Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 15 – Federica Mogherini,
the EU’s foreign policy chief, commenting on Russia’s annexation of Crimea, says
that “we will never accept the change of borders by force. Neither now nor in
this century nor in this millennium.” But she adds that there should not be any
limitson political dialogue with Moscow concerning the resolution of the Ukrainian
crisis.
This position, she says, “does not
mean that we must not talk. We must talk, and the Ukrainians also must talk
with the Russians. And my role, Mogherini says, “does not mean that I must be
soft, but even to be tough, I must talk” (nr2.com.ua/hots/Okkupacija_Kryma/Mogerini-Evrosoyuz-ne-priznaet-anneksiyu-Kryma-ni-v-etom-veke-ni-v-etom-tysyacheletii-88281.html).
And
this position about border changes means, she continues, that the sanctions the
EU has imposed “are connected with the situation on the ground. Therefore
sanctions can be changed depending on the situation and either reduced or
increased. Or not changed at all if there are no changes.”
The
EU position is, of course, welcome: it demonstrates that Brussels remains in
step with the United States whose leaders have also declared that they will
never recognize the forcible annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation. But it may have one
consequence that few in the West are thinking about now.
By
basing its position on the principle, known as the Stimson Doctrine, that
countries must “never accept the change of borders by force,” the EU position
may open the door to an idea that has been circulation in the Russian
blogosphere in recent days – namely, the possibility of having another
referendum in Crimea with international observers present.
Were
such a referendum to be held and were it to be declared to have met
international standards, something many in Europe might be inclined to do, that
would open the door to two developments that would threaten rather than
strengthen the international order that Mogherini says she is defending.
On
the one hand, such a new referendum could be presented by those in the West who
want to restart relations with Moscow as the basis for recognizing Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, even though no referendum now, given the way in which the
occupation has created new facts on the ground of that Ukrainian peninsula,
could ever be truly legitimate.
And
on the other, by implicitly raising such a possibility in the case of Crimea,
Mogherini intentionally or not may have encouraged still more reckless actions
by Putin. He may believe that he can invade and occupy parts or all of neighboring
countries and then gain the acquiescence of the West which will be encouraged
to “look beyond” any particular crime.
Those
dangers point to the need for the elaboration of a more carefully crafted
policy of non-recognition of the Russian Anschluss of Crimea. That action
violated not only the Stimson Doctrine but also Russia’s own commitments in the
Budapest Memorandum and other post-1991 agreements.
The
West’s policy of non-recognition of the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania ultimately worked not just because it rejected any acceptance of
the use of force to change international boundaries but because it insisted
that the governments that occupation overthrew remained de jure if not de facto
in office.
Western
countries should be crafting a similar non-recognition policy now, one that
doesn’t give Putin a loophole which the Kremlin leader is all too likely to
jump through given the large number of people in Western capitals who want to
find “a way forward” in which Putin can “save face.”
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