Scotland’s Pursuit of Independence Inspires Non-Russians to Think about Doing the Same

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 3 – Few broad popular movements emerge and succeed in isolation. Instead, they are inspired by and copy others especially if the latter have succeeded or appear likely to. That was true of the decolonization movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and it was true of the national movements in the former Soviet Union as well.

            The same thing is happening among some non-Russian republics and even some Russian regions now. Over the past five years, many of them have focused on and been inspired by the Catalan independence movement, openly speculating over whether Catalonia is opening a new parade of moves toward independence where few had thought it possible.

            (On this trend, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/11/russia-has-its-own-catalonias-richer.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/04/pomor-lands-not-yet-proud-catalonia-but.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/10/catalonia-contained-may-cast-larger.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/will-moscow-make-karelia-russias.html.)

                Now, non-Russian nationalists and Russian regionalists have another possible role model, Scotland’s moves toward independence, an especially ironic development given that Scotland’s independence movement has taken off in part because of Brexit, Britain’s moves to leave the EU and something the Kremlin has actively supported.

            In a 1500-word commentary for Radio Liberty’s IdelReal portal, Kamil Galeyev, a Kazan Tatar historian who is studying at Scotland’s St. Andrews University describes the history of Scots nationalism and especially of the way in which it has been energized by the 2016 referendum on Brexit (idelreal.org/a/30279971.html).

            Few in Scotland or elsewhere expected the British voters to approve that referendum. Voters in Scotland didn’t, and Scots leaders said that they wanted it to remain in the EU even if English, Wales and Northern Ireland left. Ever more Scots, Galeyev says, feel that London is ignoring them and are being radicalized as discussions about Britain and the EU condition.

“Many of those who earlier were prepared to be satisfied with autonomy and now insisting on independence,” he writes. The British government has not responded harshly but instead has declared that “it is ready to give Scotland as much sovereignty as it wants,” a phrase that recalls Boris Yeltsin’s offer to the non-Russians in the RSFSR in 1990 and 1991.

Galeyev suggests that this approach may work to limit the rise of Scots nationalism far more effectively than the harsh steps that the Spanish government has taken with respect to Catalonia.  Indeed, he concludes, European governments – and he could include Russia’s in this --- often try to hold on to everything and as a result “lose everything” in the end.