Moscow Publicized Russian Losses in Makeyevka Because It Couldn’t Hide So Many Deaths at Once in a Single Federal Subject, ‘Vyorstka’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Moscow acknowledged the loss of 89 newly mobilized troops in fighting in Makeyevka near Donetsk because it realized it couldn’t hide so many deaths at once given that those involved were from a single federal subject, the Vyorstka news agency says, citing anonymous sources in the Russian government.  

            Up until then, Russian media either denied losses or sought to minimize them, the news agency says; but now it has concluded it must change its approach given its increasing tendency to assign men from one federal subject to the same unit and its inability to block people there from learning the truth either by observation or the Internet (verstka.media/pochemu-vlasti-ne-zamalchivayut-massovuyu-gibel-mobilizovannyh/).

            But some observers think this change has less to do with fears among the regime that their lies will be exposed than with a calculation that reports about such losses will have the effect of mobilizing Russian opinion against Ukraine and making the population more willing to make sacrifices against an enemy who has inflicted so much pain on Russians. 

Neither Tatar nor Non-Tatar Telegram Channels Treated Retitling of Tatarstan Head as Extraordinary, Milliard.Tatar Analysts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Many Moscow media outlets treated Tatarstan’s decision to retitle the head of the republic as rais rather than president as something extraordinary, an act of continuing national assertiveness. But telegram channels, both Tatar and non-Tatar, in contrast suggested that it was an entirely normal means of making republic law conform to federal ones.

            That is the conclusion of analysts at the Milliard.Tatar site who used word embedding analysis of 16 non-Tatar and nine Tatar telegram channels, places where politically attentive people are most likely to express their opinions (milliard.tatar/news/rais-kak-telegram-kanaly-rasskazali-o-pereimenovanii-dolznosti-prezidenta-tatarstana-2688).

            The only difference between the Tatar and non-Tatar channels as far as the use of rais is concerned is that the Tatar ones devoted far less attention to that Arabic term than did the non-Tatar ones, likely because, the Milliard.Tatar analysts say, it is quite familiar to Tatars even though it may seem very foreign to others.

            The results, presented in the form of two word clouds, suggest that media hype notwithstanding, the political class both in Moscow and in the regions and republics accepts what Tatarstan has done as entirely normal and acceptable and that the adoption of the word “rais” is a step that they are quite prepared to live with.

            That suggests that Moscow is likely to be satisfied with what Tatarstan has done rather than take any future steps to force Kazan to drop the term “rais” and replace it with something like “head” as other republics have done. As a result, Tatarstan will remain in this respect an outlier and potential bellwether within the Russian Federation.

New Census Data Challenges Putin’s Notions about the Relationship between Language and National Identity

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Like many others, Vladimir Putin assumes that those who give up their native language will more or less at the same time give up their ethnic as well. But newly released Russian census data show that relationship between the two changes is more complicated and that many retain their identities even after they give up their native tongues.

            Indeed, the experience of the Soviet past and of other countries even suggests that those who shift from their native language to the language of the imperial center may, as a result of the competition they now find themselves in with the members of the imperial nation may become more nationalistic and thus more attached to their identity despite language change.

            That must be recognized by anyone using census data or thinking about this relationship. Those nations where almost everyone speaks the language of the nation may either be growing or declining. They are growing if their total grows; and they are declining if people who stop speaking the language stop identifying as members of the native.

            Conversely, those nations in which the share speaking the native language is far lower may in fact be better positioned to survive. They are if ethnic numbers remain high even though the share of those speaking the national language drops but are in a weak one if the ethnic numbers decline along with the number speaking the national language.

            Rosstat reports the most recent Russian census shows that for some groups, the overlap between ethnic self-identification and declaration of native language is almost 100 percent. That is the case with ethnic Russians and Chechens. But their situations are radically different as far as this relationship is concerned.

