Paul Goble
Staunton,
October 23 – Russia’s rush under Vladimir Putin toward authoritarianism and imperialism
in recent years should not have come as a shock to anyone, Vladislav Inozemtsev
says, because “Russia does not have the prerequisites need for positive changes”
in a different direction.
In
a presentation to the Russian diaspora in California, the Russian economist and
commentator says that Moscow’s aggressive policy toward its neighbors and the
world reflects not just Putin’s preferences but “the very logic of the formation
of Russia as an empire” (rusmonitor.com/v-rossii-net-predposylok-dlya-pozitivnykh-izmenenijj-vladislav-inozemcev.html).
Unlike
other European countries which had consolidated their statehood before building
empires, Inozemtsev says, “Muscovia at the time of the beginning of its
colonial expansion was only a borderland of the Kyivan state” and thus “Russia
as a state was formed as an empire ad this imperial identity replaced a
national one.”
Another
important factor holding Russia back is the enormous waves of emigration from
Russia over the last 200 years. Russians
thus prefer to change their individual fates by leaving rather than change
their country by remaining. That position is “quite logical” under the circumstances
for individuals but it works against the country as a whole.
Under
conditions when collective protest doesn’t have any chance for success, people
see the most effective means of achieving their goals” an individual approach
which involves “either emigration [for large numbers] or conformism [for even
more],” Inozemtsev continues.
At
the same time, he argues, immigration from the territories of the former Soviet
space has had a negative consequence for Russia’s development as well. Most of
those who have come from the now independent countries to Russia firmly support
the course of the powers that be in Moscow foreign or domestic.
The
drive for “imperial revenge,” Inozemtsev says, began under Boris Yeltsin who backed
separatism in Transdniestria, faked the outcome of the 1996 elections, and
talked about the “Russian” nature of Crimea and the Donbass throughout the 1990s.
These things didn’t just come out of nowhere once Putin became the Kremlin
leader.
Russian
attitudes today are a delayed reaction to perestroika, “’the fear of normality,’”
and a desire to return to the past, he suggests.
Indeed,
Inozemtsev says, “the existing political system [in Russia] lacks the resources
for democratization or for economic modernization.” “Modernization is possible where the
population and elites do not want a return to the past,” he adds. But in Russia today, “the past is being
idealized.”
Worse, Russian
elites are living off the wealth built up in the past or from natural
resources. They haven’t learned that they could earn even more from
modernization and show no signs that they are about to. Instead, they believe
that they are in the best of all possible worlds and work hard to suppress any
competition, exactly the reverse of what Russia needs.
“Of course,” the economist says, “this
will not last forever but one should not expet changes in the nearest future.
The system is horrible, corrupt and ineffective but despite that it has a large
reserve of strength. The majority of the population in Russia isn’t seeking serious
change.”
Thus, the most one
can say,” Inozemtsev suggests, is “that this system will collapse only when it
is completely exhausted. Sooner or later this will happen but it is important
to understand that Russia in the form in which we know it will not survive the
collapse of this system painlessly.”
What we can be certain of, he says,
is that “Putin will not go voluntarily” but instead simply seek ways to present
as “legitimate” his remaining in power for the rest of his life. Those may
range from the transformation of Russia into a parliamentary system or the
annexation of Belarus to make the union state a reality with the need for a “new”
president.
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