Staunton, March 5 – The purpose of
terrorism is to terrorize, to suggest that old rules and old expectations no
longer apply and thereby increase uncertainty and fear. That explains why
someone like Kseniya Sochak has suggested that she is next on Putin’s list now
that the Kremlin has killed Boris Nemtsov and why an increasing number of
countries around Russia are nervous.
From the point of terrorists be they
states as in this case or sub-state actors, that is one of terrorism’s great strengths
because it can often achieve its ends of destabilization, confusion and
appeasement even if those engaging in it carry out only a few actions and then
sit back and watch while others react.
And it is also why such terrorists
benefit by denying or not taking responsibility for their actions and why they
don’t want to be clear about what they plan to do next because those things in
and of themselves increase uncertainty and lead some of their potential victims
to talk in ways that alienate rather than attract the support they need in
order to counter the threat.
At present, among those who feel
most threatened by Putin’s potential actions are the Baltic countries and two
of Moscow’s supposed allies, Kazakhstan and Belarus. That the latter are on
this list is instructive: if Putin moved only against those who were clearly
his enemies, he would be less terrifying; attacking those aren’t -- or aren’t
yet -- makes him more so.
Like her Estonian colleague Toomas
Hendrik Ilves, Lithuanian President Dalia Gribauskaite leaves no doubt that
Putin is looking at the Baltic countries, has already begun an information war
against them, and forced them into a position where each must be able to fight
on its own against Russian forces before NATO forces can arrive.
Speaking yesterday on the occasion
of the re-introduction of compulsory military service in Lithuania,
Gribauskaite said that “the threat is very real” and that threat emanates not
from somewhere abstract but from Russia (ru.delfi.lt/news/politics/prezident-litvy-ugroza-realna.d?id=67341746).
Indeed, she suggested bluntly, Russia
is “already attacking us. Will this grow into a conventional confrontation? No
one knows. But already now be must defend ourselves from aggressive behavior
like the increasing activity of Russian military units in Kaliningrad, and flights
in the Baltic airspace, as well as propaganda and cyberattacks.
All this means that Lithuania and her
Baltic neighbors are today “on the front line” in a new conflict.
The
Lithuanian leader noted that Vilnius is very familiar with NATO procedures and
that the alliance would need “little less than 72 hours” to come to the aide of
its member countries in the Baltic states. Because the three are small, “we
must be in a position to defend ourselves for 72 hours or perhaps longer.” And
the Balts must do so in addition because it would be wrong to ask others to
defend them if they were not defending themselves.
A second possible
target of Putin’s attack is Kazakhstan, and Meduza.io’s Ilya Azar has provided
important background on the prospects for a second Crimea among the ethnic
Russians in the northern portion of that Central Asian country (meduza.io/news/2014/10/20/ust-kamenogorskaya-narodnaya-respublika).
Following Moscow’s Anschluss of
Crimea, Kazakhstan’s officials from President Nursultan Nazarbayev on down were
alarmed by the possibility that Moscow might try the same thing in Kazakhstan
not only because of the precedent of the failed Ust-Kamenogorsk Peoples
Republic of 1999 but also because Putin dismissed the idea that Kazakhstan had
been a state before 1917.
Astana tightened laws about
separatism, and both ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan began to
talk about whether this was a real possibility or whether one or the other side
was overreacting. The positions taken by each have exacerbated the feelings of
the other, with Russian statements feeding into Kazakh ones and vice versa.
Ethnic Russians have noted that
prior to 1900, what is northern Kazakhstan now was populated almost exclusively
by Russian Cossacks, that it and indeed the rest of the republic were initially
part of the RSFSR with a capital at Orenburg, and that Moscow had developed the
whole region. Moreover, as late as 1989, Russians formed the majority of the population
there.
Ethnic Kazakhs insist that Kazakhs
lived in eastern Kazakhstan well before the Russians appeared, and they
dismissed complaints about the status of the Russian language and the level of
local autonomy as unwarranted given that Russian still dominates many sectors
and the question of the unitary nature of the state is for Kazakhstan and not
Russia to decide.
Indeed, many Kazakhs say it would be
better to have more of the schools teach Kazakh, while some Russians connected
with the “Russian world” idea complain that the schools in northern Kazakhstan
may be in the Russian language but that “they are
not Russian” because they don’t teach the same subjects with the same stress as
schools in Russia do.
Ethnic Russians
are leaving the region, and more are likely to given Russian expectations that “sooner
or later Kazakhstan will go over to a state language,” as a result of which
Russians will feel themselves “uncomfortable” and prefer to move, in the words
of one, “rather than begin studying Kazakh.”
The events in Ukraine deepened this divide, with Kazakhs
displaying “a palpable fear of Russia” and ethnic Russians a clear expectation
that Moscow will come and include them within the Russian Federation, Azar
says. Despite that relations between the two have remained relatively stable,
and most doubt there is a possibility of a Crimea-type action in Kazakhstan.
But
no one can dismiss it entirely given that, in the words of one Russian
journalist there, “90 percent of ethnic Russians in Eastern Kazakhstan would be
glad if ‘polite people’ should arrive.” That reality has changed how ethnic
Kazakhs view them and of course both things are changing how ethnic Russians
there view themselves.
According to
one local political scientist, an ethnic Russian who doesn’t believe a Crimean
scenario is likely, that changes everything: “If Putin believes that Russians
in Kazakhstan are being persecuted, then he will not be against the creation of
conditions for real actions” against Astana.
For the time
being, however, he insists, Putin doesn’t need a “separatist” situation in Asia
because that could provoke “Russian separatism in the Urals and in Siberia,”
something the Kremlin leader wants to avoid at all costs.
And a third
case which in many ways is the most interesting because it is the most
complicated and unexpected concerns Belarus whose leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka
has simultaneously been Moscow’s closest ally and among the most outspoken
critics of Putin’s policies in Ukraine.
While almost
everyone shares the view of former RISI analyst Aleksandr Sytin that Lukashenka
has no interest in openly fighting with Russia, it is now very much unclear
whether he is loyal enough given Vladimir Putin’s ever-tighter definition of
what that consists of. And that is all the more clear now that Mensk is
reorganizing its army to counter a hybrid war.
Indeed, as NR2
analyst Kseniya Kirillova notes, Moscow has been sending Lukashenka clear
warning signs about that, and she advises in a commentary today that Mensk “should
focus” on these signals and try to increase the autonomy of the Belarusian
military “while there is still time” (nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/S-kem-gotovitsya-voevat-Lukashenko-91507.html).
Other post-Soviet states, most notably Georgia, are also
concerned, but the last few days have brought warning signs that other
countries may be at risk as well and not just from the nuclear blackmail that
Putin has sought to use against Europe and the West more generally over the
past weeks.
In
Finland, a new book has been published documenting Russian penetration of
Finland, a country that was never part of the USSR but was part of tsarist
Russia, and calling on the government them to engage in lustration to limit the
possibility that this penetration could presage a Moscow move against that
Scandinavian country (http://lustraatio.fi/lustration/).
And even more disturbingly, one
analyst has proposed what he calls a series of “gloomy scenarios” in which
Moscow might seek to project power far beyond the borders of the Russian
Federation or even the former USSR and demand bases and control in much of
northern Europe (linkis.com/wordpress.com/v6Ooq).
One hopes and prays that there is nothing
behind such suggestions, but the very nature of the kind of state terrorism
Vladimir Putin is engaged in means that they cannot be dismissed out of hand
and that there is a compelling need for new measures to track and then counter
his actions lest they lead to one or more disasters in the future.
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