Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 6 – “After decolonization,
some European countries did not reject the projection of power in their former
possessions,” Yegor Spirin says, with “the clearest example of that being the behavior
of France which “has been successfully carrying out a neo-imperial policy in
the African direction.”
That policy, known as Francafrique
(cf. Maja Bovcon, “Francafrique and Regime Theory,” European Journal of
International Relations 19:1 (2013): 5-26), provides a model for Russia as
it develops “an analogous strategy for creating “a security belt’ in the post-Soviet
space, the commentator says (topwar.ru/161723-francafrique-po-russki-ili-strategija-rossii-na-postsovetskom-prostranstve-.html).
The
continuing weakening of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, the Voyennye obozreniye writer
says, has an extremely negative impact on Russia’s national security and “significantly lowers its geopolitical weight in the international arena.” Francafrique provides a roadmap for Russia to escape from this situation.
Spirin
says that when decolonization happened, “France de jure offered independence its former colonies (with the exception of Algeria) but de facto it only
replaced an archaic model
of direct colonial administration with a more refined system of
indirect projection of its own will by establishing special relationships with its former colonies.
These special
relationships, the commentator says, involved the establishment f trade ties
between France and “’the new independent’ states” which were of a classical colonial
kind, of military arrangements allowing France to intervene whenever it feels
its interests are threatened, and f the strengthening of French cultural
influence throughout the region.
France’s approach represents “an
extremely sophisticated ne-imperial plicy,” the Mscw military analyst says, one
that others should study. “Of course,” he continues, “not all the instruments of
foreign policy used by the French in Africa can be easily extrapolated to the post-Soviet
space.” But many can and the ideas behind this effort need to be copied.
“The present-day foreign policy f Russia
on the post-Soviet space, alas, doesn’t resemble French policy in Africa at all.” Russia routinely writes off the debts of its
former possessions and gives them subsidies rather than using them as a source of
income for the metropolitan center. And
it does this without gaining much influence in return.
For example, Spirin says, none of the
former Soviet republics supported Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. And many of them are actively cooperating
with NATO and the United States against Russia’s interests. In Central Asia, Russia doesn’t have control
over the region, and “a Francafrique policy would suit the situation
there better than anything else.”
Toward that end, he continues, Moscow “must
begin to conduct an uncompromising geo-economic policy” to benefit itself and
to impose loyalty on its former possessions.
It must promote Russian culture and in particular Russian language so
that booth will “again become dominant in the region.”
It needs to structure its forces and their
basing so that it can intervene at will whenever Russian national interests are
threatened in any of the former Soviet republics, using but going beyond the Organization
for the Collective Security Treaty. And it must radically improve its
intelligence operations in the region.
It is critically important that Russian
intelligence gathering and capabilities be developed so that they “can be used
as a shadow political actor within these states” and thus give Moscow the
ability to act in a preventive way against any challenges, including color
revolutions, Spirin says.
Three things about Spirin’s article are
striking: his open acknowledgement of the view many in Russia have that the non-Russian
republics were Russia’s colonies, his support for a naked policy of
neo-imperialism in all of them, and his clear suggestion that Moscow mustn’t re-absorb
“the new independent states” but run them as France does Francafrique
style.
It is impossible to know just how many
people in the Moscow elite are thinking in exactly these terms, but Voyennoye
obozreniye is an influential publication and Spirin an influential
commentator. And the appearance of this article now suggests that while his
ideas may not yet have been adopted, they have significant support in key elite
groups.
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