Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 25 – By projecting its own
failings on others, the Putin regime confuses cause and effect and convinces
both itself and some others that “the entire world is against it and therefore
it must behave aggressively toward this world,” according to Vadim Shtepa, a
leading Russian regionalist writer.
“The classic examples of such government
paranoia in the 20th century,” he writes, “were the regimes of
Hitler and Stalin.” But by the end of Soviet times, such paranoia had
significantly weakened, and consequently while the Kremlin continued to use
such tropes, “society reacted to it ever more skeptically and ironically” – and
at the same time, showed more interest in “’the enemy’” (nr2.ru/column/Vadim_Shtepa/Psihoanaliz-politiki-Kremlya-102209.html).
Many had thought this the time of such
government paranoid projection had passed,
Shtepa says. Indeed, in 1999, Vladimir Putin himself even declared that “constant
pointing to outsiders as the source of our misfortunes is incorrect at its
core. All our misfortunes are in ourselves” (youtube.com/watch?v=3sG9C1qG-jc).
But if Putin believed that 16 years ago,
he clearly does not believe it now – or at the very least, he and his regime
are not acting as if they do and instead regularly ascribe to others the faults
that they display in themselves and regularly blame others for problems in
Russia that Russia has itself caused.
For many, it is obvious that “the
Russian-Ukrainian conflict began with the arrival of Russia’s ‘little green men’
in Crimea and the involvement of pro-Russian fighters in the eastern regions of
Ukraine,” Shtepa says. “But for those living in the regie of projection,
reality looks entirely different,” and they think that “the West in this way is
fighting against Russia.”
In this inverted world, “there was no
annexation of Crimea,” because “the logic of projection excludes recognition of
one’s own negative acts – in them someone else is always guilty. Russia only ‘restored
justice’ of the times of empire. And if someone doesn’t agree with that, he
himself is an evil violator of lawful borders.”
Similarly, for Moscow, “the
post-revolutionary Ukrainian regime” had to be labelled “from the very beginning
with the term ‘junta,’ although there were hardly any military people involved,
unlike in the higher Kremlin leadership. And the junta of course is ‘fascist’
even though authoritarian nationalism with a cult of an irreplaceable leader is
more characteristic of Russia today.”
This has led to the promotion of all kinds
of phobias, all reflecting the notion that “’everyone hates Russia.’ But in
reality it is the Russian language social networks which are filled with
aggressive hatred” to almost everyone else. And it is Russian television, not
CNN or Fox News which is talking about transforming someone into “’radioactive
ruble.’”
Such projection mechanisms sometimes work,
Shtepa says, “but those who fall under [their] influence do not notice this.”
He gives as an example Moscow’s insistence that Ukrainian forces shot down the
Malaysian airliner and then its objections to any international tribunal to
look into the matter.
If the Kremlin is so sure the Ukrainians
did it, the Russian regionalist writer continues, what sense does it make for
the Russian leadership to oppose such a tribunal?
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