Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 30 – Twenty-nine
years ago, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR adopted a declaration of state
sovereignty which declared that from then on, Tatarstan would be a union
republic rather than an autonomous one, a declaration that represented a
continuation of Tatar strivings from the earliest Soviet period but one that was
never realized.
The Soviet Union collapsed a year
later, Ilnar Garifulllin says; and as a result, Tatarstan was never able to
make use of that status – or even defend what it contained after the RSFSR
became the Russian Federation and Tatarstan was again reduced to being an
autonomous unit within it (idelreal.org/a/30138048.html).
What occurred in
1990-1991, the Idel.Real commentator argues, was an attempt by the Tatars to “jump
on the last car of a departing train by using to the maximum the possibilities
which Perestroika had given them” in much the same way in 1920, it sought to
use the possibilities created by the weakening of the Moscow-centered state.
Immediately after the establishment
of the Tatar ASSR, Garifullin continues, “the national republics were divided
into ‘first class’ entities – the union republics – and ‘second class’ ones,
the autonomous republics. And people in the latter began their struggle to be
included among the former.
Tatar elites were no exception – indeed,
they were the leader of this trend -- and they, led by remarkable figures like Muslim
national communist Mirsaid Sultan-Galiyev, worked in that direction until they
were wiped out in the Great Terror. What
happened in 1990 was an effort to revive and continue their work.
But that effort fell short not
because of terror but because hopes for democracy in 1990 were never realized
and the Russian Federation returned to its traditions of authoritarianism and
centralism, Garifullin says; and Tatar elites were gradually forced into going
along in the naïve expectations that they could save something by cooperating.
The supposed,” he writes, “that it
was sufficient to declare sovereignty and everything else would follow. This was logical, since they were educated in
the Soviet spirit and could not understand that in the framework of a single
state could exist at one and the same time two separate worlds, one for the
power elite and a second for the rest.”
“The limited independence of the
1990s rapidly ended, and valuable time was lost,” Garifullin continues. “Then in the naughts, the era of centralization
began;” and it became “inconvenient” even to recall the 1990 declaration of
sovereignty or even the word itself. Instead, Tatar officials began to mark on August
30 the Day of the City of Kazan.
What this means is that “even if the
republic were given the amount of sovereignty it had in the early 1990s, this
would not represent a major breakthrough. In Tatarstan, politics as such doesn’t
exist. Therefore, there are no real
levers on the Tatarstan elite;” and major issues like the status of the state
language or the fate of Tatars outside the republic can’t be addressed.
Under these conditions, Tatars need to
think about what they will do if and when “Perestroika 2.0” begins. They need to reflect upon “’the Tatar world’”
which at present they think about only on occasion and they need to have a plan
prepared to better exploit a new window of opportunity than they were in 1920
or 1990.
(With regard to Tatars outside of
Tatarstan, one of the most useful publications on this anniversary is a
detailed guide to the people and issues of the ten largest Tatar diasporas
around the world, people who will help make plans for the future, that was
published by Kazan’s Business-Gazeta at business-gazeta.ru/article/436912.)
Echoing Garifullin’s concerns but in even
more impassioned language, the émigré-based Free Idel-Ural organization says
that “with each passing year, Tatarstan is losing ever more attributes of statehood,”
with its constitution having been amended to its detriment 17 times (facebook.com/Free.IdelUral/posts/483145208908710).
In today’s Tatarstan, it declares, republic
laws are no longer superior to federal ones, there is no power delimitation
agreement with Moscow, and there is no obligatory study of Tatar in schools. Moreover,
the Tatars no longer control the natural resources of their land: Moscow does.
The last thing that Tatars are proud about
is a self-deception, Idel-Ural says. They are proud that they are a rich
republic that gives more to the center than it receives, forgetting that their money
finances Russian aggression in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria and the Central
African Republic and at Moscow’s direction, “dictatorial regimes around the
globe.”
Money from Tatarstan also helps finance “the
daily searches, arrests, and puppet judicial processes” in Russia itself as
well as “the kidnaping and murder of Muslims in occupied Crimea.” Tatar money isn’t going to develop Tatar
culture and language, but for purposes, most Tatars don’t approve of – and have
no voice over.
If one must live within the Russian
Federation, the organization says, it is better not to be a donor region but a
recipient one. “Let Moscow pay for everything” and ensure that Tatars and
others like them don’t pay for what they don’t want.
To that end, Free Idel-Ural calls ono the
citizens of Tatarstan to minimize their declared incomes and thus transfers to the
federal budget Think about the future of the republic! Tatarstan needs your money;
not the Russian occupation forces in Idlib.”
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