            Those identifying as Russians, on the one hand, fell by five million over the last 11 years, with some changing their ethnic self-identification or giving it up altogether, a pattern suggesting that for Russians, language is key to ethnic identity and that its loss likely would lead those who had declared that identity to change it.

            Those identifying as Chechens, on the other hand, increased in number even as their allegiance to Chechen as their native language remained almost as high as the Russians, something that highlights not so much the importance of language as support for identity but the way in which in such a situation the two reinforce one another.

            More interesting are the cases of nations in between. In some cases, particularly those involving numerically small nations, the loss of language can lead to the loss of ethnic identity as well. But in others, both small and large, the loss of language has not led to a loss of national identity – or at a minimum not at the rates that the Kremlin leader and many others assume.

            A case in point are the Ukrainians living within the current borders of the Russian Federation. Seventy percent of them say that Russian is their native language but continue to identify as Ukrainians by nationality, a sign not of weakness of national identity as many might suppose but of its strength (nazaccent.ru/content/39789-bolee-70-rossijskih-ukraincev-schitayut-rodnym-yazykom-russkij.html).

           

Iranian Wharf Now Repairing Russian Ship

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – In a move that potentially may prove more consequential that Tehran’s ongoing supply of drones to the Russian army now invading Ukraine, Iran’s Maritime Industrial Company (SADRA) is currently repairing a Russian ship that crashed into ice in the Volga River (casp-geo.ru/rossijskij-suhogruz-otpravlen-na-remont-na-kaspijskie-verfi-irana/).

            Three aspects of this development are important. First, it represents a kind of solution to the difficulties Russia has long faced in its domestic shipbuilding capacity and its more recent exclusion from the use of foreign yards (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/10/russian-navy-and-its-shipbuilding.html).

            Second, it represents a major step forward in Iran’s efforts to become a major shipbuilding center, something that could help it project power in a variety of directions including northward (tehrantimes.com/news/480398/Iran-s-shipbuilding-an-old-but-newly-developing-industry).

            And third, it highlights the difficulties Russia is having with its river fleet, a set of ships closely tied to its invasion of Ukraine and its efforts develop a north-south trade corridor to end run Western sanctions (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/08/moscow-wants-north-south-transport.html and jamestown.org/program/russia-now-forced-to-look-east-of-caucasus-to-reach-iran/).

If Moscow Restarts Regional Amalgamation Campaign, It is Likely to Involve Russian Regions in Center of the Country, Chablin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Telegram channels are buzzing with reports saying that the Kremlin is planning to restart its regional amalgamation campaign, despite the fact that its past efforts in that direction haven’t been without problems and that the last effective combination of two regions into one took place 15 years ago.

            If Moscow does decide to do so, Anton Chablin of the Accents analytic center says that the most likely candidates are ethnic Russian regions in the center of the country whose governors lack the political clout to block such a move (mk.ru/politics/2023/01/05/gubernatory-ne-piknut-chislo-rossiyskikh-regionov-mozhet-rezko-sokratitsya.html).

            Moscow may decide, he suggests, that it can combine these poor and overwhelming ethnic Russian regions without being challenged as it has been in the non-Russian areas where it faced resistance in the past. But it is important to remember that the center did not anticipate problems even with them when it carried out its amalgamation plans in the past.

            In his report about the possibility of another amalgamation campaign, Andrey Vladimirov of Moskovsky komsomolets cites the views of Aleksandr Kynyev, a regional specialist whose own research and writing helped put an end to the regional amalgamation campaign of a decade ago.

            Kynyev argues that any amalgamation won’t solve problems but only create new ones and that most importantly it will set ever more regional and republic elites and populations against Moscow, something that in the current situation the authorities at the center can hardly afford to allow to happen.

            “Any unification,” he continues, “is always a catastrophe. It involves reorganization, firings, loss of pass and so on. This is something any normal person understands. Now, there is so much mass depression and frustration” that any amalgamation campaign would generate “mass dissatisfaction and conflicts.”

