Paul Goble
Staunton,
November 4 – Emil Pain, perhaps Russia’s most distinguished specialist on
ethnic conflict, says that the ethnic situation in that country today is increasingly
similar to that which existed on the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and that it will lead to the same outcome with any weakening of the
central powers that be.
It
was the weakening of the central powers that led to the demise of the Soviet
empire, the ethno-sociologist says. “In Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the language
issue arose not when it was banned or when there was mass russification
connected let us say with the arrival of the ethnic Russian population” (republic.ru/posts/92396).
That
issue arose, Pain observes, “in periods of the weakening of the imperial
diktat. And today, as soon as there will be a certain weakening of this very
vertical system, all the offenses that have built up, real and imaginary, will
become important. And today there is a mass of signs that this same kind of
built up is happening again.”
This
conclusion flows from Pain’s discussion of broader issues, including the relationship
of empires and nations to the state.
Russia, he says, is “already not an empire but it is still not a nation.”
There are two basic points of view about its nature, he says, and both are inadequate
to the current situation.
One view, the official and dominant
one, is that “there is a nation in Russia,” and in its most extreme form, that
offered by Academician Valery Tishkov, there has always been a nation there “even
when Russia was officially called the Russian Empire” because “all the
population of the country is a nation.”
The other is that Russia “is not a
nation but an empire,” something some welcome and others are appalled by. But
to assess these views, it is important to remember what a nation is and what an
empire is. “A nation is interested in
integration, but an empire for centuries lives according to a directly opposite
principle – divide and rule.”
“Setting some ethnic communities
against others is a means of survival for empires,” Pain says. “Today, this principle, divide and rule, in
all its forms, including extremely concrete ones, exists and acts in Russia.”
So what then is Russia? Pain asks
rhetorically. In the 1990s, it was on its way to becoming a nation with the population
having a decisive voice in public policy. “But ‘what the tsar gave, the tsar
took away.’ And in the 2000s,” things have gone in exactly the opposite direction.
According to the Levada Center, Pain says, “the
share of people who consider that they influence the state has fallen since
1995 by three and a half times.”
“The most serious degree of
alienation of society from the authorities” over this period “have appeared in
the republics of Russia. This is a paradox: the republics, the leader of the
parade of sovereignty and the most recalcitrant subjects of the Russian Federation”
have become “the most loyal” to the central powers that be.
“But,” the ethno-sociologist says, “the
demographic situation is changing. The Russian empire expanded and existed under
conditions when the ethnic Russian population in the national borderlands grew.
But today, it is rapidly declining: In Chechnya, by ten times, in Ingushetia by
seven, and in the majority of republics, the Russian population is falling.”
What follows from this are an array
of psychological problems: Russians don’t like to study non-Russian languages,
but languages are especially important for non-Russians. And Russians identify
primarily in statist terms while non-Russians identify as members of an ethnic
community.
In Soviet times, Yury Arutyunyan conducted
the first investigation of “The Russians” and showed that Russians to a
remarkable degree are distinguished from the main part of the population by
their de-ethnicization.” They identify with the state rather than with their
own nation, while non-Russians are just the reverse.
The very same thing is on view
today, the scholar continues. While
ethnic Russians identify with the state and thus with the population of the
country, non-Russians identify first with their nations, then with their republics
and only in the third case as citizens of the Russian Federation.
The best Russian can hope for is a
return to the values that were being realized in the 1990s. That is possible if
far from inevitable, because it will require a fundamental change in the way
Russians in the first instance view their society, the other nations in the
country, and the country as such.
“In 1995, 72 percent of Russians
considered Stalin’s repressions tob e crimes and half supported the idea of
popular sovereignty. In 2013, more than half called the party of power ‘the
party of thieves and crooks.’ All these ideas have existed in our society,” Emil
Pain concludes. This is not what might have been but what was.
“And if it was, then under specific
conditions, it could be repeated.” If that scenario isn’t, then other scenarios,
including disintegration become more likely.
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