Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 2 – Boris Nemtsov “was
afraid of becoming a victim of a revolution” whose results he feared could lead
to an even more horrific situation in Russia but as a result, Moscow
commentator Boris Sokolov argues, he “became a victim of the dictatorship
because a revolution didn’t happen.”
Four years ago, Sokolov recalls,
Nemtsov told an interviewer that “there are three possible scenarios of a
revolution in Russia.” The most probable would be a nationalist one, involving
pogroms of ethnic minorities. The next most probable would be a socialist or
communist one, the result of declines in the standard of living and increase in
corruption.
And “finally, in third place, in
terms of probability,” the opposition leader who was murdered in the shadow of
the Kremlin said, there could be “a liberal revolution, called from by the
absence of freedom and democracy.” But regardless of the one that will occur,
Nemtsov suggested, there will be bloodshed (grani.ru/opinion/sokolov/m.238611.html).
But regardless of which one occurs,
the late opposition figure said, “Putin bears 100 percent responsibility” for
the likelihood that a revolution will happen.
As a result, Nemtsov continued, he personally is no supporter of
revolutions because “there will be many victims,” adding “I could be one of
them.”
Such views – Nemtsov wanted a
revolutionary transformation of Russia without a revolution – simultaneously explains
why he had so much support among many liberal Russians and non-Russians and why
he was such a threat to the Kremlin leader.
Indeed, Sokolov says, it helps to explain why Putin wanted him out of
the way.
The
pro-Kremlin media have been working overtime to come up with various suggested
versions to “distract attention” from the fact that Putin and his regime are “the
most likely” to have ordered this murder, the Moscow commentator says, noting
that each new invention is “more absurd” than the one before it.
In
fact, Sokolov says, there are only two “real versions of the murder.” The first
is that “the murder of Boris Nemtsov was exactly the same kind of state crime
as the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko and the order for it could be given only
by the first person of the state” – that is by Putin.
And
the second is that “the opposition leader was killed by some radical supporters
of the ‘Anti-Maidan’” organization Putin and his regime itself set up to block
public protests in Russia and thus to ensure Putin’s continued rule. But this
is highly improbable because of where the murder was carried out, right under
the Kremlin walls.
Thus
everything we know points to Putin as the man responsible, Sokolov says. The
Kremlin leader had two obvious reasons for wanting Nemtsov dead. On the one
hand, “of all the politicians on the liberal wing of the non-systemic
opposition, only [he] could gather mass demonstrations,” something Putin
clearly fears.
And
on the other, the Kremlin leader knew that Nemtsov was getting ready to publish
a report proving that the Russian military is fighting in the Donbas, something
that calls into question Putin’s line. “Either
of these causes would have been sufficient” for Putin decide to have Nemtsov
killed.
Both
the skills of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine and the propensity of many
journalists east and west to confuse balance with objectivity and to refuse to
draw any conclusion about Putin’s involvement in the absence of “a smoking gun”
likely means that no one will be able to prove this to everyone’s satisfaction.
Putin is certainly counting on that.
But
having killed Nemtsov, Putin has not killed his message, as the demonstrations
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, throughout Russia and the world yesterday show. And if one can overlook the media debates
about how many or how few people marched, it is worth noting what they were
marching for.
As
another commentator pointed out, Nemtsov’s ideas were truly revolutionary even if
he did not want a revolution. What he did want was the elimination of the
all-powerful presidency in Russia and the introduction of a government
responsible to the parliament, an end to imperial unitarism and aggression and
the rise of real federalism in its place, and an end to government control of
the media (kotsubinsky.livejournal.com/454817.html).
Obviously, each person will take
from Nemtsov’s statements what he or she wants. But two trends are already
obvious. The first is that outside of ethnic Russian areas, democrats and
nationalists have found a reason to march together just as they did in
1989-1991 (irekle.org/news/i1991.html).
And the second is that the Russian
people themselves care coming up with their own slogans on the basis of his legacy. The march in Moscow yesterday featured not the
manufactured slogans of pro-Kremlin demonstrations but the expressions of the people
themselves (gordonua.com/publications/Nemcov-eto-lyubov-Putin-eto-voyna-Samye-yarkie-lozungi-traurnogo-shestviya-v-Moskve-69169.html).
Among the most striking and resonant
were the following:
- Nemtsov is Love; Putin is War.
- We Will Not Forget; we will not forgive.
- Russism kills.
- Heroes do not die.
- I am Boris. I am Nemtsov.
- Fear for one’s children and grandchildren is stronger than the fear of one’s own death.
- Struggle.
- I am not afraid.
No comments:
Post a Comment