            He contributed to the 2010 report by the Moscow Institute of Contemporary Development that made some of the same points and put an end to talk about amalgamation. Unfortunately, it appears that some officials are talking about it again, something that will not do anyone any good.

Departure of Even a Single Federal Subject Now Could Trigger Complete Disintegration of Russian Federation, Ginzburg Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Russians must understand that with the weakening of Moscow, the departure of even a single federal subject, even a small one, could trigger the disintegration of the entire country, just as the departure of the three Baltic countries led to the demise of the entire USSR a few months later, according to Vitaly Ginzburg.

            In 1991, “no one was prepared” for that possibility, either in Moscow or in the West, and so what happened happened, the Russian commentator says. But now no one has an excuse and should be planning for such a repetition of those events so that it will benefit the most people and entail the least cost (http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=63B6BA3CD25 7C).

            And this means, Ginzburg continues, strategies must be adopted so that “the disintegration of Russia will become a means of RATIONALIZATION and not MARGINALIZATION,” something possible only if it is recognized that “after the weakening of the center,” it will be the republics and regions and their elites that will matter.

            Russia is unlikely to fall apart for the usual reasons such as a revolution, a military coup, or a split in the elite; but it very much may if the center gradually loses control and the leaders of regions and republics decide to exploit the situation. If even one or a small number leave as happened in August 1991, then the others will follow and Russia will disintegrate.

            Once Russians recognize that such an outcome is not only likely but almost inevitable, they can take steps to ensure that the situation does not spiral out of control into chaos and the kind of violence that could threaten not only everyone within the current borders of the country but many others besides.

            Ginzburg suggests four steps that Russians need to take: first, they must recognize that the past and present colonization of national republics and regions is Russia’s primary problem; second, they must acknowledge that the main struggle in the future will be between national and regional elites; third, they must work to eliminate the possibility that these elites will use force; and fourth, they must understand that those regional and republic elites who are in power by election will be far more successful than those appointed from the outside.

            Even if Russians recognize and act on these principles, they may not be able to prevent the disintegration of Russia, Ginzburg concludes. But they may be able to ensure that the process will work to their benefit rather than against their interests – and that is no small thing. In any case, those who are forewarned are forearmed.

Ethnic Russians Declined in Number by More than Five Million between 2010 and 2021, Newly Released Census Figures Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 5 – Even though the population of the Russian Federation increased slightly between 2010 and 2021, newly released Russian census data show, the number of ethnic Russians living within the current borders of the Russian Federation fell from 111,016,896 to 105,579,179, a decline of 5,437,717 – or almost five percent.

            That happened despite the Anschluss of Ukraine’s Crimea which brought additional ethnic Russians under Moscow’s rule and the counting as Russians of people who declared that they had a different national identity (nazaccent.ru/content/39783-chislennost-russkih-v-rossii-za-11-let-sokratilas-na-5-mln-chelovek.html).

            Among those whom Rosstat counted as ethnic Russians despite these declarations were the Albaza, the Drevlyans, the Krivicheys, the Kubans, the Kulugurs, the Lipchans, the Meshcheryaks, the Molokane, the Nuucha, the Rusaks, the rusicheys, the Russko-Ustins, the Siberians, the Skobars, the Old Believers, the Chaldos, and the Yakutyans.

            Some Russians may have been assimilated by other groups, but the most important factor almost certainly is a weakening of attachment to Russian identity and the dramatic increase in the number of residents of the Russian Federation who declared no nationality at all: one in every nine residents in the last census (zemfort1983.livejournal.com/1440919.html). 

            The decline in the number of ethnic Russians listed in the latest census does not mean that non-Russians inside the current borders of the Russian Federation are not at risk given the Russianizing and Russifying policies of the Kremlin. But it does mean that the ethnic Russians are at risk as well, albeit in ways few have paid much attention to.