Putin’s Claim that Lenin Created Ukraine Alarming Non-Russians whose Republics Bolshevik Leader Also Set Up, Solovyeva Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Vladimir Putin has said repeatedly that Ukraine exists only because Lenin established the Ukrainian SSR, statements that are alarming people in the non-Russian republics whose state structures were also set up by the Bolshevik leader, according to Elena Solovyeva.

            In a commentary for Posle media, she says that some of the non-Russians fear that what Putin is now doing in Ukraine will be the opening of a new attack on their republics, a worry that has been exacerbated by Moscow’s increasing extraction of resources from them and its installation of outsiders to run them (posle.media/komi_colony/).

            There is a growing sense, Solovyeva continues, that they are colonies, especially in paces like the Komi Republic where the feeling is that “we send all our resources to Moscow and Moscow sends us its trash,” a reference both to the planned trash dump that sparked the Shiyes protests and, it appears, a judgment about those Moscow sends as its rulers.

            Such concerns have grown in anger over the last year, the commentator says, not just because of Putin’s comments about Ukraine but also because there is growing evidence that Russian census takers falsified the results of the 2021 enumeration, artificially reducing the number of Komis by refusing to list them as such or even by listing them as ethnic Russians.

            As a result, there is a coalescence of environmental and economic concerns with political ones in places like Komi and other non-Russian republics, a coming together that has been overshadowed by protests about Putin’s war in Ukraine but has led to the rejection by the Komi of Moscow-nominated politicians and to large demonstrations.

            Without attracting much attention outside the republic, she continues, “the national question in Komi as a whole has become so sensitive that any further pressure from the center can and will provoke an increasingly fierce response,” transforming the current low boil to something more radical.

            “Can the separation of the republic from Russia be the result of the anti-colonial rhetoric now heard in Komi?” she asks. “Theoretically, yes. Formally, the republic already as a state structure including a constitution. “But geographically, it may turn out to be  in the position of an enclave state,” surrounded by Russian territories.

            For the time being at least, Solovyeva suggests, “the internal demand for Komi statehood is not that great.” But real demands for “greater federalization and greater economic and political freedoms” exist” and “as soon as the federal government begins to weaken, the republic, along with other regions and republics, will more actively seek to win back its rights.”

 

Moscow Patriarchate Seeking Immediate Political Gains Rather than Mass Evangelization in Africa, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Most of the world’s Christian denominations are now focusing on Africa, seeing that continent’s growing population as key to their futures. But the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Federation is the odd man out in that it is seeking political alliances rather than promoting evangelization of Africa’s peoples, Nezavisimaya gazeta says.

            Those who fail to see that distinction are also failing to recognize how superficial the gains the Moscow church claims in fact are, the editors of the Moscow paper say in a lead article – and how quickly these gains the ROC MP is trumpeting and getting support from the Kremlin may be swept aside (ru/editorial/2023-02-19/2_8664_red.html).

            The Roman Catholic Church and many Protestant denominations meanwhile are putting down deep roots, attracting many Africans to their flocks and setting the stage for the expansion of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa. Their actions will only help the West to expand its influence there. What the Russian church is doing won’t help Russia do the same.

Russia’s Ruling Class Sees No Alternative to Putin or Support for His War, Preobrazhensky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Russia’s ruling class sees no alternative to supporting Putin or his war in Ukraine, Ivan Preobrazhensky says. “There’s nowhere for it to run,” and the dangers of protest are all too real. As a result, the elite in Russia remains “monolithic” in that regard, something Putin chose to underline by scheduling his address to the nation on February 21.

            Despite the expectations of many in the West and the fact that many in the Russian elite have suffered because of Putin’s policies, the Deutsche Welle commentator says, “the Russian ruling class approaches the anniversary of the start of the war perhaps even more monolithic than it was” a year ago (dw.com/ru/kommentarij-u-elit-v-rossii-vyhoda-net-ili-vmeste-za-putina/a-64746718).

            In both the Russian and European media there is talk about “a Party of February 23” which supposedly consists of those who “would like to return to the re-war period. But in the Russian ruling class,” Preobrazhensky says, “there is much more strongly represented what one might call “the Party of February 21.”

            “It is no accident,” he continues, that Putin chose this date to deliver his address because exactly a year ago, on February 21, 2022, Putin assembled the Russian Security Council and forced his inner circle to “publicly support the aggression that was beginning. For him then this date is clearly very important.”

