Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 19 – As in many
countries, generations and the change from the dominance of one generation to
another have played a key role in Russian history. Now, picking up on the work
of Teodor Shanin about that, Vladimir Pastukhov argues that today “the lost
generation” of the 1990s is being replaced by “the generation without a future.”
And that leads to “one extremely dull
conclusion: one should expect a serious shift in public life in Russia most
likely after 2020-2025” because until then there won’t have been formed “a
subject of social action capable of any changes, the St. Antony’s College
scholar says (novayagazeta.ru/comments/69250.html).
Generations, Pastukhov begins by
pointing out, are “a social not a biological phenomenon.” That is, they are
formed by some major historical event which transforms “in a mystical way” those
born over the course of a particular period from “a statistical category” into “a
generation” whose members were defined by a common and “unique social
experience.
Following Shanin’s research, the
Russian scholar says that generations typically include people born over the
course of a 15 year period; and he then discusses the series of generations who
have mattered in Russian history over the last century in order to consider
where Russia is likely headed next.
The first of these generations,
those born between 1910 and 1925, he calls “the people of the front.” Their
views were defined by the Great Terror and the Great Victory. Having suffered
in both, they became after 1945 “the second edition of the Decembrists,” that
is, they believed they had a right to a better future because of what they had
struggled against.
They gained a partial victory with “the
arrest of Beria, the rejection of mass terror and the unmasking of the cult of
personality,” Pastukhov says.
The next generation, those born
between 1925 and 1940, became “the people of the ‘60s.” For them, “the main event of their entire
lives” was Khrushchev’s thaw, and that defined their attitudes ever after. They
believed that Russia could change for the better, and “in part,” their faith
was reflected “in the ideals of perestroika.”
The third generation in Pastukhov’s
account, those born between 1940 and 1955, were “the people of the ‘70s.” The defining event of their lives was the
Brezhnev reaction not the changes of Khrushchev or the Stalinist past. And they
were affected less by the Prague Spring than by its suppression with Soviet
tanks.
To a large extent, he writes, this
generation “was transformed into non-ideological pseudo-communist consumerist
plankton.” They were more affected by
the delights offered by the Western market than by the arguments in samizdat.
One of the many ironies is that “the USSR feared” Western weapons “but it
capitulated before mass consumption.” And for this generation, the most
important new freedom after 1991 was “the freedom of imports.”
The fourth generation, born between
1955 and 1970, was in Pastukhov’s telling “the generation of perestroika.” This generation grew up as the Soviet system
rotted. They weren’t prepared to defend it, but at the same time, “this
generation valued freedom only nominally because it was given to it without a
struggle like manna from heaven.”
For its members, “perestroika
forever has remained a holiday” that they meet “with tears in their eyes, something
which generates not so much delight as perplexity.” They did not become a
second ‘60s generation. Instead, they were infected by a narrow pragmatism, something
that “in large measure” was responsible for “the destructive character of
perestroika and all succeeding events.”
The fifth generation, those born
between 1970 and 1985, Pastukhov calls “the disappointed generation,” a
generation of complete cynics who grew up “in an atmosphere of banditry or
worse. It still remembered Soviet
standards of living, and it was disappointed in what had happened to its
country.
Its members thus “became the chief
social support” of Vladimir Putin; and “it was from among them that he selected
his new post-communist aristocracy.” He provided them with stability and
predictability, but he didn’t prepare them for the fact that they would be
succeeded in turn by a generation “more cynical” than their own.
The sixth generation, those born
between 1985 and 2000, constitute “a lost generation,” the St. Antony’s
historian says. This is “a generation of
mega-consumers,” Pastukhov writes. For them, the early years of Putin’s rule
were a defining moment. They weren’t formed by either the 1990s or the last
years of the Soviet Union.
As a result, “authoritarianism,
especially in the form of ‘sovereign democracy’ is for [this generation] a
customary and natural milieu.” Their goal is to take everything from life they
can; they are “convinced consumerists; and “the main event of their life was the
oil boom” which gave them without effort more toys. “They are infantile and
aggressive.”
Moreover, he continues, they form “the
social base for all pro-power radical movement, but not because they love the powers
that be but because they love a beautiful and comfortable life. [They] not only
support the growing over of authoritarianism into neo-totalitarianism but do
everything to provoke that.”
The seventh generation, those born
between 2000 and 2015, Pastukhov calls “the generation without a future.” For them, what may be most important is some “epic
event,” possibly “a new war” that one hopes will be “local and not a worldwide
one.” They are growing up in an atmosphere of obscurantism and of a cult of
force.
Almost every day, the members of
this generation “have to make a serious moral choice. Many make it not in favor
of good, but those who reject evil will stand firmly on that position.” That gives hope, but it also means that those
who choose evil may define the future more than the others and will seek to
bend reality to their will.
This generation will enter political
life at the beginning of the next decade when the current regime will have
reached its “apogee,” Pastukhov says. And it may have a far greater impact on
the future of Russia than did its three immediately preceding ones.
“The generations of 1955-1970 and
1970-1985 are the demiurges of the existing status quo, and the generation of
1985-2000 has not justified the hopes that have been laid on it,” Pastukhov
says. That makes the generation of 2000-2015 especially important, one over
which “a most serious struggle” must begin.
If there are unexpected shocks, a
revolution in Russia could begin earlier than 2020-2025, he says, but that
would hardly be good for Russia “because a revolution in a country where there
are no forces capable of seizing it and heading it, of giving it a clear
direction,” is likely to develop, as has been true in Russia in the past, in an
especially dangerous way.
No comments:
Post a Comment