Paul Goble
Staunton, July 26 – Vladimir Putin
may have cause to regret his promotion of right radical Russian nationalists
because some of them reject one or another of his policies and many believe he
is “too soft” in pursuit of his objectives, and thus both represent a potential
threat to his position, according to Aleksey Kurpas, a Kyiv commentator.
In “Delovaya stolitsa,” Kurpas
argues that Putin hoped “to bury all the extreme radicals” in eastern Ukraine,
quite possibly because he recognized “not without foundation” that they could
turn against him or be turned against him in the future (dsnews.ua/world/kogda-rossiya-poluchit-svoy-pravyy-sektor--24072015101100).
It
is no secret to anyone that over the last seven years, “great power ideology
has been actively supported by the authorities in Russia,” and that the regime
has financed some “mega-radical groups.”
That seemed to the Kremlin a strategy with no downside because those it
supported appeared to have nowhere else to go.
Between
2008 and 2014, Kurpas says, the numbers of nationalist and radical movements in
Russia increased by a factor of three. And as they grew in number, these
divided between the pro-Kremlin ones and the “anti-authority” ones, with the
second sparking concern among the leadership because they are “well-organized,
instructed, and profess an even harsher state nationalist policy than Putin and
his entourage do.”
In
support of his contention, highlighted in the headline of his article that
Putin may soon face a “Right Sector threat” like the one Kyiv does, the Kyiv
commentator points to three developments that must be disturbing to the
Kremlin.
First,
in 2014, in central Russia alone, there were more than 500 official camps
established to provide basic and advanced military training for the radical
nationalists. “More than half” of these were pro-Kremlin, but many of the
others were anti-authority and thus a potential threat.
“As
a rule,” he says, “people from the organs control the radicals,” and some of
them like those they instruct may feel that Putin’s approach is too soft. That incubation is happening even as support
for public actions by nationalist groups has fallen by two-thirds, and these
groups may in fact be displacing the more high-profile but more loyal Russian
nationalists as a force to be reckoned with.
Second,
Kurpas says, “all the official preparation camps officially work as recruitment
points for the war in Ukraine.” But in recent months, “only a tenth” of those
who pass through these camps are being sent there. The remainder are being
trained for street battles and fights in major cities. If they turn against the Kremlin, they have
the skills to be a threat.
Third,
he writes, the Russian authorities have “changed their tactics” in working with
national radicals. Earlier, they provided generous financial support; now, they
are launching criminal investigations against them in the hope of driving them
to negotiate with the powers that be.
But
this shift may be proving counter-productive, Kurpas says. On the one hand, it
suggests the Russian authorities are afraid of them. And on the other, it may
help them attract new members: Over the last 18 months, he says, the number of people
in such organizations has “almost doubled.”
And
fourth, in addition to those who are receiving paramilitary instruction in
Russia but not being sent to Ukraine are those who have gone there and returned
with their ideas and their weapons. “The
Russian special services are trying to stop this flow, but such organizations
don’t exist on their own: they have overseers who know all the ins and outs.”
Kyiv
has to deal with the challenge presented by the Right Sector, Kurpas concludes,
but Russia may face an even larger problem of a similar kind, one made larger
by its past and present policies not only inside the borders of Ukraine but
inside the Russian Federation as well. And the latter may prove the biggest of
all.
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