Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 4 – The propensity
of Muscovites from those in the government to its most liberal opponents, to
treat the rest of Russia as their “provinces” is playing an evil trick on them,
Vadim Shtepa says. It is transforming Moscow and Russia more generally into a
province of the rest of the world.
In a commentary on the Rufabula
portal, the Russian regionalist and federalist from Karelia who has been forced
to emigrate to Estonia, says that “the imperial tradition of dividing the
country into a capital and its provinces arose centuries ago when Muscovy
defeated Novgorod and viewed it as its natural patrimony (rufabula.com/articles/2016/08/03/provincial).
Vladimir Putin thus has not invented
anything but only made an existing situation worse, he continues, noting that “in
this case, ‘the Third Rome’ has completely followed ‘the first’ where the word ‘province’
appeared as a designation for conquered lands ruled by Roman representatives.”
That attitude and approach among
Muscovites stands as a completely opposite to federalism in which “”this
capital hyper-centralism does not exist,” Shtepa writes, adding that “it is
impossible to imagine that a Washingtonian would call a Chicagoan or a Los
Angelos resident ‘provincials.’”
But in Russia, the idea that all the
regions beyond the ring road are “the provinces” has only intensified after it
appeared in the 19th century. Earlier, residents of St. Petersburg
never thought of calling Muscovites or Kyivans ‘provincials.’” But under the Soviet regime, that is exactly
what happened with Muscovites viewing everyone else as that.
And in the minds of many Muscovites
and not only they, the dualism of capital and province had deep consequences
for social and political thought. “’The
capital’ is associated with progress and innovations while ‘the provinces’ are viewed
as backward and secondary” to the country as a whole.
Muscovites
in particular and Russians in general are often not aware of how out of step
this puts them with the rest of the world.
Europe and the West generally consist of federal states with real power
and taxation sharing, and regional parties are part of their landscapes,
something not allowed in Russia since 2003.
And
Russians seldom recognize that in European countries, there is no belief that
everything has to be concentrated in the capital cities. Great scholars like Kant, Nietzsche, and
Heidigger worked in small cities, while other scholars in the capitals of their
countries studied them – exactly the reverse of what Russians expect and Moscow
promotes.
Muscovites
have told themselves that their way is justified because Moscow is “a donor
region.” But it is only a donor region,
Shtepa says, because it takes so much from the regions rather than produces
anything but political decisions on its own.
Were the regions able to retain the money they produce, Moscow wouldn’t
be a donor any more.
One
manifestation of this “imperial tradition,” he writes, is that “Moscow
politicians consider themselves completely justified in going to ‘the provinces’
and taking part in regional elections, even putting their names at the top of
the lists on the ballots.” That doesn’t happen in the West, but it does in
Russia with both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin groups.
Muscovites
justify what they are doing by “considering themselves to be not ‘Muscovites’
but ‘federal’” representatives – even though if Russia were a federation,
something it is not, that would mean that each region would have the right to
run its own affairs, the exiled regionalist says.
But
perhaps the most important consequence of this Muscovite division of Russia
into “the capital” and “the provinces is elsewhere, Shtepa suggests. “Imperial centralization inevitably gives
rise to a view abroad” of Russia as a whole as a kind of provincial phenomenon
relative to other countries.
Muscovites
and indeed all Russians should thus stop using the word “province” and instead
employ the more neutral term “region.” That does not immediately presuppose the
existence of a capital beyond its borders. Unfortunately, Russians typically
view regionalism as something suspicious, even as the first stage to secession,
even though it is not.
By
way of conclusion, Shtepa cites the observation of Mikhail Epshteyn in the
latter’s book, “The New Sectarians: Types of Religious and Philosophical
Proclivities in Russia.” That book from
the 1990s described some imaginary “sects” of the late Soviet period but it was
written in such realistic language that many accepted it as factual.
Among
the sects Epshteyn described, the regionalist says, were “the provs,” an
abbreviation for “the provincials.” He wrote that Russia is “an enormous
province,” from whichever end you approach it Europe or Asia. “The only thing that we have given the world
is the worldview of the provincial.”
What
is “paradoxical” about this, this provincialism was “created by residents of
the capital,” Epshteyn wrote. But he shouldn’t have been surprised, Shtepa
says, because “if within the country is preserved the ‘capital-province’ model
of consciousness, it inevitably will be extrapolated outside as well.”
And
therefore, Shtepa says, “all Russia together with Moscow, and perhaps Moscow
above all remains a secondary and dependent ‘province’ of the developed world.”
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