Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 10 – A major reason
Russians in the regions are furious at Moscow for viewing their territories as
nothing more than suitable sites for trash dumps is that many of them fear that
the country’s leadership is quite happy with a vision of Russia’s future in
which there will be 25 big cities surrounded by dumps and connected by
pipelines.
That vision is widespread and
reflects both the long-term emptying out of the Russian countryside and ever
more frequent talk in Moscow about “agglomerations” as the best way to organize
the country in the future (newsland.com/community/129/content/budushchee-rossii-25-aglomeratsii-ostalnoe-truboprovody-i-musornye-poligony/6710231).
There is just enough truth behind
this vision to convince many that it is the case or at least it is Moscow’s intention
– Newland has assembled maps showing the concentration of population in the big
cities and the rise in trash dumps everywhere else as well as commentaries promoting
these trends. As a result, ever more Russians fear Moscow doesn’t care about
them.
That sense of being ignored, of
being passed over, and of being slated for oblivion can be a more powerful
motivating force than almost anything as political developments in many
countries in recent years have shown. And it, more than anything else, is
changing the passivity of many in rural Russia into activism.
Whether this activism can be
sustained and connect with political leaders in the center remains to be seen,
but it is definitely a force capable of transforming the political system of
Russia in much the same way that traditionalist and anti-globalist forces have
in the United States and Western Europe.
And this trend raises the question
as to whether the future of politics in that country will feature a Russian
version of Donald Trump, someone who plays to the fears of those who think they
are held in contempt, are ignored and are left out of the elite’s vision of the
future, rather than to liberal opponents of the current regime or an even more
Stalinist leadership.
Vladimir Putin has on occasion
played to aspects of this anger, but he is now far more associated with those
who are acting in ways that generate it rather than reflect it. Consequently,
it is far more likely that someone else will pick up on the anti-intellectualism
that is the core of such complaints.
One of the criticisms of this
attitude made by Lenin and others on the left is that such populism focuses on
cultural questions and thus allows elites who exploit it to deflect the
attention of the lower classes away from their own economic oppression and thus
allow elites to exploit them all the more easily.
Such attitudes have a long tradition
in Russia. They are typically branded “Makhevism” from Jan Waclaw Machajski
(1866-1926), a Polish Marxist of anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. (See Paul
Avrich, “What is Makhaevism’?” Soviet
Studies, July 1965, online at theanarchistlibrary.org/library/paul-avrich-what-is-makhaevism.)
For a useful discussion of Machajski’s
writings in Russian, see Albert Parry’s introduction to Machajski’s writings
collected and republished as Umstvennyy
rabochy (New York, 1968); and for parallels between this trend in Russia and
developments in the West now, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/11/another-thing-putin-and-trump-share.html.
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