            By taking that action, Putin himself “openly showed that he is most afraid not of popular risings for which he has large repressive resources to suppress but a split in the elites.” By forcing them to commit as he did, the Kremlin leader left them with no chance to oppose him in the future about the war or about his remaining in power.

            In working to keep the elites around him monolithic, Putin has also employed carrots as well as sticks. Most prominent among the former over the last year was his decision to cancel much of the anti-corruption efforts his regime had made. Now, the elite, as long as it remains loyal, can enrich itself with less worry about the future.

            Putin can thus look to the future with confidence as far as his domestic situation is concerned, Preobrazhensky says, “because after a year of war, he has been able to maintain the main thing, the loyalty of the ruling class.”

‘Biden’s in Kyiv and Putin Isn’t’ – Russian Bloggers on the Two Presidents

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 21 – Sometimes the title authors or editors select says almost everything that needs to be said. The latest case is the decision of the editors of the Kasparov portal to headline their compilation of the reaction of Russian bloggers to US President Joe Biden’s trip to the Ukrainian capital at a time when his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin remains in a bunker.

            They took the words of Volgograd blogger Aleksandr Saygin, who summarized his reactions to the events of the last several days with the words “Biden is already in Kyiv, but Putin isn’t,” a reflection of the commitment and even triumph of the first and the problems and looming defeat of the latter (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=63F3591F4A0FD).

            Other comments that appear especially noteworthy:

·       Mikhail Khodorkovsky said that Biden’s visit to a city under Russian fire has called attention to the fact that Putin hasn’t even gone to secure rear areas in the course of his war.

·       Aleksey Lushnikov said that “Biden’s arrival in Kyiv is the most important sign of solidarity with the people of Ukraine. All the civilized world is with Ukraine.”

·       Tatyana Stanovaya said that Biden’s visit will be taken by the Kremlin as confirmation of Putin’s view that the war is not between Russia and Ukraine but between Russia and the West.

·       The Pezduza telegram channel said that “in response to Biden’s visit to Kyiv, Putin visited the other side of his desk.”

·       Vladimir Pastukhov said that in Putin may now move from “latent nuclear fetishism”” to “open nuclear exhibitionism.”

·       Dimitry Savvin said that Biden’s visit showed that the US knows what Moscow plans and wants to send as strong a signal as possible that those plans won’t succeed.

·       And the Kolokol XXI telegram channel said that “Biden has left but the humiliation of Putin remains.”

Ukrainian War’s Impact Helps Keep Russia’s Unemployment Numbers Low, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 19 – Moscow has always reported lower unemployment in Russia than do other governments for their countries, both by outright falsification of the data and by not counting many people who are kept on the payroll of corporations but who are not in fact working or paid.

            But over the last year, the Russian government has acquired a new resource that is allowing it to claim that unemployment in the Russian Federation has actually fallen: the decline in the size of the civilian labor market both because of long-term demographic changes and, more importantly, because the impact of the war in Ukraine.

            As a result of Putin’s decision to expand his invasion of Ukraine a year ago, the size of the civilian workforce has declined because several hundred thousand men have fled abroad to avoid serving in Ukraine and because more men, also numbering several hundred thousand, have been enlisted in the military.

            As a result, the size of the civilian labor force has declined, allowing officials to claim that the percentage of unemployed Russians has fallen as well. But the size of the decline in the number of unemployed is less than the size of the decline of the size of the workforce as a whole since the war started.

            That means that unemployment in Russia has only declined because there are fewer workers in Russia and there are fewer workers in Russia this year than last because so many men have either fled the country or have been impressed into the military, a pattern that some call “the paradox” of the Russian economy (ng.ru/economics/2023-02-19/1_8664_paradox.html).

            But of course, it is not a paradox; it is simply statistical sleight of hand intended to fool those who don’t look closely at the figures.

 

‘Hurrah Compatriots’ Now Include Descendants of First Anti-Bolshevik Russian Emigration

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 19 – The work of its embassies restricted by the rolling up of Russian intelligence operations in many places and the negative response of many people in Western countries to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine have prompted Moscow to expand its efforts to get them to support Moscow and counter anti-Russian attitudes.

