Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 22 -- “Post-Soviet Russian nationalism has been fatally
flawed from the outset because it arose not from the word ‘nation’ but from the
word ‘nationality,’” a reflection of the fact that a Russian “nation” in the normal
of sense that term does not yet exist in Russia, according to Vadim Shtepa.
In a commentary on Delfi.lt, the Russian
regionalist notes that the invocation of the term “Russian world” to “justify
territorial expansion and annexation of the regions of other countries” has led
ever more people to discuss Russian nationalism and to ask whether a Russian
nation exists (ru.delfi.lt/opinions/comments/vshtepa-nacionalizm-bez-nacii.d?id=66963324).
That is at the heart of discussions
about the similarities and differences between “an ethnic Russian [“russkaya”]
nation and a non-ethnic [“rossisskaya”] one, he says.
One must not confuse a nation with
an ethnos, Shtepa continues. The latter is “a biological phenomenon while the nation
is a social-civil one.” For example,
Americans arose as a separate nation even though at their start they were part
of the same ethnos as the empire from which they separated.
“In other words,” he continues, “a
nation is a social contract which presupposes the presence of a civil society. From
this point of view, no nation has arisen in Russia in the course of its
history.” There were precursors of one in the Novgorod Republic but that was
destroyed by Moscow, and the centralized Muscovite state transformed the entire
population into “subjects,” not citizens.
In Soviet times, “despite all
solemnly proclaimed equality of citizens, in fact, the residents of the USSR
remained slaves of the state, the interests of which immeasurably exceeded the
status of any individual citizen.” Indeed, Shtepa notes, in the USSR, the word “citizen”
had almost a “criminal” connotation. “’Comrade’” was preferred.
But
even after the collapse of the USSR, “a nation as a civic phenomenon did not
arise.” Few accepted the identity of “’Rossiyane,’” viewing it as “only the
continuation of the faceless ‘Soviet people’” and thus confusing a nation with
the “ethnic ‘nationality’ which was fixed in Soviet passports.”
With the new rise of “neo-imperial attitudes
and the appearance of the doctrine of ‘the Russian world,’” the government
media has been able to create only “a quasi-nation,” insisting that it consists
of “all the subjects of the empire” or all those who speak Russian. But that
does not have anything in common with a real nation, Shtepa argues.
A genuine Russian civic nation can
arise “only if Russia becomes a full-fledged federation, the subjects of which
will have a high level of self-administration and at the same time have an
interest in the development of inter-regional ties.” But Russia in fact has
been “converted into a unitary state where the regions have been reduced to
provinces without rights.”
That is generating opposition in the
regions rather than quieting it, and “separatist attitudes are inevitably
arising.” Indeed, Shtepa says, “new civic nations are arising already in the post-Soviet
regions” of the Russian Federation, a development which he calls “entirely
logical.”
To the extent that “present-day Russia
ever more applies to itself the religious-messianic title of ‘the Third Rome,’
it can count on a similar end to ‘the First,’ when out of imperial Romans arose
Italians, Spaniards, French, and so on.”
Shtepa points out, however, that “the
distorted understanding of the nation” which Russians are now displaying is
shared by many non-Russians who also conflate nation and nationality and thus
promote ethnocratic regimes, which he defines as those which seek to give
privileges to “‘the titular ethnos.’”
Neither understands that “the contemporary nation is
inclusive: it can include within itself representatives of many ethnoses” and
that its “chief characteristic is civic patriotism and work for the good of one’s
own republic.” As Shtepa notes, the Finns
have a real nation not an imaginary one: As a result, they could have as their
founding father “Marshal Mannerheim, a Swedish baron and Russian general who initially
could barely speak Finnish.”
People in Russia “frequently like
to criticize the Baltic republics for ‘discrimination’ against Russian
speakers,” but they typically get their facts wrong. In Lithuania, all
permanent residents who wanted citizenship received it “regardless of their
ethnic origin.”
“In Latvia and Estonia, the
situation was more complicated,” Shtepa says, “but even there to obtain
citizenship it was sufficient to pass an easy examination on knowledge of the
state language and the Constitution. And
today, the mayor of Riga is an ethnic Russian” – but there is “no doubt” that
he is a member of “the Latvian civic nation.”
Moreover, the Russian regionalist
points out, “Latvian ‘non-citizens’ in a paradoxical way turn out to be almost the
most privileged social group” in that country because they enjoy “the unique
right” of visa-free travel to Russia and the EU, even though they show little
interest in resettling in Russia.
Ukraine “after the revolution last
year can really serve as an example of the establishment of a new civic nation,”
one in which identification and not language or ethnicity is the key. Unfortunately, at present, “it is impossible
to imagine an analogous” development in the Russian Federation.
In conclusion, Shtepa suggests that “a healthy nation
which recognizes its own civil rights and is prepared to defend them doesn’t
need any push toward nationalist passions.” That was shown by the march in
Paris for freedom of speech. Unfortunately, too, the Kremlin has been backing those
in the French National Front who didn’t take part.
Clearly,
he says, “the chauvinists of various countries are finding a common language.” The
question for the future is whether citizens will do the same.
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