Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 2 – Moscow in March
2015 confirmed the statute for military police in the Russian armed forces as
part of an effort to fight dedovshchina and modernize the military, but three
months later, the creation of this critical network has been blocked, the
victim of infighting among various agencies, according to an article in the
latest issue of “Sovershenno Sekretno.”
A few MPs in special uniforms
appeared at an international conference this spring, at the Victory Day parade,
and in Crimea protectingthe defense minister, Aleksandr Kruglov says. But as of
now, “this is practically an exhaustive list of the achievements of the
military police” in Russia today (sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/4881/).
MPs exist in more than 40 armies of
the world and play an important role in many of them, but Russia has been
unable to launch such a system even though proposals to do so have appeared
more or less regularly since 1989. In
the last decade, the defense ministry has even announced that the MP system has
been created only to have to backtrack when it became obvious that this had not
happened.
Until 2011, there wasn’t a legal
basis for such a structure in the Russian armed forces, and after one was put
in place, the general staff wanted to name as the commander of the new unit a
general, Sergey Surovikin, with a checkered past in which he was frequently
accused of crimes only to be let off after the intervention of those on high,
including in at least one instance, Boris Yeltsin.
He and others wanted the job because
initially the MP system was to be a high-prestige operation, with additional
salaries and benefits and with commanders stationed not at some distant base
but in the major cities were the military districts and fleets have their
headquarters. And its commander would
oversee a force of 20,000 men.
“Initially,” Kruglov writes, “the
military police was planned as a powerful law enforcement and control structure
which would not be limited to the maintenance of order in military facilities”
but would provide guards for the minister and have enormous authority to
investigate criminal activities. In war time, the MPs would even have the right
to conduct independent military activities.
But precisely because the new
structure would be so large, cost so much, and take powers from others, it was
immediately opposed both by the FSB and by the military procuracy who
considered the MP system as a threat to them. Their leaders also feared that
the MPs would survive any military cutbacks to which they, on the other hand,
would be subject.
Those two agencies succeeded in getting the MP statute
rewritten, the powers of the MPs reduced to the point of almost
meaninglessness, and the number of MPs planned cut back to 6500, less than a
third of what had been proposed, as Kruglov documents in extraordinary and
telling detail.
Three other factors played a role as
well, the “Sovershenno sekretno” journalist says. First, rights activists
pointed out that the MP plan not only duplicated existing functions but might
allow some officers involved in criminal activities to escape punishment by
controlling the investigation.
Second, because no one had yet been appointed
to command the MP system, there was no powerful voice even within the defense
ministry which could speak out on its behalf. And third, the replacement of
Serdyukov with Sergey Shoygu meant that the new minister was pleased to
dispense with the problems the earlier MP plans had created.
The only place where the MPs seemed
to be on track to have real authority was that everyone appeared to agree that
they should run punishment cells and disciplinary battalions. That could reduce
the amount of dedovshchina within those facilities, but it could also lead to
even worse treatment of soldiers if the MPs concluded they could act with
impunity.
Even for that function, the MPs will
be spread thin once the system takes off. “In many armies of the world, from
two to five percent of the total number of military personnel serve as MPs,”
Kruglov says. In Russia, that would mean between 20,000 and 50,000 men, vastly
more than anyone plans for now. Consequently, their role is largely going to be
“a fiction.”
What is especially disturbing, the “Sovershenno
sekretno” journalist says, is that the MP forces are not attracted the most ambitious
who will seek to do a good job and be promoted but by officers close to
retirement who see this force as “a safe haven” where they can spend their days
until leaving service.
According to experts with whom
Kruglov talked, Russia’s effort to form a modern MP force has so far failed,
something that was predictable because it followed “a bureaucratic and thus in
essence imitative path of development” rather than being genuinely concerned
about improving the country’s defense capabilities.
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