Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 21 – No issue is as sensitive
in Russian society as World War II, a conflict Russians call “The Great
Fatherland War,” and consequently no shift in its interpretation by senior
officials provides a better indication about the priorities and directions that
Moscow will pursue in the future.
Until Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech
in 1956 unmasking some of the crimes of Stalin, Soviet historians in lock step
followed the late dictator’s interpretation, one that laid all the blame for
the war on Germany and denied that Moscow by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and
other measures bore some measure of responsibility.
After Khrushchev’s speech and
especially during Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and afterwards, many Russian
historians explored Soviet involvement and even culpability for the conflict,
raising the question in the minds of some about the possible moral equivalence
of Stalin and Hitler and of their respective systems.
Under Vladimir Putin, such questions
are anathema, and yesterday, at a meeting of the Victory Committee, the Kremlin
leader effectively restored the Stalinist interpretation and ruled out any
questions in the future about Soviet complicity in the war, according to
US-based Russian historian Irina Pavlova (ivpavlova.blogspot.com/2017/04/blog-post_20.html#more).
The Stalinist interpretation, “the
truth,” in the words of Putin, must be insisted upon because it “holds together
society, serves as a spiritual and moral foundation for development, and helps people
of various generations feel themselves really a single cohesive nation,” a
position Pavlova labels as “Russian fundamentalism.”
At the same meeting in the Kremlin
yesterday, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin underscored why it is so
important for Moscow to insist on Stalin’s innocence: Any other position, he suggested,
opens the way to those who seek “to equate Nazi Germany, an aggressor country,
and the Soviet Union.”
Putin’s words thus complete the
consequences of the February 2014 Russian law against “the rehabilitation of
Nazism” (rg.ru/2014/05/07/reabilitacia-dok.html), a law which
made any independent research on the history of World War II a crime punishable
by law and thus put a straightjacket on historians in the Russian Federation.
But Putin’s words and Karasin’s
gloss show that this law is about more than domestic Russian affairs: it is
something that Moscow uses to attack anyone who suggests Stalin was culpable in
any way for the unleashing of World War II as being someone who is “restoring
Nazism.” To avoid such charges, all too
many in the West now avoid raising this issue.
And thus the promotion of this
interpretation, Pavlova argues, is “an ideal form for the broadening of Russian
influence on the international arena,” exactly what Stalin hoped and now Putin
hopes for. But as so often with the Kremlin, such “broadening” takes place only
when others are not willing to stand up for the truth.
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