Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 4 – Never before have
the messages coming out of Moscow about the future of relations between Russia
and the West been so contradictory, with some of them suggesting that Vladimir
Putin is ready for a new deal with the West and others pointing in exactly the opposite
direction and pointing to a new world war.
Some of these messages are directed
at the Russian domestic audience – and are dismissed by some Western analysts
as a result as an indication of Putin’s intentions – while others are directed
at Western leaders and populations without recognition being given to the fact
that such confusion is part and parcel of Moscow’s aggressive approach to the
world.
Sorting out these messages and
determining what they mean, Novy Region-2 commentator Kseniya Kirillova argues,
is never more important than at times like now when Russian forces are engaged
in a broad new attack on Ukraine – and when some in the West still appear to believe
that Putin wants a deal and that they can strike one with him.
In a commentary today, she says that
in order to figure out what to expect from Russia in the future, it is critical
to figure out “how to assess the information contained in Russian open sources.” And as a contribution to that effort, she
offers three principles of interpretation of that flow (nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/CHego-zhdat-ot-Rossii-98201.html).
First,
Kirillova says, one must always keep in mind that “besides the declarations of
Kremlin analysts, politicians and journalists, there are also facts, not
opinions but facts, and these must never be ignored.” Facts include such things as the
concentration of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders, violation of NATO
airspace, and increased military spending.
Second, she
continues, everything coming out of Moscow must be evaluated in terms of “how
closely they correspond with the goals and habits of thought and ambitions of Vladimir
Putin personally.” It is not so
difficult, Kirillova suggests, to specify exactly what these include and what
consequences they have.
“No one would
dispute that Putin beyond any doubt conceives not only Ukraine but the entire
territory of the former USSR as the zone of his absolute influence,” she
writes. He has certainly said that in a variety of ways over the course of many
years. His talk about “the territorial
losses of Russia” is especially indicative given that the Russian Federation has
the same borders as the RSFSR under international law.
Moreover,
Kirillova continues, “Putin is very much afraid of the expansion of NATO and
the appearance of NATO military bases near his borders.” The membership of the
three Baltic countries in the Western alliance is thus a particular irritant.
But Putin “also fears an open military conflict with NATO” and therefore is
unlikely to launch open military aggression there.
Moreover, Putin
is committed to restoring Russian influence in Eastern Europe. His statements
about a multi-polar world and the Yalta accords at the end of World War II show
that what he wants is Western acknowledgement that Eastern Europe is within
Russia’s zone of influence as well.
If the West
shows firmness in opposing this, Putin’s comments suggest, he will back down or
at least not expand his activities in this regard, especially given his
problems at home. But if the West shows that it wants negotiations, he will not
only pursue them but raise the stakes by pushing harder and further so that at
the very least, he will have more to “trade.”
And third,
Kirillova suggests, there is “another important factor which can assist in the
analysis” of what Putin will do next and that is the domestic situation in
Russia itself. Not only does he face economic problems as a result of
sanctions, but he is even more worried about the possible blowback of the
Pugachev-style revolts he has been sponsoring.
Perhaps more
than he fears NATO, the Kremlin leader fears the possibility of the emergence
within the Russian population of forces with guns that he does not control,
forces that may emerge if he does not continue his aggression in Ukraine or
elsewhere and that will return home to cause trouble.
For Putin, aggression
he controls is fine; aggression that creates conditions he doesn’t control is a
grave danger, Kirillova suggests. All
this, she says, points to the conclusion that Putin’s “regime needs war,
although it need not be in the Donbas or in Crimea.” It could be elsewhere, but
Putin has created a situation in which he has no other way out.
Those who
follow Russian events and those who seek to influence them should be under no
illusions about that.
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