Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 1 – In a new
book, Russian Totalitarianism (in
Russian, Moscow, 2017, 386 pp.), Dmitry Shusharin argues that the Russian
authorities, the Russian people, and the so-called extra-systemic opposition
(not to mention the systemic kind) are all part of a single whole and all
totalitarian.
In a review published in today’s Novyye izvestiya, US-based Russian
historian Irina Pavlova says this approach sets him apart “from the
overwhelming majority of anti-Putin authors” and thus merits close attention
for the lessons it offers (newizv.ru/comment/irina-pavlova/01-12-2017/ob-ekt-izucheniya-zlo-kak-ponyat-novuyu-knigu-dmitriya-shusharina).
Among the most important, Pavlova continues,
is that “to speak about the existence [in Russia] of an opposition in the
Western understanding is senseless. It doesn’t exist and never did.” Instead,
it, along with the powers and the people, are part of “a totalitarian
community” based on “a totalitarian consensus.”
If that is understood, Shusharin
says, then “Putinism isn’t stagnation” as many think but rather “a constantly
renewing organism” even though or perhaps because there has never been in
Russia “a single governmental or social institution with the potential for
democratic development.”
“On the contrary,” the author
continues, “the authorities have learned how to use [democratic] technologies
for the strengthening of totalitarianism” rather than for its demise. As a result, he says, “contemporary Russian
totalitarianism doesn’t need any ideology.” Instead, it relies on mass culture.
Shusharin, Pavlova says, also
focuses on the impact of Russian totalitarianism on the surrounding world. That
world now is “in deep crisis” and has displayed its weakness and inability to
address the most important problems, including those posed by the aggressive Putin
regime in Russia.
Pavlova says that she shares the
view of the author that “the Putin regime as never before is aggressive,
consistent and decisive in its actions and is capably playing on the weaknesses
of Western civilization.” But she suggests that Shusharin’s arguments end by
being entirely too apocalyptic.
For Shusharin, in what Pavlova describes
as “a very sad book,” Russia is “an eternal evil,” “a constant threat for the
entire world,” and “a chronic illness of humanity,” an ahistorical position
that ignores what Russia has been at some points in the past and what it might
under certain conditions be in the future.
And the author doesn’t address what the
West might need to do to promote that better future, Pavlova says. But there is an even bigger problem, she
suggests. Few in either Russia or in the West are likely to read this book and
take its arguments seriously, the first because of their own apocalypticism and
the second because of the personalization of the problem.
Many in Russia assume that all of
Russia’s problems will disappear when Putin does, a position that many in the
West accept almost as readily. Shusharin’s book is an antidote to such thinking
and deserves an audience in both places, even though it is certain to make each
of them uncomfortable.
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