Tuesday, August 14, 2018

In Backing Trump, Putin from the Outset May have Planned to Betray Him, Pastukhov Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 14 – Vladimir Putin initially backed Donald Trump because the Kremlin leader assumed he would have a better chance of getting a deal with him than with Hillary Clinton or at least could count on Trump’s style to further disorder and distract the United States, Vladimir Pastukhov says.

            But even at that time, the London-based Russian historian says, Putin didn’t put all his eggs in one basket and was prepared to betray Trump in order to win time for himself by spreading chaos in Washington and making it more difficult for the US to act internationally (republic.ru/posts/91803).

            The Helsinki Summit provided clear evidence, Pastukhov suggests, that Putin has both “Plan A” and “Plan B” in his pocket and so while he continues to seek agreement with Trump may at some point turn on the American president and take steps that would make it more likely that Trump would face impeachment, the ultimate distraction and disordering development.

             “At Helsinki,” the Russian historian says, “only one problem was resolve: the leaders of Russia and the US ‘won back’ their right to have personal meetings,” something that cleared the road “to ‘a big deal’ but the game itself has still not begun.” There, the two men showed both important similarities and equally important differences.

            The two leaders are united in their hostility to Europe, “albeit not so much in a geopolitical as in a metaphysical sense … Each doesn’t like Europe in his own way. Putin despises Europe as a barbarian despised Rome. Trump hates Europe ‘opportunistically,’ as a heretic does his former church.”

            But from this, of course, “it hardly follows that they really love one another.” Each of them is “seeking to establish in the entire world but above all in Europe a new order which in actual fact turns out to be a very old order, in which the national everywhere dominates over the all-human.”

            The problem, of course, is that “in this brave old world there cannot be two leaders.” Each will strive for supremacy, Pastukhov says; and consequently, “what divides Putin and Trump is greater than what unites them.”

            According to the Russian historian, “Trump overrated the importance of his business experience and tried to apply it to politics too directly.” Moreover, he arrived at his meeting with Putin “poorly prepared,” approaching it as a realtor might with someone who wanted to buy rather than with a raider who wanted to take.

            “What worked well with Kim Jong-un works poorly with Putin,” Pastukhov continues. And it is clear that “Trump does not yet understand that in Putin” he is dealing with someone with two plans, one public that seeks a deal and a second less public but quite obvious more important that seeks the weakening of the United States.

            The chances for a deal are far less likely than many imagine because of the domestic situation in the two countries.  Trump can’t afford to appear too deferential to Putin, and in any case, He would find it “easier to convince his voters to recognize Crimea as Russian that Putin would to convince his that the Donbass is Ukrainian.”

            “With ‘the Russian Spring,’ Putin awoke forces and expectations which he cannot entirely and completely. He is still not yet Stalin who might allow himself something like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” the historian continues.  Putin recognizes that there is thus not likely to be a deal, although Trump still doesn’t.

             According to Pastukhov, “Plan B consists in keeping Trump and through him America is as suspended a position as possible, disorganizing and weakening it and thus depriving it of chances” to put pressure on Russia. That will allow Putin to win the time he believes he needs; and it is a plan that from his point of view makes good sense.

            “One should not overrate the importance of Trump for Moscow,” the historian argues. “Putin doesn’t believe anyone.” His “hidden” goal is to “inflict as much harm as possible on America,” supporting Trump as during the election when the American politician looks the better choice but possibly turning on him as the Mueller investigation proceeds.

            It might seem, Pastukhov suggests, that the Kremlin would gain the most by having “’its president’” in office in Washington. But if Trump finds himself in more difficulty and if the Kremlin can leak things that add to his problems, Putin may change course “by creating unbearable conditions” to Trump and thus weakening him and the US further.

            The Russian historian discusses the shadowy case of someone who received money from Russia and made contact with all kinds of political figures in the US as something the Kremlin could use to that end, especially if there are more examples of similar Russian actions that are not yet known in the US.

            “Moscow today has more effective levers of influence on domestic politics in the US than destroying voting machines,” Pastukhov says. It can spread stories which will make it more difficult for Trump to focus on anything but his own political survival and that works for Putin and his plans. There won’t be a deal but the US will be weakened.

            “It is not excluded,” the historian suggests, that this possibility was on Putin’s mind two years ago.  And if that is the case, the Kremlin backed Trump during the election not in order to get a deal with him but because he could be used one way or another to achieve the Kremlin’s larger goals.

            All this means, Pastukhov suggests, that instead of the big deal many have expected, there are going to be “several years of turbulence when love and hatred will alternate” in this relationship, thus creating “a strange competition in sophisticated betrayal.” In that competition, Putin has “not bad chances for success.”

            But because of the relative positions of the two countries, “this success hardly will mean a victory,” however much some hope and others fear.

No comments:

Post a Comment