‘Better than Nothing’ – How Putin Regime is Trying to Respond to Changes in Russian Society

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 1 – Ekaterina Schulmann says that in contrast to democratic systems, the current Russians adapt to social changes before elections begin and make mid-course corrections before campaigns begin, an arrangement that she says is less adequate than the democratic process but that it is “better than nothing.”

            In a commentary for the Republic.ru portal which she has posted on her Facebook page as well, the Moscow analyst argues that all the activities of the Presidential Administration now, including the drafting of new programs are “attempts at correcting things before the elections” (republic.ru/posts/78121, facebook.com/Ekaterina.Schulmann/posts/10211854965480517).

            What will emerge from all this activity, of course, is “a big question because the system can be changed only as much as it can,” Schulmann writes. “It cannot reform itself” in a profound send because it exists as a certain kind of organization. But “all the same, the agenda for 2017” is currently subject to “an attempt at correction” to win more support.

            But for all the talk, there is a real question about how far the Kremlin can go.  It can’t simply change course in a major sector because “there are interest groups with corresponding budgets who are interested” in particular policies, such as “an extension of ‘the policy of war,’” Schulmann argues.

            These include “powerful members of our ruling elite – the military industrial complex, the defense ministry and the members of the Security Council. To say: ‘that’s it guys, forgive us but we are changing direction’ isn’t going to happen” instantly. For it to happen at all, these plays must be compensated with something. How to do that is a major issue for the year ahead.

            One place where the Presidential Administration has been forced to try to find a new approach concerns education and health care, areas where “a very dangerous, even radical break between the agenda of those in power and the agenda of society is in evidence,” the Moscow analyst says.

            For people, she writes, these issues are “becoming ever more important first because the population is aging … and second because of the cult of children that has been developing in recent years and the view by people of their parental role as a social one and even partially as a political one as well.”

            At the same time, the government is cutting back its spending in these areas, creating a situation that it is difficult to imagine a more unhappy conjunction.  Clearly, something needs to be done because people are angry and “do not understand why the state is acting in the way that it is,” especially since the government hasn’t explained why.

            Of course, there is the argument that there is no money, an argument that represents a kind of return to the situation that existed in the 1990s.  But at the same time, now the government is in full control of educational and health care institutions, so it has to support them or its inability to do so will be on full display.

            The Kremlin could decide to privatize some of these institutions or hand them over to NGOs, but for that to happen, Schulmann points out, the regime would have to “liberalize” the situation in these sectors, something very difficult because “control, supervision and repression are the bread of powerful people in authority.”

            They won’t want to lose any of their powers, and so doing anything about this will not be simple or easy.

Three Trends Likely to Dominate Russian Domestic Politics as 2017, Pryanikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 1 – Pavel Pryanikov, the always interesting and sometimes provocative editor of the Tolkovatel portal, says that the three most important trends of the past year that are likely to cast a shadow on Russian domestic politics in the year ahead are the return to high office of the methodologists, the end of Russian nationalism, and the revolt of the regions.

            “The main event of 2016,” the blogger says, is the return of the methodologists “to the levers of power.” They first emerged out of the technical intelligentsia in the 1970s, were brought into midlevel positions by “the liberal Chekist” Andropov, and played a role in perestroika (ttolk.ru/2017/01/01/три-с-половиной-тренда-внутренней-пол/).

                The second trend of the last year, he continues, is “the continuation of the active departure of Russian nationalists from the ranks of ethnic Russians.” The largest number of these are turning to Islam, some to the Ukrainians and a still smaller part to the “all-European” position.  There are compelling reasons for this, Pryanikov argues.

            “In Russia, there are only three groups with solid support and traditions of activity over the last two to four generations: the special services, the old Moscow liberals and Islam. But the first two are closed: entrance to them is now by birth. And the most democratic [of these options] is Islam.”

            And the third trend which emerged last year and is likely to become more important in 2017 involves protests by the regions.  “The destruction of the USSR also began with the fronds of national regimes.” That by itself makes the protests from the Transbaikal, the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus significant.

            Pryanikov adds a fourth to this list, one he says is for the moment still “a half-trend.” That involves “the erosion of supreme power” because of the presence in the Presidential Administration of the methodologists who control the media, and the Volodin command which controls the United Russia Party and the governors.

            Putin retains control over both, but this system of “’checks and balances,’” one that recalls the arrangements in Boris Yeltsin’s time may or may not prove stable, especially given that Putin is “already a real grandfather, a pensioner of 65” just as Yeltsin was in 1997 when the former president “rapidly lost the levels of rule on those checks and balances.”

            What remains to be seen in the year ahead is whether this “half trend will grow into a trend” or not.

