Paul Goble
Staunton,
August 14 – People in the regions and republics of the Russian Federation can
take heart from the back that their resistance to Vladimir Putin’s efforts to
create a highly centralized unitary state have not been entirely successful,
but they must recognize that their situation now is much worse than it was only
a few years ago, Dmitry Oreshkin says.
Russia’s
regions and republics by their resistance were able to slow and then stop Putin’s
plan to amalgamate the federal subjects, to reduce his federal districts to
little more than “sinecures for failed politicians,” and to make the regions
and republics little more than branch offices of the center, the political
analyst says (idelreal.org/a/29415524.html).
But with time, Oreshkin continues,
the center became both more clever and more ruthless, something that has left both
the officials and the population of the country’s regions and republics in a
far weaker position than they were in only a few years ago, with the ability of
non-state actors especially diminished.
Nonetheless, he argues, there are at
least three things that activists in the republics and regions can do defend
federalism and promote their own distinct interests. First, they can form alliances with officials
in the region, something that gives the latter a resource in their dealings with
Moscow, although a much smaller one than in the past.
Second, they can go to court against
central institutions that exceed their legitimate rights and, although they are
unlikely to win, use such actions and other media means to spread the word
about what Moscow is doing and attract more support for resisting the growing
centralization of the Russian state.
And third – and this is by far the
most important role civic activists can play – they can promote the development
of horizontal ties among regions and republics, something that will ensure that
any positive development in one place is known and copied elsewhere and thus
becomes more difficult for Moscow to stop, Oreshkin continues.
The ongoing controversy about making
non-Russian language instruction entirely voluntary while keeping instruction
in Russian mandatory underscores the importance of this role, the political
analyst says. “Before the language
conflict,” he says, “the North Caucasus did not know that in the Middle Volga
regional languages were often languages of instruction; and the Middle Volga
wasn’t aware about the weak presence of Caucasus languages in education.”
Once each became aware of the other
as a result of the work of civic activists, the two were able to cooperate; and
although they have not won out in this case, they are now far better positioned
than they were a year ago to resist other attacks on federalism and their rights
emanating from Moscow.
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