Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 28 – Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement this week that ISIS is using Georgia’s
Pankisi Gorge as a base for destabilizing the entire Caucasus is a clear indication
that Moscow is laying the groundwork for another invasion of Georgia and doing
so in a way that may be hard for some Western governments to oppose.
Representatives of the Islamic
State, Lavrov said on Tuesday, “are using this isolated territory in order to
train, rest and fill their ranks.” That constitutes “a terrorist threat” and is
the major reason that Moscow has rejected the idea of a visa-free regime for
Georgian citizens (tass.ru/politika/2615018).
The foreign minister’s charge
attracted enormous attention in Moscow and denials by Tbilisi. Georgian Prime Minister Georgy Kvirikashvili
said that there was no basis for Lavrov’s claims and that the Georgian
authorities “completely control” the Pankisi Gorge. Consequently, “no terrorist
risks exist there.”
But that denial has not stopped the
flood of Russian commentaries on this “threat,” an indication that at least
some in Moscow view it at a minimum as another way to isolate and put pressure
on Tbilisi or at a maximum as laying the foundation for a new Russian military
strike, one that because it would be nominally against ISIS, the West might not
oppose.
In a detailed article today on the
Svobodnaya pressa portal, Moscow journalist Anton Mardasov surveys this
discussion, pointing out that it has roots in the past and that it points to
problems for Georgia and other countries in the South Caucasus far beyond the
Gorge itself (svpressa.ru/war21/article/141067/).
Last
December, Mardasov begins, a senior
South Osetian official said that “militants who had come from Syria were
concentrating in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge” and that these militants “were
preparing provocations in the direction of the Georgian-South Osetian border.” At the time, Georgian security officials
dismissed this out of hand.
Then,
South Osetia’s government paper, “Yuzhnaya Osetiya,” published materials which
it said proved that ISIS militants were in Pankisi and that the Georgian
denials should be ignored. And it pointed out that in June 2015, Valid Abaz, a
Syrian general, had talked about the existence of an ISIS base in Georgia.
According
to him, “Chechen militants in Georgia were being encouraged to attach
themselves to ISIS because they have experience in military operations.” He
added that “the base itself apparently enjoys the complete support of Tbilisi,”
an assertion that at a minimum was intended to blacken the Georgian government’s
reputation.
Subsequently
and especially now, Mardasov says, specialists on the Caucasus say that
Georgian actions in fact unwittingly confirm what Tbilisi is denying. Arrests in the Pankisi Gorge of those
suspected of ISIS ties are up, but these are being made by local police rather
than by Georgian security officials.
Aleksandr
Krylov, the president of the Russian Scientific Society of Caucasus Specialists
and a researcher at Moscow’s IMEMO, says that “the threat emanating from the
Pankisi Gorge is becoming ever more real because militants are being driven out
of Syria and Iraq” as a result of “the successful actions of the Syrian army”
and its allies.
Krylov
says that there are “two dimensions” to the Pankisi Gorge problem. On the one hand, people from that region did
go and fight for ISIS in Syria and have ties with the local population in the gorge. And on the other, NATO has been talking about
setting up “a regional training center” in Georgia to prepare “moderate Syrian
opposition” figures.
Moscow
reacted harshly to that idea, IMEMO researcher continues, saying that how could
it represent progress to replace the Chechen militants who had been in the
Pankisi Gorge with Syrian ones, especially since “the moderate opposition
figures often go over to the side of the Islamists.”
Still
more worrisome about this idea – which appears to have been shelved – Krylov
says is that ISIS views the Caucasus as part of its patrimony and thus would
use Pankisi to spread its activities and influence “both in the Russian North
Caucasus and in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
South
Ossetia, Krylov says, is “reliably defended.” (Vadim Mukhanov, an MGIMO
researcher agrees.) But the danger for the region of “a partisan war” is
intensifying there and in Armenia and Abkhazia.
As far as Georgia is concerned, Adjaria is at risk. “Thus we can have
quite a lot of potential theaters of military operation.”
That
points to destabilization across the region, Krylov says; and “it is thus
important for the states of the region together with Russia to find forms of
joint opposition to this growing threat” – especially since “’the honeymoon’”
between Georgia and the West has ended and Tbilisi can’t be counted on to take
action on its own.
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