practical resolution” of them. But it not only fails to do that but creates a situation in which the state, however powerful it may appear, in fact suffers from serious problems, they continue.
Having suppressed political activity, they continue, the Russian state in its Putinist variant “loses not only accountability but the capacity for self-correction” given that “institutions deprived of autonomy ever more poorly send up bad news and correct mistakes,” and the supposedly strong center operates increasingly blind to what is happening.
“The war against Ukraine, Bursygina and Filippov argue, “is the most vivid manifestation of this defect, a failure of the Putin model even when judged by its own criteria.” Indeed, the Kremlin’s unwillingness to listen to anything but echoes of itself has resulted in “a monumental error” with far-reaching consequences.
Those who want to see democracy and rule of law come to Russia not only must overcome the fears of many Russians that moves in that direction will result in a weakened rather than strengthened state, the two continue; and that as a result, what reforms are calling for will open the way to the disintegration of the state followed by a recrudescence of authoritarianism.
There are, of course, reasons for such fears. The restoration of democracy requires that new players enter the political sphere; but many of them will do so without the constraints that limit such players in established constitutional systems – and as a result, there is a danger that they will go too far at a time when the state has not evolved in ways to limit such outcomes.
“This dilemma,” the two analysts argue, “is most clearly evident in the relationship between the central government and the regions” and in Russian fears about federalism undermining the state. In fact, “federalism doesn’t equal a weak state: on the contrary, federalism requires the simultaneous existence of a strong central authority and strong regional elites.”
That is the lesson that can be drawn from existing successful federations; but it is not one that most Russians have accepted. They believe just the opposite. “Politically speaking,” Bursygina and Filippov say, “the extent to which these fears are rational is of little consequence; what matters is their persistence.”
“Consequently, any federalization initiative that fails to articulate the nature of a strong, democratic central government inevitably narrows the coalition of support for reform from the start: regional elites fear regulatory uncertainty; business fears asset redistribution; the bureaucracy fears a loss of governability; and the general public fears a return to chaos.”
What is critical then is that the advocates of democracy, rule of law and federalism need to change the way the question about the future of the country is posed. “The dispute is not taking place between a strong authoritarian government” as Putin would have it “and a weak democratic one. It must be between two models of a strong state.”
Unless the debate is reframed in that way, those advocating democracy and rule of law are likely to find the battles ahead far more difficult to win; and those who want something like the Putinist status quo will find it far easier to mount a defense against any change either now or when Putin leaves the scene.
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