            The Insider earlier published two extensive articles on Moscow’s efforts in the United States and Germany, focusing in particular on the support the Kremlin enjoys among many recent “relocators” in the West (theins.ru/politika/256770 and theins.ru/politika/258094). Now, it has released on one a different country and a different generation altogether.

            In what journalist Diana Fishman describes as the latest portrait of “hurrah compatriots,” the new article looks at France and at the way in which descendants of the first anti-Bolshevik Russian emigration are in an increasing number of cases in Moscow’s corner, defending the Kremlin and seeking to promote Russian influence there (theins.ru/politika/259028).

            “In France,” Fishman writes, “the chief resource of Russian ‘soft power’ has become the descendants of White Russian emigres, many of whom are representatives of noble families. Being native Frenchmen, many nonetheless have cooperated with the Russian authorities and helped the Kremlin recruit allies among the French opposition and business communities.”

            Her study builds on an earlier one  (carnegiecouncil.org/media/series/russian-soft-power-in-france/russian-soft-power-in-france-assessing-moscows-cultural-and-business-para-diplomacy%23_ftn15) and shows just how much this alliance between the descendants of former monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks and the Putin regime has grown.

            Fishman’s article provides disturbing evidence of the extent to which the bearers of some of the most distinguished names of the Russian emigration in Paris are now working hand in glove with the Russian embassy and Moscow more directly against the policies of a country that gave their ancestors asylum in the past. 

Lithuania May Soon have Two Orthodox Churches – One Subordinate to Moscow and the Second to Constantinople

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 19 -- Since 1991, Vilnius has not interfered in the internal affairs of the Lithuanian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church. The leadership of that 140,000-person strong denomination in turn has been both loyal to Lithuania and increasingly critical of Russia and its actions abroad.

            In that, the third Baltic republic until recently has been a very different position than Estonia and Latvia with regard to the Russian church. In Estonia, two Orthodox churches have emerged with one loyal to Moscow and another to Constantinople; and in Latvia, the government has moved to restrict and possibly ultimately close the Russian church (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/ukrainian-orthodox-autocephaly-now.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/11/latvian-state-enters-autocephaly-fight.html).

            The situation in Lithuania began to change after Ukrainian Orthodox achieved autocephaly, largely because there are almost 40,000 Ukrainians living in that Baltic country and many Lithuanians believe they should have the chance to worship in churches not subordinate to Moscow. And it has intensified since Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine.

            That position has continued to gain support, intensifying in particular following the Russian invasion of Ukraine a year ago (lrt.lt/naujienos/nuomones/3/230385/r-bogdanas-ka-dabar-darys-lietuvos-staciatikiai and alfa.lt/straipsnis/50385427/ukrainieciu-autokefalijos-aidas-lietuvoje).

            Now, there appears to be a very real possibility that Lithuanian Orthodoxy will split into two parts, one, the existing eparchate, remaining subordinate to Moscow, and a new group loyal to the Universal Patriarchate in Constantinople, according to Andrey Melnikov, editor of NG-Religii (ng.ru/kartblansh/2023-02-19/3_8664_kb.html).

            There are two reasons for his conclusion. On the one hand, Moscow has not responded to the eparchate’s demands for greater autonomy and self-administration, thus increasing the number of those in the Lithuanian church who want complete separation and autocephaly on the Ukrainian model.

            And on the other, the eparchate has expelled five priests for what it says is insubordination but what Constantinople says is their opposition to Moscow’s war in Ukraine. The five have turned to the Universal Patriarch for protection, and Patriarch Bartholemew has restored their priestly rights and taken them under his wing.

            Bartholemew’s actions violate traditional Orthodox norms, but by not addressing Vilnius’ concerns, Melnikov says, Moscow has given those in Lithuania who want autocephaly or at least a separate church an opening. Now, Constantinople may form around the five priests a second Orthodox church in Lithuania on the model of Estonia.

            But that of course is only a half-way house in the minds of many and represents another step toward the peeling away from Moscow of Russian Orthodox communities outside of the Russian Federation and the reduction of the Russian church to a national denomination within the county’s borders.

            The NG-Religii editor says that it is now obvious that Bartholemew has “far reaching plans, slowly but surely rearranging the pieces on the chessboard of world Orthodoxy.” And he is winning bit by bit because the Moscow Patriarchate, having lost in Ukraine, is now “afraid to more even a pawn by one square on that board.”