Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 27 – The number of
Russians working for themselves or in kinds of economic activity not registered
with the state has been growing every year since 2008, Alekandr Pavlov says;
and the expansion of their number over the last two years has prevented the
mass unemployment and hunger that many had expected the economic crisis to
bring.
And it is that rather than any
anti-crisis measures adopted in Moscow or in the regions that has allowed
Russians to survive, the Khamovniki Foundation for the Support of Social
Research expert says. In short, they are surviving the crisis “not thanks to
the regime but in spite of it” (rbc.ru/opinions/society/26/01/2016/56a755e49a794740e4162175).
When
the crisis began, Pavlov says, some regions announced and introduced
anti-crisis measures and some didn’t. He studied both and concludes on the
basis of his research that these programs had little impact either on the
number of officially unemployed or on the expected rise in food shortages and
misery.
There
are several reasons for this, he continues. Regional officials have only two
feedback channels from the population: official statistics and individual
complaints. But “it has turned out that
neither the one nor the other has been capable of adequately reflecting the
processes taking place in the localities.”
And
because that is so, Pavlov says, officials didn’t have any information about
those working-age Russians who were not in official categories like homemakers,
students, business people and the like but who nonetheless somehow working at
something and thus maintaining at least a minimal standard of living, largely
independent of and unnoticed by the state.
In
2013, he points out, many in Russia were struck by the statement of Deputy
Prime Minister Olga Golodets that there were 38 million Russian residents who
were “occupied” in ways she didn’t know. She and others claimed in April 2015
that that number had declined, but in fact it has gone up.
Indeed,
Pavlov continues, those occupied in positions the state doesn’t include in its
accounting have been rising every year since 2008 “despite all the efforts of
the state.” And in many ways, that
rather than any actions by the authorities has saved Russians from what would
otherwise have been a complete disaster.
Using
government figures, Pavlov found in the eight regions he examined that the
number of Russians engaged in some kind of economic activity but not counted by
the state in 2014 ranged from 27 percent in Samara Oblast to 45.3 percent in
Mordvinia – and that in all places this figure had increased since 2008.
Faced
with declining incomes and rising prices, Russians have been forced to rely not
so much on the government “which often is viewed as a source of resources but
rather on their social ties and various kinds of self-supply,” Pavlov says. And
this affects people across the social spectrum with people adding to their
nominal incomes as they can.
“Almost
always,” he says, “people have side occupations from which they benefit ranging
from simple theft and ending with the export of their intellectual efforts
abroad.” But much of it involves the
revival of crafts or the use of craft-like operations to earn money, his
research shows.s
In
Russia’s provinces, “the overwhelming majority of homemakers engage in such
activities although this is rarely acknowledged.” Most say they live on their
pay, but it turns out that they raise food, help their neighbors build houses,
and engage in what in other circumstances would be called second jobs.
And
these positions often bring in more money or resources than do the jobs that
they are formally attached to, Pavlov says. Individually, these second incomes
are small, but collectively they amount to enormous sums. In Ulyanovsk Oblast, for example, these
second jobs account for more than 80 percent of the region’s earnings from the
production of furniture.
“All
these unseen practices are helping Russians to survive the crisis,” Pavlov
says, and they are quite responsive to the situation. When prices for food go
up, people raise more of their own; or when mortgage markets collapse, they
help build houses for their neighbors or register as unoccupied dachas houses
in which people live on a permanent basis.
And
these craft-life operations are often among the leaders at import
substitution. Unregistered Russian
craftsmen are now making Italian furniture, details for European cars and even
rebuilding lathes and other equipment that no one can any longer import from
abroad, Pavlov says.
And
thus “a paradox has arisen which it is difficult for the government to
understand: formally [that is according to statistics] everything is getting
worse and worse, but in fact they aren’t so bad.”
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