Are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Finally Going to Swap Territory to Solve Border Dispute?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, September 12 – In August 2018, Kyrgyz and Uzbek officials announced that they had agreed to swap territories in order to eliminate exclaves and solve their long-running border disputes but in the succeeding months, nothing happened and border tensions continued (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/08/kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-swap-territories.html).

            Now, Kyrgyz and Uzbek officials are making similar pledges, declaring that they have agreed on where the border will be and will make a public announcement giving details in the coming days (currenttime.tv/a/30160536.html).  Given the record, one has every reason to be skeptical, but two things have changed that make a move now more likely.

            On the one hand, the violence that continues along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border is a reminder of just how explosive these exclaves and disputed borders can be and thus provide an incentive for some but not all officials on both sides to address the issue by redrawing the borders (cf. windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/08/bishkek-dushanbe-wont-end-border.html).

            And on the other hand, some officials and experts in Moscow, long hostile to any change in borders, have begun to argue that changing borders is a better option than shifting populations or allowing disputes to fester, a shift highlighted by a major article in Nezavisimaya gazeta in July (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-could-solve.html).

            Consequently, there is more reason for optimism now than even a year ago (russian.eurasianet.org/кыргызстан-и-узбекистан-обмениваются-землями-в-рамках-исторического-соглашения) especially since the territories the two sides have been talking about exchanging are either covered with water or have few people on them. 

            But borders have always been a sensitive issue in the region – in Soviet times, the administrative-territorial atlases where among the most politically explosive documents; and in post-Soviet times, local people have been infuriated at the problems state borders cause even as politicians in the capital have exploited such disputes to generate nationalism and support.

            That has been especially the case in Kyrgyzstan; and so if this supposed deal does collapse, it will likely be less the fault of Tashkent than of political machinations not on the border itself but among parliamentarians and other politicians in Bishkek.