'Putin May Well Go Down in History as Last Ruler of a Place Called Russia,' Martynov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – Because of Vladimir Putin’s vicious and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and his increasingly repressive policies at home, Russia over the last ten months has become “the symbol of a caricature of evil,” Kirill Martynov says, with the consequences of his actions spreading into all aspects of Russian life.

            Russia is now ruled by “a dictator besotted with infinite power, cut off from the people and from real life;” and despite several tens of thousands of protesters, there is no one in Russia to stop him from engaging in what looks like national suicide, the editor of Novaya gazeta now published abroad (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/12/31/mezhdu-otchaianiem-i-soprotivleniem).

            Russian society “reeks with fear; and in universities, schools and offices, people have learned to be silent and turn away” from what is going on around them, allowing Putin and his camarilla to continue to behave as they are and threatening the future of Russia and themselves as well.

            According to Martynov, “Vladimir Putin possibly will go down in history as the last ruler of a country called Russia” because it is “difficult to imagine how our motherland will be able to right itself after the catastrophe created in honor of his 70^th birthday. Nero with his fires was a piker: he didn’t have the present-day technologies” Putin does.

            Martynov offers what he describes as “an incomplete list of what the authorities of the Rusian Federation have done to harm their own people”: the demise of Russian education, demographic collapse, economic decay and decline, a legal system that doesn’t work, Russian sports in their worst shape ever, and Russian culture in a state of collapse.

            “There is not a single sphere of life that Putin’s war has not touched,” the editor says. As a result, he says he is “sure that ‘the special military operation’ will go down in history as an example of radical incompetence as it is difficult to find any other cases of such stupidity at least in recent times.”

            Because of what Putin has done, Martynov continues, “we are guaranteed the eternal hatred of our neighbors, a European people of some 40 million. I’m not sure if my friends in Kyiv will want to talk to me now. After all, when I promised to do everything I could, I still believed we could stop the killers.”

            He says that when he asked the readers of his paper last month what they were proud of, they spoke about “the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people, that in the face of aggression by a terrible enemy, Ukraine has reliable allies … and that even cruise missile, cold and darkness could not break the spirit of the Ukrainian people.”

            As Russians, Martynov says, we must be honest with ourselves and recognize that 2023 will be even worse than 2022 was. “Putin will dry to drag Ukraine, Russia and if possible all of humanity into hell after him.” Faced with that, each Russian must really try to do whatever he or she can to stop him and save themselves, their country and the world.

A Quick Victory by Ukraine Best Outcome for Russia, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – There can be no question that the most important event of the past year was “Russia’s defeat in its war against Ukraine,” Dimitry Savvin says, a defeat brought about not only by the initial hubris of Moscow and the powerful resistance of Ukrainians but by the Kremlin’s unwillingness to cut its losses and declare a victory in March.

            Had it done so after advancing into the Donbass and the land bridge to Crimea and then withdrawn to the pre-February 24 borders, the editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian Harbin portal says, Moscow could have presented what it had done as a victory and would not have suffered the defeat that followed (harbin.lv/god-kotoryy-reshit-sudbu-stoletiya).

            At that time, the West had not imposed the sanctions it decided upon later or lined up as completely behind Kyiv, and the Ukrainian authorities had indicated that they would accept such an outcome at least as an intermediate position. But instead of doing that, Putin and company behaved according to type and pushed on, hoping that by raising the stakes they could win.

            They were profoundly mistaken. The West is now behind Ukraine. Ukraine won’t accept the pre-February 24 borders. The Russian military has been shown not to be the powerful force everyone had assumed but a Potemkin army. And worst of all, Russia has been forced into becoming “a vassal of China.”

            The Kremlin now faces a clear choice in Ukraine, either exiting from the conflict as soon as possible or increasing its military presence there in the hopes of reversing its current defeat. The Kremlin hasn’t chosen either but it is clearly “afraid to leave the war” because doing so, as in the case of Afghanistan, would put the system on course to a new perestroika.

            But the Kremlin’s half way approach, classic in Putin’s time, won’t work, Savvin argues; and it is beginning to backfire not only internationally but within Russia and the ranks of his own regime. Meanwhile, China is picking up the pieces, securing Russia as a kind of second North Korea behind which it can pursue its own goals.

            Russia won’t be the beneficiary of that, the conservative commentator continues; and that reality will become increasingly obvious in the coming months, the recognition of which will likely split Russian elites still further. That the Putin apparatus isn’t pursuing Russian national interests is no surprise; but in this, it isn’t pursuing its own either. That too is becoming clear.

            For all these reasons, Savvin goes on to suggest, “Ukraine in 2023 is becoming the place where, without exaggeration, the fate of the world is going to be decided. The paradox is that the most rapid possible victory of Ukraine is also the best outcome not only for it but also … for Russia.”

