Moscow Exploiting Distinctive Experiences of Russian Emigration to Keep It Pro-Putin, Kirillova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 11 -- Many have been struck by the apparent paradox that many Russians have left their country but that even among those who do, a remarkably large percentage remain supportive of the Kremlin. Some of this has natural causes, but much of it, Kseniya Kirillova says, is the result of concerted efforts by the Putin regime.

            For example, the US-based Russian journalist says, the share of Russian citizens living abroad who voted for Vladmir Putin’s reelection in 2018 was significantly higher than the overall percentage he received from those who voted in the Russian Federation (svoboda.org/a/30306956.html).

            “Of course,” Kirillova says, “election results are not an absolute indicator” of the phenomenon of support for the Kremlin among Russian emigres. Many of them are seeking to assimilate to their new countries and do not take part in Russian elections, and others who oppose Putin adopted the boycott Russian opposition groups advocated.

            But the voting statistics do point to a remarkable fact: a large share of Russians living abroad do choose to support the Kremlin, especially on foreign policy issues. One of the reasons for this, Kirillova suggests, is that they feel guilty toward Russia because they have moved to “’a hostile country’” like the US, an action many feel subconsciously is an act of betrayal.

            Even if they have chosen to more abroad for purely personal reasons, the Russian journalist says, they do not want to be called “’traitors’” because for them, a conflict with the regime is “traumatic.”  But what is important is that the Kremlin recognizes this feeling and is exploiting it by setting up various organizations to rope them in.

            Many Russian emigres, “even those indifferent to politics, are quite prepared” to voice support for the Kremlin’s polices as the price of being accepted in these often nominally apolitical groups in order to “peacefully continue to live abroad while feeling at the same time ‘forgiven and accepted’ by Russia.”

            And that desire is often combined with and even reinforces hostility to the country they find themselves in and often cannot adapt quickly to. Many observers write off these attitudes to “ideology, a feeling of guilt or cynicism” among Russians, but it has two broader sources, the common experiences of emigres and the actions of the Russian state.

            Kirillova cites the works of psychologists who note that emigres go through a series of steps in the course of their first years abroad, with many disliking their new country and longing for their old one at least for a time (theoryandpractice.ru/posts/15978-stress-i-nenavist-v-emigratsii-4-stadii-adaptatsii-v-novoy-strane).

            But for most groups, this stage is relatively brief. What is worth noting is that the Russian government is doing what it can to make that stage last far longer than is normally the case and is having remarkable success in many cases because the receiving countries either do not see this as a problem or do not commit resources to counter what Moscow is doing.

            “The Russian authorities are supporting the creation for compatriots abroad a special milieu, one ideologically and mentally isolated from the countries where they are,” Kirillova continues.  This effort has succeeded as much as it has because of Russian psychology and the fact that the diaspora has brought with it “the sharp polarization of Russian society.”

            And it has been reinforced by market forces. Moscow puts money into Russian-language outlets that push its line, and as that line is accepted, even those outlets into which Moscow hasn’t put funds find themselves repeating the line in order to expand their audiences and subscriber base.

            Under these conditions, Kirillova concludes, “systematic work with the Russian-language diaspora abroad and at a minimum an attempt at creating independent media and organizations which help with the effective adaptation of emigres appears as a much more effective strategy than simply labelling all lovers of Russia ‘a fifth column.’”

            Unfortunately, she suggests, labeling them in that way is not only easy but cheap; and there is a lack of understanding and financing to move in a more useful direction.