Sunday, August 2, 2020

Russian Police and Russian People Back Vigilante Groups, 'Public Verdict' Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – One of the more disturbing developments in Russia over the last several years has been the emergence of groups who in the name of supporting law and order engage in vigilante-type actions and who are sometimes used by the authorities to do their dirty work in a way that offers the powers that be a certain deniability.

            Now, the Public Verdict rights group has prepared a report showing that many in the Russian police force welcome the cooperation of these groups rather than viewing them, as do many activists, as a threat to the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of the people (kommersant.ru/doc/4435194).

            But not only do many police officers say that groups like StopKham and Antidiler, “do more good than harm,” many Russians do as well, “not only approving such attempts at taking over police functions [by such groups] but also are ready to make their peace with any force accompanying such actions,”  according to the new study.

            In her report on this trend, journalist Mariya Starikova says that a vigilante is usually defined as someone who pursues violators of the law outside of normal legal channels on the assume that the police are ineffective. The Public Verdict group simplifies this concept by referring to such people as “pseudo-policemen.” 

            Asmik Novikova of the Public Verdict study says that only one Russian in ten views the activities of vigilante groups as exclusively harmful, with far larger percentages saying that they make a positive contribution.  More than half of its sample said that “some citizens may force others” to obey the law.

            Novikova says that Russian vigilantism is typically very specific in its targets, with some groups focusing on parking enforcement and others on public alcoholism or drug dealing rather than having broader agendas.  But even in these narrow areas, she continues, they often trigger conflicts rather than improve public order.

            Denis Volkov, deputy director of the Levada Center, says that Russians are broadly tolerance of the use of force by the police or those allied with the police and do not think that they have the right to speak out against it, including when such force is used by extra-legal vigilantes.

            Starikova spoke with the leaders of groups which fight parking violations and drug dealing. Both were proud of what they have been able to accomplish and only wish they had more authority to enforce the law.  Apparently, the Moscow police union and the Russian Guard want them to be more heavily involved, especially in raids on violators.

            But Anatoly Kucheren, head of the public advisory council of the Interior Ministry, warns that “citizens cannot assume the authority of the police because if they do, they risk landing ‘on the bench of the accused’” alongside those they say they are targeting. They must offer their services but act only in coordination with the police rather than independently.

Kazakhstan Becoming Not Just More Kazakh But More Muslim Too, Mustafayev Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – Since 1991, Kazakhstan has become more Kazakhs given that many non-Kazakhs have left and the Kazakh growth rate is higher. At the same time, it has become more Muslim with Kazakhs increasingly shifting from nominal allegiance to something more. The question now is whether this can happen in a way precluding the rise of extremist groups.

            Some argue that the strengthening of traditional Islamic identities serve as a bulwark against extremists because those who are committed to their faith are less likely to be swayed by radicals. Others say that as a population becomes more attached to Islam, the more likely it is that this will open the door to fundamentalists and radicals.

            That debate has now broken out in Kazakhstan. Several months ago, Galym Zhusipbek, an independent investigator, argued that Kazakhstan must promote a civil society and downplay religious attachments, a position that has drawn fire from those who say that Islam is an integral part of Kazakh nationhood (camonitor.kz/34923-kakoe-buduschee-zhdet-kazahstan-religioznoe-ili-svetskoe.html).

            Now, historian Nurtay Mustafayev has taken up the issue, arguing that Kazakhs are becoming more Islamic and that the state should support that as a bulwark against extremism rather than continue to view this development as a threat (camonitor.kz/35510-kazahstan-stanovitsya-vse-bolee-musulmanskoy-stranoy-chem-eto-chrevato.html).

            According to Mustafayev, as recently as 30 years ago, the majority of Kazakhs identified as atheists; but after independence, they overwhelmingly declared they were Muslims, an identity without a great deal of content besides its link to nationhood. Since then, many of them have added content to the religious identity and insisted on its application in the country.

