Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 1 – During the first
cold war, Moscow and Washington tried to recruit as many countries to their
respective sides as possible but accepted the notion that some countries would
remain non-aligned or neutral at least for some time to come. Indeed, each saw
the existence of such countries as providing a useful channel of communication
with the other side.
But in the emerging second cold war,
Vitaly Portnikov says, Vladimir Putin has no place for the non-aligned because
he approaches international relations with the same values he picked up from
the criminal world out of which he emerged: everyone who is not with him is
against him and thus an enemy (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5ABF14DBE4B57).
Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko
Borisov is only one of many who does not yet understand this shift. He tried to
remain in good graces with both the West and Moscow by pulling briefly his
ambassador for consultations after the attack on Skripal to show solidarity
with London but not expelling Russian diplomats to keep channels open with
Moscow.
In trying to do both tings, the
Ukrainian analyst says, “Borisov is making the very same error which some
Ukrainian politicians have before him, people who call for ‘neutrality’ or ‘non-bloc’
status for their country” in the belief that Russia will immediately love and
support them for doing so.
“But the Kremlin doesn’t need ‘neutrality,’”
Portnikov says. “It needs support and solidarity with its dark actions.
Therefore, for Moscow, Boiko Borisov is a traitor and an American hireling
whether he expels Russian chekists from the embassy or leaves them in peace.”
This
shift in the Kremlin’s approach from cold war – 1 to cold war – 2 is going to
put the countries within the CIS in the most difficult position. Moscow expects them to show loyalty but many
of them have pursued what they call “a balanced foreign policy,” hoping for
good relations with the West as well.
That
position is increasingly difficult for them to maintain, especially since many
of them have continued to act on the assumption that this is possible. Some of
the CIS countries, in fact, have taken positions on the Skripal case that
reflected their understanding of what is possible. But that isn’t what Moscow
wants.
Vladimir
Yevseyev, the deputy head of the Moscow Institute for the CIS Countries, says
that “unfortunately, Russia isn’t receiving support from the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States” and said that Moscow “should not count on
serious support in the future” (regnum.ru/news/polit/2398393.html).
Regnum commentator Stanislav Stremidlovsky
says that “judging from everything so far, this is so.” The question is how Moscow will now react. It
certainly won’t want to accept this new reality willingly given that it sees
even modest efforts at maintaining balance as hostile actions, and so it may be
inclined to try to force this or that CIS government to change positions.
That could lead to an explosion in one or
more of them; but at the very least, it is going to put new pressure on the
governments of many to decide just how “neutral” and “non-aligned” they can be.
That provides an opening for pro-Western forces even as it may open the way to
yet another defeat for Putin in an area he thinks Russia should have a recognized
droit de regarde.
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