Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 31 – Russians are
now wallowing in their past but “literally going around the edge of the enormous
black hole [of Stalin’s crimes], afraid to look into it,” Sergey Medvedev says.
But if they are to make progress, they must behave as Germany has done, acknowledging
the crimes their country has committed.
“Sooner or later,” the Russian
historian told a EU-sponsored seminar at Oxford, “Russia will have to pass along
the same path” if Russia is to reacquire a future (znak.com/2020-01-31/rossii_predstoit_osoznat_uzhasy_svoey_istorii_kak_eto_sdelala_germaniya_lekciya_sergeya_medvedeva_v_).
“Memory has become one of the most
important platforms of present-day political life,” the historian says, “the sphere
where the hottest wars are breaking out. Twenty years ago, no on thought that
the past would become ‘a mine field’ where we would fight over the
interpretation of World War II, the Holocaust, Stalin and so on.”
“Now this has become mainstream”
especially in Russia and especially in this 75th anniversary year of
the end of World War II. The fact that the Polish president did not go to
Jerusalem and the Russian president was not invited to Auschwitz is emblematic
of this fight over the past as a way of dealing with the present and future.
And as Medvedev notes, it recalls the
old Radio Armenia joke: Will there be a third world war? The station is asked.
No, there won’t be such a war, “but there will be such a struggle for peace
that it may seem like a war.” And what is striking is how rapidly this has
occurred: “If in 1991, we had a world of the future, now we have a world of the
past.”
This “transformation has taken place
booth in Russia and abroad, both from below at the level of individual families
and personal histories and from above by governments and international
coalitions.” The question naturally
arises -- “why has this occurred?” -- the Russian historian says, and why is
there such “a strong demand for dignity and identity?”
The Germans have been remarkably
immune to this trend because they were forced as a defeated and occupied people
to confront their past honestly, an experience
which continues to exert “a strong impression on German policy” be it with regard
to thinking about the Nazis or allowing immigrants to come into the country.
Other countries have had less
success in avoiding this turn to the past in part because they did not have
this German experience. Russia in particular has had “problems with memory” in
part because “with us, memory is very weak: in Russia there are many badly
preserved cemeteries and there are no graves which are preserved for centuries.”
“Our memory was taken from us by the
state and the empire,” Medvedev says. “The Russian people once every few
decades or even more often passes through a meatgrinder” because “this is the
problem of an imperial nation. And having begun a search for their roots is a
delayed reaction to this lack of memory.”
“We live with a black hole in the
midst of our national memory,” Medvedev continues. “This is an enormous hole
which was formed in the middle of the 20th century. We go along the
edge of this black whole and are afraid to look into it.” And that opens the
way for “the falsification of history” which justifies this obliviousness to
the actual past.
“Now it is considered right to think
that the history of Russia is a history of victories. Suvorov, Stalin, Zhukov”
and that there has been on uninterrupted series of such victories with nothing
else in between. That demands averting one’s eyes and believing many things
that aren’t true – and there are plenty who will supply these new myths.
According to Medvedev, “with us, the
era of utopia ended with the collapse of the USSR. But we now are nostalgic for
that utopia” and its imagined benefits. “We have a Museum of Victory, but why
don’t we have a museum of war? There
cannot be victories without war,” and war involves more than victory marches.
Stalin has become fashionable with
Russians: he is now “a pure brand.” “Why?
This is connected with nostalgia for order. People think that under Stalin
there were no tortures in the militia. This is a kind of protest voting for
Stalin. A paradox. This is a fashion which reflects an absolutely demoralized
note.”
“Not 1991, not, 1917, But 1945 and
May 9, 1945 is when the USSR was at the height of its geopolitical greatness
and decided the fate of the world. All of today’s geopolitics of Russia is an
attempt to return to that condition,” Medvedev continues. To that end, the
Putin regime has created “an indisputable myth which is easy to package and
sell to the people.”
But this isn’t going to save Russia,
he says. The only thing that will is to go along the path Germany did, one that
involves both “soft memory like literature and stories, and hard like laws,
memorials and school textbooks. In Germany there are both.” Russia needs to
have both as well.
“Memory is a question of enlightenment.
On need not insist on one’s memory; one must recognize one’s guilt. The vicious
circle is broken when all the participating sides recognize their particular guilt
– Germany for the Holocaust and Russia for the occupation of Eastern Europe,
the border guards, SMERSH, and its attacks on Poles about the Holocaust.”
And then Medvedev concludes: “Only
from that point will Rebirth begin. In the opposite case, the memory wars are
fraught with civic, political and military conflicts.”
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