Northern Sea Route Shows that ‘Shortest Path is Not Necessarily the Most Profitable,’ Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 26 – Moscow invariably suggests that the Northern Sea Route will beat out the Suez Canal as the primary sea path between Asia and Europe; but that argument is deeply flawed because “the shortest path is not necessarily the most profitable one,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            There are many reasons why this is true in the case, the Russian economist says; but before considering them in detail, it is important to remember that Moscow’s claim that the NSR is shorter is itself flawed because it is measured from northern China rather than other Asian ports further south (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/26/sokraschayuschaya-rasstoyaniya-mechta-a204315).

            But the most important is that the speed ships travel on the NSR is very different from that of vessels using more southerly routes. Because of ice, NSR transit often proceeds at two to three knots compared to 19 to 20 elsewhere, a difference which in itself vitiates the advantages of the geographically shorter northern route.

            There are other problems with the Russian assumption about the advantages of the NSR, Inozemtsev says.  Most large container ships require deeper water to sail through than is available in parts of the NSR. A ship drawing 15 meters which many do simply can’t pass through the NSR which in places drops to far less, only nine or ten meters.

            Another problem is that ships using the southern route typically drop off and pick up cargo at ports along the route, but in the case of the NSR, these are few and far between; and so shippers lose that advantage as well, something the enthusiastic Muscovite backers of the NSR ignore

            Beyond that there is the problem of ice. Of the 116,000 merchant ships in the world, Inozemtsev says, only “about 360” of the container ship segment are ice class, that is, built to withstand ice and required by insurers for passage via the NSR. Building more ships is hardly an attractive option when there are other ways to bring goods to market.

            And there is the problem of icebreakers which must accompany even ice capable ships along the NSR. According to Inozemtsev, “Russia’s icebreaker fleet is too small to handle” a flow much great than the one now, which is far belong what Putin called for only a few years ago and which can’t approach the volumes he and others have projected.

            Changing any of these things would be massively expensive, far beyond the means of the Russian state. That means Moscow would have to hope for and then rely on foreign investors, something that would make the NSR anything but the bulwark of Russian greatness and national security Putin hopes for.