The Greatest Miracle in Russia is the One Putin Fears Most

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 1 – After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, the New York Times featured a drawing of a single blade of grass breaking through a brick. Anyone who has ever had a driveway or a sidewalk knows the significance of this: the strength of the concrete always looks overwhelming, but the grass always finds a way to break through.

            Something similar can be said of Russia. Despite all the repressive power of the state and its repeated destruction of its best people, good people committed to freedom miraculously continue to emerge. They aren’t numerous, at least not yet, but they provide a surety that they and not those who seek to pave them over will ultimately determine the future.

            That is the greatest hope of those in Russia and elsewhere who believe that Russians like all other nations have both the right and the capacity for becoming democratic and free.  It is at the same time the greatest fear of dictators like Vladimir Putin whose power and even survival depends on targeting again and again those committed to such values.

            On the Kasparov.ru portal for the new year, commentator Svetlana Naumova notes that she has spent much of the past year tracing “the progressive mental and moral degradation” of Russian society and Putin’s “unbelievable successes in turning the population into a herd” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5867EF8778271).

                And she indicates that she has no doubts that Putin truly does enjoy the support of the 86 percent his propagandists regularly claim.  But what is interesting and for the future of Russia important is that despite everything, there is the other 14 percent, those who don’t approve of him or his regime and who are denounced as “national traitors” as a result.

            “By what miracle,” Naumova continues, have such people continued to exist and what may be more important emerge?  The answer is “unknown” but the fact that they do exist provides the basis for hope even though the numbers of such people remain small and most other Russians view them as the regime would like.

            She cites with approval the views of Yury Nesterenko before he fled to the US that only a tiny number of Russians today are willing even to consider the argument that “Russia and Russians are not identical,” that the regime is not operating for the benefit of the population and never will (yun.complife.info/miscell/exodus.htm).

            That has led the small number who do understand that to grasp at straws, at the few who turn up at meetings or at regime crisis that might lead to change, and failing that, at the possibility of continuing to live in emigration. But, Nesterenko writes, any hopes in the near term appear misplaced.

            “Even if tomorrow Medvedev were to hang Putin and then shoot himself or both were blown up by terrorists … things nonetheless would not improve. This snake would throw off its skin” but not change its form. Therefore there is no reason to think that things are changing or will change soon.

            As a result, Nesterenko says, “the more wise people leave Russia, the ore quickly this evil empire will disappear and disappear once and for all.”  The criminal state will collapse because the herd it has made the population into “will not be able to support its existence.”

            Naumova says she has “her doubts” on this last point. First of all, she says, Nesterenko might be right if the West were to recognize that Putin’s Russia is a cancerous tumor; but increasingly its leaders are prepared for business reasons or their own convenience to connive with it to continue to exist.

            Moreover, emigration will help Russia only if those who depart continue to fight for the implementation of what they believe in Russia. If they don’t – and unfortunately, many do not – then their departure abroad will only be “a plus for Putin” who will be only too glad to see them leave and thus stop causing him trouble.

            What then should the 14 percent be doing? There is no chance of a revolt now, “even ‘the minority or the minority’ isn’t ready for this,” Naumova says.  She says she understands this on the basis of Russian behavior in areas of the USSR occupied by the Germans. People didn’t revolt, but “they weren’t slaves. They hated and waited for a suitable moment to begin resistance.”

            The fate of Russian dissidents today, she continues, “is much more difficult than that of the residents of the territories seized [by the Nazis because] they have to oppose not only the occupiers but also the hurrah patriotic and zombified nerds. But nevertheless,” Naumova insists, “it is no less important to struggle with evil” even when “there is no hope of victory.”

            In the current situation, she argues, “it is important not to be silent but to give an assessment of the crimes of the regime and also of the negative processes which are taking place in the country and in society. Such texts are a kind of mirror” and they can attract the attention and understanding of others.

            Doctors have “a mantra,” she continues. “’If you can’t cure an illness, it means one must learn to live with it.’ To learn to live with evil does not mean to come to terms with it.”  There are many ways to show that one hasn’t done that, and she lists six ideas.

            First, one must “boycott the actions of the illegitimate regime,” including elections and demonstrations. Second, one must “boycott the Kremlin media.” Third,  one must “change the tone of conversation with the powers that be,” stop requesting things and start making real demands, even if they won’t be granted, at least at first.

            And fourth, one must ‘”unite and form horizontal cooperation.”  The Putinists are afraid of this and afraid of its capacity to organize mass demonstrations against them. That fear must be recognized and then exploited, Naumova says.

            At the risk of sounding naïve and overly optimistic, Naumova concludes by saying that she “as before believes that Russia will be free, even if this happens not veryquickly and possibly at the price of disintegration and the loss of territory and that the Putin regime, which rules society with the help of fear and force is doomed.”