            A speedy Ukrainian victory and withdrawal to the borders of 2013 will create conditions for political normalization, the preservation (in general and on the whole) or state unity, at least superficial perestroika-like liberalization and its inclusion in one way or another in the bloc of free nations that is emerging to oppose China.”

            “The alternative, an extended conflict, the intensiveness of which inevitably will fall” would transform the war into something like that between the two Koreas, Savvin suggests. “In this case, Russia under pressure of sanctions will begin to transform itself into a North Korean-like state and its vassal dependence on China will become all-embracing.”

 

Putin’s War in Ukraine has Radicalized Bashkirs at Home and Abroad, Gabbasov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – Vladimir Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine and repressive measures by both Moscow and Ufa against the Bashkir people have radicalized both those Bashkirs who have been forced to emigrate and those who have remained at home, according to Ruslan Gabbasov, one of the leaders of the Bashkir National Movement.

            Despite repression by Moscow and Ufa, he says, Bashkirs at home have continued to protest the war; but in large part because of it, he continues, Bashkirs in the emigration like himself have moved from seeking genuine federalism to demanding independence for Bashkortostan (idelreal.org/a/32195860.html).

            Because of increasing repression in their homeland, Gabbasov says, “it has become ever more difficult to carry out opposition activity, especially since the beginning of military activities; and therefore, the main focus of the activity of the Bashkir national movement has shifted to abroad” where in Lithuania a Bashkir National Political Center has been set up.

            The Center’s representatives have begun to “actively participate in various political forms and conferences which have taken place in various countries,” he continues. “We have been telling the world community what is really taking place in the republic. As a result, many have begun to learn about the problems of the Bashkir people.”

            “The longer the war has gone on, the more radical have become the actions of ordinary residents of the republic,” Gabbassov says. They have distributed leaflets againsthte war and firebombed at least two draft offices. In addition, some have gone to fight in Ukraine, even forming a Bashkort company there.

             Bashkirs have thus become the fourth non-Russian nation doing so, the others being the Chechens, the Crimeans and the Daghestanis.

No One in 1916 Thought the Russian Empire would Cease to Exist or in 1990 that the USSR would Disintegrate, Aysin Reminds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – The Kremlin has done everything it can to narrow the opportunities non-Russian nations within the Russian Federation have to preserve their identities; and Moscow has had some tactical successes, Ruslan Aysin says. But precisely because of Russia’s enormous diversity, Moscow is setting itself up for strategic failure.

            The war in Ukraine has only exacerbated the tension between Moscow’s drive for a Russian world and the desire of the various nations and peoples now within the borders of the Russian Federation to retain their identities, according to the political analyst of the IdelReal portal (idelreal.org/a/32201253.html).

            Moscow has acted as it has precisely because it “fears Kazan” and the other non-Russian centers. It recognizes that they can become centers of separatism and that sooner or later they will be able to pursue the goal of national independence. And it believes that promoting the Russian world idea can prevent or at least forestall that outcome.

            But, Aysin says, “in 1990, no one thought that the Soviet Union would fall apart; and no one thought that in 1917 the Russian Empire would be no more. But both disappeared from the political map of the world.” In each case, neither the center nor those abroad understood the forces that were working toward those ends.

            Given those precedents, many more recognize that the Russian Federation is approaching its end not only because of the aspirations of the nations living under Russian rule but because of the nature of that rule, a rule that is based on a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of the country.

The Russian Security Council which now runs the country for Putin is filled with people who grew up in the security services in Soviet times, Aysin says. “they see a conspiracy and a threat in everything and aren’t interested in any other problems. They live in the era of the Cold War.”

“For Putin, Patrushev, Bortnikov and the others, the main thing is to revive the Soviet empire, but they do not understand well that history must not be turned back,” the commentator continues. And so “they are fighting against the future, progress and civilization itself.”

They view the non-Russian republics as “the source of separatism, and they want to make Russia a unitary country. But that is impossible because Russia is a complex land” of enormous diversity. “But they don’t want to see this because they have a colonial mentality and dream about an empire with a single religion and a single nation.”

Moscow leaders dream of this but they can’t create it; and so what they are doing instead is pushing policies that will accelerate the demise of the system they rule and lead to its end. Both in Ukraine and in the non-Russian republics, Moscow is engaged in what in all likelihood is its “last colonial war.”

It is fated to lose these two interrelated wars, and what will emerge as a result will be something fundamentally different from what the Kremlin wants or what existed before Putin came to power. 

Anti-Western Patriotic Consensus Breaking Down from Within, Makarkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1—Most observers have focused on the clash between the Kremlin which has done everything possible to promote an anti-Western patriotic consensus and those few Russians remaining who are not part of that consensus, according to Moscow political analyst Aleksey Makarkin.

