Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 1 – The amendments
to the rules governing the Russian Orthodox Church have been presented as
giving the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) more
independence in fact further restrict the ability of that church to act on its
own, according to an analysis by the Religion
in Ukraine portal.
This week, Metropolitan Onufriy of the
UOC MP proposed at the meeting of ROC MP hierarchs in Moscow certain changes in
the church’s statue to “avoid further speculation directed at undermining the authority
of the UOC in the eyes of millions of Ukrainians” (religion.in.ua/news/vazhlivo/38240-arxierejskij-sobor-rpc-ogranichil-samostoyatelnost-upc.html).
Because the UOC MP is viewed by many
Ukrainians as an agent of the state that has invaded their country and because
it is challenged by two other Orthodox Churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church (UAOC), some want to stress its independent standing.
Onufriy proposed three changes in
the ROC MP statute that appeared to some as offering that possibility: They
stressed that the UOC MP is run on the basis of the ROC MP’s offer of “self-standing”
of October 1990, has broad autonomy from Moscow, and is guided by Moscow’s
provisions of such autonomy.
But when the ROC MP “approved” the
Ukrainian churchman’s proposals, it significantly modified them and in fact in
most regards imposed even greater Muscovite control over the UOC MP, according
to an analysis by the Religion in Ukraine
portal.
First of all, in point three of the
amendments, the ROC MP specifies that the UOC MP is guided by all the decisions
of the former in 1990. That means the ROC MP has the power to approve all
changes in the statue of the UOC MP, something that had never been required of
the UOC MP up to now.
Second, the amendments require that
all UOC MP churches remember ROC MP Patriarch Kirill in their services, again
something not demanded of them up to now but inserted at the insistence of
Patriarch Kirill who is unhappy with the fact that many UOC MP churches do not
mention him anymore.
And third, the new amendments say
that the UOC MP must get the approval of the ROC MP for any changes in the
number or borders of bishoprics, again something not required by UOC MP statutes.
And they specify that all decisions of the ROC MP are obligatory for the UOC
MP, something not made explicit ever before either.
Other points in the amendments also “strengthen
the dependence of the UOC on the ROC,” the analysis continues, “in particular,
they affirm that the UOC ‘receives the holy chrism from the Patriarch of Moscow
and All Rus.’”
Language in the amendments benefits
the UOC MP by specifying that the UOC MP has under its authority “the highest
church-legal instance” rather than being subordinate to the ROC MP. But in
fact, as the analysis continues, “the church court of the ROC even before had de facto not functioned in the UOC.”
And the UOC MP also benefits from language specifying that
it is administered from offices in Kyiv, something required so that the UOC MP
can claim that it is not a church “’with a center in the country of the
aggressor,’” as many have often and with justice implied and which the new
amendments make even clearer.
Religion
in Ukraine points out that many in the UOC MP as well as in the two other
Ukrainian Orthodox churches understand that Moscow hasn’t given the UOC MP
anything real but rather only something
it can use for propaganda purposes (ukrinform.ru/rubric-society/2355128-gonimuu-upc-mp-v-moskve-vydelili-v-otdelnuu-glavu-ustava-rpc.html).
And consequently, what the ROC MP
and the UOC MP are seeking to present as something new will only confirm the
old subordination, thus offending some in the UOC MP, and spark new demands by
other Orthodox in Ukraine for real autocephaly.
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