            At present, he says, expert surveys suggest that from 20 to 25 percent of Kazakhs are religious in more than name.  They are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi rite. But despite suggestions that interest in religion is ebbing and atheism returning, Mustafayev says, in reality, ever more Kazakhs are taking their religion seriously.

            One sign of this is that they are building more mosques. Between 2017 and 2020, he says, the number of mosques increased from 3600 to 3796, a six percent increase over only three years.  This means that in time more Kazakhs will become religious and they will give a religious coloration to the country regardless of its constitutionally defined secularism.

            Mustafayev says that in the world today, there are only “four theocratic states – the Vatican, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan” but there are many more de facto. Chechnya, although within the borders of the secular Russian Federation, has imposed the norms of shariat on its residents.

            What Kazakhs should be talking about is not whether Islam will become more influential but what role it will play and how greater religiosity in fact can serve to prevent any expansion of Islamist radicalism, he argues. The Kazakh government can help if it supports Kazakh Muslims in their aspirations rather than opposes them, thereby alienating them.

            During the cold war, the historian continues, liberal democracy was kept in tone by the challenge of communism; but now that its opponent has disappeared, many liberal democrats have begun to support ideas like single sex marriages that alienate many traditional people not only from liberalism but also from democracy.

            “The experience of many countries shows that democracy is not a panacea,” Mustafayev concludes.  “Having discredited itself, it in fact has promoted the disintegration of Christianity, the growth of religious extremism, and the migration crisis in Western Europe.” Kazakhstan needs to learn from this and welcome the increasing influence of traditional Islam.

Putin No Longer Seeking Natural Growth of Russian Population, Will Rely on Immigration Instead, Chernyshov Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – In the new text of his national goals for Russia for the next decade (nakanune.ru/news/2020/07/21/22579126/), Vladimir Putin has dropped his earlier commitment to boosting the growth rate of the indigenous Russian population, an indication that he will rely on immigration alone for any rise in the total, Yevgeny Chernyshov says.

            Putin’s decision shows just how irresponsible Russian officials have been in suggesting that in a few years, the natural rate of increase of Russian citizens (births over deaths) will rise and points to dramatic changes in government policy and the conditions under which Russians will live, the commentator says (nakanune.ru/news/2020/7/31/22580091/).

            Apparently Putin has decided that neither pro-natalist policies nor improved conditions for Russian adults and the elderly designed to reduce the death rate are going to work or at least that he is not prepared or able to commit sufficient resources to them in order to ensure the fertility rate rises to replacement levels and mortality rates fall.

            That means, Chernyshov says, that programs now in place designed to do so are likely to be cut back or even eliminated in the coming years, something that will inflict serious hardships both on younger families and on older Russians who suffer disproportionately from alcohol-related accidents and illnesses associated with aging such as cancer.

            But Putin’s decision means something else that may matter even more to many Russians. If the Kremlin has decided to rely on immigrants alone to boost the population, that will mean that the share of such immigrants, most of whom will come from Muslim areas in Central Asia and the Caucasus, will inevitably rise.

            At present, such immigrants may form ten percent of the population; but if Putin’s policies are followed, that share will rise, both because the number of Russians will continue to decline and because the number of immigrants will rise. Given tensions between these communities, that trend by itself is likely to prove destabilizing.

            There is another consequence of this shift in policy, one that Chernyshov does not discuss, that may also matter a great deal. Moscow has counted on its pro-natalist policies to boost birthrates among ethnic Russians who today have fewer children than many non-Russian nations now within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            Without such programs as maternal capital, birthrates among ethnic Russians will likely fall still faster, making the relative advantage many non-Russian groups have that much larger. And as a result, the non-Russian share of the population will continue to increase at an accelerating rate.

            Chernyshov is the first to raise the alarm about this, but Russian nationalists are likely to add their voices soon as well, especially given the Kremlin leader’s constant talk about how he is promoting a Russian “world,” something that this shift in his policy will not only do nothing to promote but will make increasingly impossible.