            But the real story of recent months has been the appearance of dissent not against this consensus but of dissent within it, with various factions adopting different positions on how best to implement it, he continues. Those divisions are likely to become the seedbed for the re-emergence of politics in Russia (rosbalt.ru/posts/2022/12/31/1981511.html).

            Within the patriot consensus, Makarkin says, a real debate has emerged over what to do with those who fled Russia to avoid military service. “Political rationality suggests that dissatisfied people abroad are less dangerous for the authorities than are those who remain within the country … but there is an emotional desire to punish those who have broken the consensus.”

            Two camps have formed, with one wanting draconian punishments and the other behaving in a more rational manner. That shouldn’t surprise anyone at a time when a decision is yet be taken. “This is exactly how the return of politics happens – not in some academic seminar about alternatives but rather in talk about what level of brutality should be applied.

            Another sign that politics is returning not against the consensus but within it are the changing positions various public figures are filling. Dmitry Medvedev, long the archetypical systemic liberal, “now stresses his radical patriotism. Russian imperial nationalists admire Ramzan Kadyrov and Yevgeny Prigozhin is now a businessman who can attack a governor.”

            Such moves may not seem like much, but they are undoubtedly harbingers of a new politics in Russia, one in which the predictability of the past is rapidly being replaced by the a renewed as old alliances and interest groups break down and new ones form. This trend must be carefully watched, Makarkin suggests.

A Study in Isolation: Putin Went Outside of Russia 22 Times in 2019 but Only Nine Times in 2022, ‘Vyorstka’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – Almost everyone now is given to observing that Vladimir Putin retreated to his bunker because of the covid pandemic and has remained there because of his expanded war in Ukraine, but such conclusions are seldom based on an exact count of his travel and speeches.

            Now, the new Vyorstka outlet has come up with the numbers that provide confirmation of that view and underscore how isolated Putin has become not only with the outside world but even with the residents of the country he currently rules (verstka.media/putin-stal-menshe-ezdit-2022/).

            In 2022, the news portal says, Putin travelled out of Moscow only 24 times, down from 62 in 2019. Of these, only nine were to places beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, while three years ago, 22 were and “almost half of these were to countries of Europe,” countries to which he no longer goes or whose leaders no longer come to Moscow.

            And of the nine foreign visits this year, the news portal says, only two – to China for the Olympics and to Iran – were to countries beyond the borders of the former Soviet space. The others were primarily to Central Asian countries and most recently to Belarus.

            The last European leader to visit Putin in Moscow was the German chancellor who came ten days before Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine. Since then, there haven’t been any exchanges of visits between Putin and the leaders of the West, although he has spoken by telephone with the French president 19 times and the German chancellor 12.

            Putin has also isolated himself within Russia. Between 2019 and 2022, the number of trips he has made to locations within the Russian Federation outside of Moscow fell from 40 to 15 and the number of public speeches inside Russia fell from 55 to 21, all trends which show little sign of ending in 2023.

Tatars Suffered Huge Decline in Numbers in Last Decade while Bashkirs Didn’t, New Nationality Data from Latest Russian Census Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 1 – The number of Tatars living in the Russian Federation fell from 5.3 million to 4.7 million between 2010 and 2021, according to the newly released results of the 2020/2021 census, but the number of Bashkirs remained almost constant at 1.6 million, after a decline of only 12, 675.

            According to the census figures, the number of Bashkirs in Bashkortostan rose from 1.17 million to 1.27 million while the number of Tatars in that republic fell from one million to 974,500, trends that allowed the ethnic Russian share of Bashkortostan’s population to rise to 37.5 percent.

            Because of the holidays, the Rosstat website has not been updated but the nationality figures that it will likely report more fully later this month are being reported in the regions and republics and can be found at milliard.tatar/news/za-10-let-tatar-v-rossii-stalo-mense-na-pocti-600-tysyac-2668 and zemfort1983.livejournal.com/1440919.html).

            The differences between Tatars and Bashkirs are likely to reignite Tatar fears that Bashkortostan has been manipulating the census and spark demands that the results be corrected. (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/10/tatars-not-declining-in-bashkortostan.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/tatar-writer-who-forced-moscow-to.html.)

            Other non-Russian republics in the Middle Volga have also seen their titular nationalities decline in number. The Chuvash, for example, have fallen by 370,000 to just over a million. Such declines in the titular non-Russian nationalities has opened the way for ethnic Russians in many of them to increase their share since 2010, reversing a longtime trend.

            Another result from the nationality section of the 2020/2021 census now being released is the finding that 11.3 percent of the population of the Russian Federation no longer reports a nationality at all. According to at least one observer, the share of such people is greater among former Russians than others (zemfort1983.livejournal.com/1440919.html).  

            To the extent that is the case, it suggests that Russian ethnic identity may weaker than those of other nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation and that Russians are increasingly thinking of their identity in political rather than ethnic terms, while non-Russians, although declining in size, are not making that transition nearly as much.